Seventh Circuit Remands “Waters of the United States” Case to Corps of Engineers to Determine Whether there is a “Significant Nexus”
July 10, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog On June 27, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided the case of Orchard Hill Building Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. The Court of Appeals vacated the decision of the District Court granting the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) motion for summary judgment dismissing the Orchard Hill Building Company’s (Orchard) complaint that the Corps’ jurisdictional determination erroneously found that the waters at issue were “jurisdictional waters” under the Clean Water Act (CWA) subject to the Corps’ jurisdiction. Acknowledging that the Corps and EPA had promulgated a new rule re-defining “waters of the United States” in 2015—which is now being challenged in the courts—the Court of Appeals noted that this case is controlled by the pre-2015 definition of “waters of the United States.” The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the Corps, directing it to determine if there was a significant nexus, as required.
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Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLPMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
New Law Impacting Florida’s Statute of Repose
June 29, 2017 —
Meredith N. Reynolds & K. Stefan Chin – Peckar & Abramson, P.C.On June 14, 2017, Governor Scott signed House Bill 377 into law, clarifying that Florida’s ten-year
Statute of Repose commences either when the work is completed or when final payment becomes
due, whichever is latest. The new law resolves a problem for contractors created by a recent Florida
court ruling that held the Statute of Repose to commence as late as when the owner made final
payment. The applicable amendments to Florida Statute Section 95.11 take effect on July 1, 2017
and apply to all causes of action that accrue on or after that date.
Perhaps the most critical component of a construction professional’s risk management program is
the length of time that it is liable for the work performed on a project. While contractual warranty
periods typically run one or two years from substantial completion, the true length of a contractor’s
post-completion obligation is measured by the “Statute of Repose,” which establishes the period of
time following the completion of construction that a lawsuit can be filed for construction defects.
Reprinted courtesy of
Meredith N. Reynolds, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
K. Stefan Chin, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Ms. Reynolds may be contacted at mreynolds@pecklaw.com
Mr. Chin may be contacted at kschin@pecklaw.com
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Top Developments March 2024
April 22, 2024 —
Complex Insurance Coverage ReporterCLAIMS-MADE COVERAGE
Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot. LLC, 2024 Del. LEXIS 68 (Del. Feb. 26, 2024)
Delaware Supreme Court concludes that a letter from a lawyer informing an insured of possible lawsuits without identifying potential plaintiffs or demanding payment is not a “claim for damages” within the meaning of claims-made CGL and umbrella liability policies. Citing case law from Delaware and other jurisdictions, it reasoned that, in the ordinary sense, a “claim for damages” (which the policies did not define) is “a demand or request for monetary relief by or on behalf of an identifiable claimant.” According to the court, the letter in question did not meet this definition because it did not identify any claimants “except in the vaguest terms” or request monetary relief on any claimant’s behalf, but rather communicated only a threat of future litigation. As a result, the letter was not a claim made before the policy periods at issue.
POLLUTION EXCLUSION
Wesco Ins. Co. v. Brad Ingram Constr., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 1488 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2024)
A divided Ninth Circuit panel, applying California law, holds that a pollution exclusion* in a CGL policy does not preclude a duty to defend an underlying suit alleging physical injury from exposure to “clouds of toxic dust” deposited in the environment by a wildfire and released during clean up efforts. Citing MacKinnon v. Truck Ins. Exch., 73 P.3d 1205 (Cal. 2003), the majority explained that determining whether a “pollution event” (i.e., “environmental pollution”) resulting in excluded injury has occurred involves consideration of “the character of the injurious substance” and whether the exposure resulted from a “mechanism specified in the policy.” It concluded that a potential for coverage (and, therefore, a defense obligation) existed because, although wildfire debris may be considered a “pollutant” in certain circumstances, the mechanism alleged in the underlying complaint – “expos[ure] . . . to clouds of toxic dust during the loading and unloading of [the underlying plaintiff’s] truck” – did not clearly constitute an “event commonly thought of as pollution.”
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White and Williams LLP
Subcontractor Not Liable for Defending Contractor in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals has ruled on January 9, 2012 in Hensel Phelps Construction Company v. Urata & Sons Cement, upholding the judgment of the lower court.
Hensel Phelps was the general contractor for a high-rise in Sacramento. They were sued by the owners of the building after problems were discovered in the concrete slabs of the building’s parking garage. Instead of welded steel wire mesh, the slabs had been constructed with fiber mesh. Hensel Phelps filed a cross-complaint against Urata Cement, the subcontractor that had performed the cement work. Urata refused to defend Hensel Phelps. The owners’ case was subsequently dismissed due to the statute of limitations.
Although the original case was over, Hensel Phelps continued in their claims against Urata. “Urata argued that a handwritten interlineation required Hensel Phelps to prove Urata was at fault for the injury alleged in the building owners’ complaint before Urata was obliged to defend Hensel Phelps in that action.”
The lower court concluded that Urata would have been obligated to defend Hensel Phelps if the owners’ lawsuit had alleged that the damage was due to the subcontractor’s work or if evidence at trial established this. The lower court found neither of these true. Instead, the use of the fiber mesh was a design issue and “that decision was outside the scope of the subcontractor’s work.”
During the trial, Hensel Phelps conceded that Urata was not at fault. The appeals court could find no reading of the contract that would cause Urata to be obligated to defend Hensel Phelps, calling Hensel Phelps’s reading of the contact as “grammatically infeasible.”
Judges Nicholson, Raye, and Butz upheld the decision of the lower court and awarded costs on appeal to Urata.
Read the court’s decision…
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Illinois Appellate Court Address the Scope of the Term “Resident” in Homeowners Policy
April 11, 2022 —
James M. Eastham - Traub LiebermanIn Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Cheekati, 2022 IL App (4th) 210023, the 4th District Court of Appeals for the State of Illinois addressed whether the term “resident” in a homeowners policy included a tenant leasing the insured premises. The Insureds owned property which was insured through Farmers under a homeowner’s policy. Unable to sell the property, the Insureds entered into a two-year lease agreement with a tenant. Several months after entering into the lease agreement, the tenant allegedly sustained physical injuries inside of the rented premises when a staircase collapsed. The tenant sued the Insureds and the matter was tendered to Farmers. Thereafter, Farmers denied coverage based on an exclusionary provision in the homeowner’s policy. Specifically, the policy contained a "Liability Exclusions" section, which provided:
"Coverage E (Personal Liability) *** and personal injury coverage, if covered under this policy, do not apply to: Any insured or other residents of the residence premises. We do not cover bodily injury or personal injury to: (a) any insured; or (b) any resident of the residence premises, whether resident in the dwelling or a separate structure." (Emphases in original.)
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James M. Eastham, Traub LiebermanMr. Eastham may be contacted at
jeastham@tlsslaw.com
White House Proposal Returns to 1978 NEPA Review Procedures
November 15, 2021 —
Karen C. Bennett - Lewis BrisboisWashington, D.C. (October 15, 2021) - The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has requested comments, by November 22, 2021, on proposed revisions to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations. The proposal is Phase I in a two-phased approach that will eventually undo a final rule, effective September 2020, that updated NEPA regulations to reflect decades of agency experience and caselaw interpreting the 1969 Act.
Phase I proposes to reinstitute 1978 definitions for key terms used to determine the scope of review and the range of alternatives required when undertaking any major federal action. Phase II is expected to be an extensive rewrite of the 2020 regulations to incorporate climate change and environmental justice objectives. Businesses with projects, now or in the future, that require federal authorizations will need to pay close attention to these regulatory revisions.
The 2020 update rule intended to scale back the time and cost of producing NEPA analyses by focusing agency resources on evaluating effects that are within the agency’s ability to control and studying only those alternatives that would meet the project purpose. CEQ’s proposal eliminates these efficiencies.
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Karen Bennett, Lewis BrisboisMs. Bennett may be contacted at
Karen.Bennett@lewisbrisbois.com
Washington, DC’s COVID-19 Eviction Moratorium Expires
August 23, 2021 —
Zachary Kessler, Amanda G. Halter & Adam Weaver - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThroughout the COVID-19 pandemic, federal and local governments have adopted varying moratoria on evictions, enacted as emergency legislative protections for tenants facing eviction. The federal moratorium on eviction, promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), is set to expire on July 31. While the Supreme Court recently left the moratorium in place, the Court signaled that it would likely be held unconstitutional if extended and challenged again. With the sole federal moratorium expiring, state and local protections may remain in effect; however, many of these local orders are also beginning to expire. Washington, DC’s eviction moratorium, one of the most tenant-friendly pieces of emergency legislation in the country, is one such example, beginning a phaseout process that allows the pace of evictions to slowly begin throughout 2021 before a final legislative sunset in February 2022.
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Council of the District of Columbia and Mayor Muriel Bowser enacted a series of public health emergency legislation. Under the Coronavirus Omnibus Emergency Amendment Act of 2020, the Council put a pause on evictions for nonpayment of rent or violations of lease provisions, prohibiting landlords from filing a complaint to evict a tenant who detained “possession of real property without right” or whose “right to possession has ceased.” Under the moratorium, the Council effectively banned residential evictions, unless a court found that a tenant had performed an “illegal act” within the rental unit, that the tenant was causing undue hardship on the health, welfare, and safety of other tenants or neighbors, or that the tenant had abandoned the premises. The moratorium and other tenant-protections were initially set to remain in place indefinitely, expiring 60 days after the end of Mayor Bowser’s declared COVID-19 emergency period.
Reprinted courtesy of
Zachary Kessler, Pillsbury,
Amanda G. Halter, Pillsbury and
Adam Weaver, Pillsbury
Mr. Kessler may be contacted at zachary.kessler@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Halter may be contacted at amanda.halter@pillsburylaw.com
Mr. Weaver may be contacted at adam.weaver@pillsburylaw.com
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Motion to Dismiss Insurer's Counterclaim for Construction Defects Is Granted
June 29, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court granted the insured's motion to dismiss the insurer's counterclaim arising out of construction defects. Centrex Homes v. Zurich Specialties London Limited, et al., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77212 (D. Nev. May 19, 2017).
Centrex, the general contractor, was sued by homeowners in a residential development known as Liberty Hill Estates. The suit alleged that defective work had been performed by Centrex's subcontractors, one of which was Valley Concrete Company, Inc. The insurer had issued a policy to Valley and Centrex was an additional insured. The insurer agreed to defend, but only paid a portion of the defense fees and costs because the policy only covered Centrex as to liability arising from Valley's work. The insurer refused to pay defense costs incurred prior to March 28, 2012 the date of notice of claims arising from Valley's work.
Centrex then filed suit against the insurer alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The insurer filed a counterclaim seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend. The insurer claimed that Centrex failed to cooperate by unilaterally switching counsel without prior notification to the insurer. This deprived the insurer of the right to control the defense and discharged the insurer's obligations under the policy. Centrex moved to dismiss the counterclaim.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
