FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Illinois Court Assesses Factual Nature of Term “Reside” in Determining Duty to Defend

October 30, 2023 — James M. Eastham - Traub Lieberman
In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Guevara, 2023 IL App (1st) 221425-U, P2, the Illinois First District Court of Appeals addressed an insurance carrier’s duty to defend under a homeowners insurance policy. The underlying suit stemmed from an alleged injury suffered at a residence located in Berwyn, Illinois and owned by named insured Luz Melina Guevara, a defendant in the suit. After Guevara tendered the suit, State Farm filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Guevara because Guevara did not “reside” at the insured premises. The policy defined the "insured location" as the "residence premises," and residence premises was defined as "the one, two, three or four-family dwelling, other structures, and grounds or that part of any other building; where you reside and which is shown in the Declarations." In response to the underlying lawsuit, Guevara had filed an answer and affirmative defenses in which Guevara denied the allegation that "At all relevant times, [Guevara] resided in Berwyn, Cook County, Illinois." Guevara admitted that she owned the Berwyn property but denied that she "resided in, maintained and controlled the property". The declaratory judgment complaint alleged (among other things) that, based on admissions by Guevara in her answer, the Berwyn residence was not an "insured location" under the State Farm policy. State Farm moved for summary judgment at the trial court level on this ground and summary judgment was granted in State Farm’s favor. An appeal ensued wherein the parties disagreed as to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact that, under the language of the policy, State Farm had no duty to defend because the Berwyn property was not an "insured location" because she did not "reside" there. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of James M. Eastham, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Eastham may be contacted at jeastham@tlsslaw.com

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A Trivial Case

November 07, 2022 — Garret Murai - California Construction Law Blog
Construction defect cases leading to physical injury are rarely trivial, at least in the eyes of the injured party, but alas sometimes they are as the next case, Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach, 81 Cal.App.5th 749 (2022), demonstrates. The Nunez Case Monica Nunez, Vice President of Finance and Accounting at a restaurant chain and a part-time fitness instructor at a gym, tripped and fell on a public sidewalk in Redondo Beach. Ms. Nunez, who was in her forties, tripped following a group run when her back foot hit a sidewalk slab that was elevated at its highest point approximately 11/16 inches. Ms. Nunez landed on her left knee and right arm and in the process fractured her kneecap and elbow. Ms. Nunez sued the City of Redondo Beach for her injuries alleging causes of action for dangerous conditions on public property under Government Code section 835, nuisance under Government Code section 815.2, and failure to perform a mandatory duty under Government Code section 815.6. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Nomos LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@nomosllp.com

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Water Leak Covered for First Thirteen Days

April 11, 2018 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The Florida Court of Appeals recently held the policy's exclusion for repeated water seepage over a period of fourteen days or more does not exclude loss caused by the seepage for the first thirteen days. Hicks v. Am. Integrity Ins. Co. of Florida, 2018 Fla. App. LEXIS 2616 (Fla. Ct. App. Feb. 23, 2018). Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Continuous Injury Trigger Applied to Property Loss

January 07, 2015 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that the Wisconsin appellate courts would apply the continuous injury trigger to find coverage after the policy expired for damage caused by water infiltration. Strauss v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. App LEXIS 21794 (7th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014). The insureds built their home in 1994. They purchased coverage for their home from Chubb. Coverage was in place from October 1994 through October 2005. The policy stated that coverage was limited "only to occurrences that take place while this policy is in effect." "Occurrence" was defined as "a loss or accident to which this insurance applies occurring within the policy period. Continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions unless excluded is considered to be one occurrence." In October 2010, the insureds discovered that water infiltration had been causing damage within the building envelope of the home. The infiltration was ongoing, beginning around the time of original construction and continuously occurring with each subsequent rainfall. Chubb denied coverage because the damage was not discovered during any of their policy periods. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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A “Supplier to a Supplier” on a California Construction Project Sometimes Does Have a Right to a Mechanics Lien, Stop Payment Notice or Payment Bond Claim

October 01, 2014 — William L. Porter - The Porter Law Group
For purposes of seeking payment on a construction related project in the California construction industry, the proper legal classification of the party seeking payment is of key importance. Whether one in contract with a prime contractor is a subcontractor or a material supplier determines the availability for mechanics’ liens, stop payment notices and payment bond claims. Generally, those in contract with subcontractors have the ability to assert mechanics liens, stop payment notices and payment bond claims against the owner, general contractor and/or sureties. On the other hand, those who supply materials to material suppliers are generally not entitled to assert a mechanics lien, stop payment notice or payment bond claim. The “rule” has generally been stated as: “A supplier to a supplier has no lien rights.” However, this rule is not always true. The proper classification of an entity as either a subcontractor or a material supplier can be difficult. Simply because a prime contractor hires a licensed contractor to furnish labor, materials, equipment or services on a project does not mean that the party hired is actually a “subcontractor” as a matter of law. Conversely, even though a material supplier may not have a contractors’ license, he may still be classified as a subcontractor based on his scope of work. Based on recent case law, the method of determining whether an entity is a subcontractor or a material supplier has been clarified. The classification will depend on the scope of work that the hired party actually agreed to perform on the project. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of William L. Porter, The Porter Law Group
Mr. Porter may be contacted at bporter@porterlaw.com

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Contract Change #1- Insurance in the A201 (law note)

April 11, 2018 — Melissa Dewey Brumback – Construction Law in North Carolina
Insurance– everyone needs it; everyone would just as soon not have to deal with it. I get it, I do. Attorneys, Insurance Agents– no one likes spending time with those folk! Good news though. The changes to the A201 mean that you may end up spending less time with both! The most important change to the Insurance requirements of the AIA contract is that most of it has moved to a new Exhibit. Why is this important? Instead of having to send the entire contract to your agent or broker, you can now send them only the section that they really need to review for compliance. This also means that if insurance policies change (as they surely will), the entire contract document does not need to be re-written– the Exhibit can be updated accordingly, leaving the rest of the A201 alone. Nice, right? This change was made to streamline insurance review and provide for that flexibility of the changing insurance market. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLC
Ms. Brumback may be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com

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Patagonia Will Start Paying for Homeowners' Solar Panels

October 15, 2014 — Caroline Winter – Bloomberg Businessweek
Patagonia plans to use state and federal tax credits to invest $13 million in the construction of solar panels on 1,000 homes in Hawaii, turning the eco-conscious retailer into the financial backer of a green electrical utility. With the announcement on Wednesday, Patagonia hopes companies across America will follow suit with similar efforts. “Any U.S. public or private company who pays their fair share of taxes can use this strategy to speed up the development of new energy infrastructure,” Rose Marcario, Patagonia’s chief executive, said in an interview. “And they can make money doing it and create jobs.” Patagonia is joining forces with a tiny solar-financing company, Kina’ole Capital Partners, as well as a local Hawaiian bank to create a $27 million fund to pay for rooftop installation and upkeep. Starting in Hawaii makes sense because of its abundant sunshine and sky-high electrical rates; Hawaiians currently pay three times the U.S. average for electricity. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Caroline Winter, Bloomberg Businessweek
Ms. Winter may be contacted at cwinter10@bloomberg.net

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Homeowners Must Comply with Arbitration over Construction Defects

January 06, 2012 — CDJ STAFF

The California Court of Appeals has upheld a decision by the Superior Court of Kern County that homeowners must comply with arbitration procedures in their construction defect claim. The California Court of Appeals ruled on December 14 in the case of Baeza v. Superior Court of Kern County, denying the plaintiff’s petition that the trial court vacate its order.

The plaintiffs in the case are homeowners in various developments built by Castle & Cook. The homes were sold with a contract that provided for “nonadversarial prelitigation procedures, including mediation, and judicial reference.” The homeowners made defect claims and argued that Castle & Cooke failed to comply with statutory disclosure requirements and that some of the contracts violate related statutes.

The appeals court found that there was no ground for appeal of the lower court’s order to continue with prelitigation procedures. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not seek a review of the mediation until a judgment was issued, but that then the issue would be moot. The court felt that there were issues presented that needed clarification, and so they reviewed this case. This was cleared for publication.

The court considered the intent of the legislature in passing the Right to Repair Act, noting that “under the statutory scheme, the builder has the option of contracting for an alternative nonadversarial prelitigation procedure,” as established in Chapter 4. The court noted that Chapter 4 “contains no specifics regarding what provisions the alternative nonadversarial contractual provisions may or must include.”

The plaintiffs contended that the builder was in violation of the standards set out in Section 912, however the court responded that these sections set out one set of procedures, but they concluded that “if the Legislature had intended the section 912 disclosure provisions…it could have made the requirements applicable to all builders by locating them in a section outside Chapter 4.”

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