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DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Conn. Appellate Court Overturns Jury Verdict, Holding Plaintiff’s Sole Remedy for Injuries Arising From Open Manhole Was State’s Highway Defect Statute

June 14, 2021 — Christy Jachimowski - Lewis Brisbois
Section 13a-149 of the Connecticut General Statutes, commonly known as Connecticut’s highway defect statute, provides that claims arising from injuries or damages to people or property resulting from a defective road or bridge can be asserted against a party responsible for maintaining that road or bridge. Conn. Gen. Stat. §13a-149. The statute also extends to sidewalks and further provides that written notice of an alleged injury must be given to a defendant municipality within ninety days of the injury. Recently, in Dobie v. City of New Haven, 2021 Conn. App. LEXIS 162 (App. Ct. May 1, 2021), the Connecticut Appellate Court overturned the trial court’s denial of a municipal defendant’s post-trial motion to dismiss. The court held that even though the plaintiff attempted to assert allegations of negligence against the defendant municipality, Connecticut’s highway defect statute was the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. Since the plaintiff failed to meet the requisite notice requirements, pursuant to the statute, the Appellate Court held that the trial court erred in denying the municipality’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Underlying Case In February of 2013, Plaintiff William Dobie filed suit against the City of New Haven alleging injuries and damages as a result of the negligence of a City of New Haven snowplow operator. Dobie’s claims arose from an incident that occurred on January 21, 2011, in which he was driving behind the City snowplow driver, who was in the process of plowing snow from a municipal street located in New Haven, Connecticut. As the defendant employee was operating his snowplow, he knocked off a manhole cover, causing Dobie’s vehicle to drive over the open manhole. Dobie claimed personal injuries as a result of his vehicle dropping into the open manhole, including injuries to his jaw. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christy Jachimowski, Lewis Brisbois
Ms. Jachimowski may be contacted at Christy.Jachimowski@lewisbrisbois.com

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The Flood Insurance Reform Act May be Extended to 2016

April 07, 2011 — Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFF

The Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2011 (H. R. 1309) has been referred to the House Committee on Financial Services—the first step in the legislative process. The bill, if passed, would extend the program to September 30, 2016. It is currently slated to be terminated September 30 of this year. The bill also contains changes to premium rates, mapping protocols, and privatization initiatives.



H. R. 1309 has garnered the support of several Insurance organizations. Leigh Ann Pusey, president and CEO of the American Insurance Association (AIA), sent a letter of support to the Chair and Ranking member of the House Financial Services Subcommittee. “AIA has advocated for a long term reauthorization of the NFIP to protect consumers and help increase stability for real estate transactions and policyholders,” Pusey said. “AIA believes the five-year extension contained in HR 1309, will provide certainty in the flood program thereby increasing consumer and business confidence in the NFIP.”



Jimi Grande, senior vice president of federal and political affairs for the National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) spoke out in support of the bill. “For the NFIP to survive, the prices for flood insurance must reflect the actual costs of flood risk for a property,” Grande said. “HR 1309 will provide that transparency. In addition, the Technical Mapping Advisory Council will give communities a voice in the flood mapping process, fostering a better understanding of what flood maps represent and how they are made.”



Read H. R. 1309... 
Read the American Insurance Association statement... 
Read the NAMIC Press Release...

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Negligent Failure to Respond to Settlement Offer Is Not Bad Faith

May 03, 2017 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The Ninth Circuit found that the insurer's negligent failure to respond to a settlement offer did not constitute bad faith. McDaniel v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4029 (9th Cir. March 7, 2017). McDaniel was the assignee of claims against GEICO assigned by the insured after settling a wrongful death suit. McDaniel alleged that GEICO unreasonably refused to accept a $100,000 policy limits offer. The case went to trial and a jury awarded McDaniel over $3 million against the insured. On August 7, 2009, McDaniel's attorney Steven Nichols extended a $100,000 policy limits settlement offer with a fifteen day acceptance deadline to GEICO's attorney Michael Griott. The parties subsequently agreed to extend the acceptance deadline to ten days following MacDaniel's service of responses to outstanding interrogatories, which Nichols hand-delivered to Griott on August 27, 2009. On September 1, 2009, Griott emailed GEICO claims adjuster Aldin Buenaventura with a letter attachment indicating that Nichols had submitted the requested interrogatories and, in bold and underlined text, that "[o]ur response to Plaintiff's policy limits demand is due on or before September 11, 2009. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Nevada Supreme Court Declares Subcontractor Not Required to Provide Pre-Litigation Notice to Supplier

September 24, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
According to the Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLP blog on Construction Law, even though the Nevada Revised Statutes Annotated (NRS) Chapter 40 requires a general contractor “to provide pre-litigation notice (followed by an opportunity to repair) to a subcontractor or supplier the general contractor believes to be responsible” for the issue prior to filing suit, the Nevada Supreme Court “determined that NRS Chapter 40 imposes no such requirement upon a subcontractor.” In Barrett v. Eighth Judicial District Court, “the court reasoned that ‘while the statutes’ and, indeed, chapter’s purpose is, in part, to allow defendants an initial opportunity to repair, the Legislature chose to carry out that purpose in the manner provided by the statutes, and [the Supreme Court] will not read into the statutes a notice requirement between a subcontractor and another subcontractor or supplier where none exist.’” Read the court decision
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Is Your Construction Business Feeling the Effects of the Final DBA Rule?

June 04, 2024 — Nathaniel Peniston - Construction Executive
The Biden administration’s final rule “Updating the Davis-Bacon and Related Acts Regulations” took effect on Oct. 23, 2023. In “the first comprehensive regulatory review in nearly 40 years,” the Department of Labor has returned to the definition of “prevailing wage” it used from 1935 to 1983—before Microsoft released the first Windows operating system. Construction industry leaders must be aware that this is the most comprehensive review and overhaul of the act in 40 years; with it, the DOL has attempted to modernize its approach to wage creation and fringe benefit allocation. There are more than 50 procedural changes to the act, which means it is very important for contractors to be aware of wage classifications when bidding, performing work on Davis-Bacon Act projects and using applicable fringe dollars for bona fide benefits. UNDERSTANDING THE CHANGES Some of the critical adjustments included in the final rule that contractors should be aware of include: Wage determination changes during a project: Historically, contractors could rely on the wage determinations used to win a project for the life of the project. However, the final rule now requires the contractor to use current wage determinations when a contract is changed or extended. The DOL “proposed this change because—like a new contract—the exercise of an option requires the incorporation of the most current wage determination.” Reprinted courtesy of Nathaniel Peniston, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved. Read the court decision
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Mr. Peniston may be contacted at npeniston@fbg.com

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Showdown Over Landmark Housing Law Looms at U.S. Supreme Court

October 01, 2014 — Greg Stohr – Bloomberg
Over the past four decades, U.S. courts have ruled that plaintiffs making discrimination claims under the Fair Housing Act don’t have to prove intentional bias. Civil rights advocates simply have to show that lenders, insurers, developers or government agencies acted in ways that had a “disparate,” or unequal, impact on minority groups. Now, the Supreme Court is weighing whether to hear an appeal from Texas officials who argue that intent to discriminate must be proven and that the “disparate impact” standard is too loose an interpretation of the landmark 1968 law that prohibited discrimination in housing. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Greg Stohr, Bloomberg
Mr. Stohr may be contacted at gstohr@bloomberg.net

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Allegations That COVID-19 Was Physically Present and Altered Property are Sufficient to Sustain COVID-19 Business Interruption Suit

May 24, 2021 — Michael S. Levine & Joseph T. Niczky - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
On Wednesday, a federal judge in Texas denied Factory Mutual’s Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the plaintiffs adequately alleged that the presence of COVID-19 on their property caused covered physical loss or damage in the case of Cinemark Holdings, Inc. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Co., No. 4:21-CV-00011 (E.D. Tex. May 5, 2021). This is the third COVID-19-related business interruption decision from Judge Amos Mazzant since March, but the first in favor of a policyholder. Taken together, the three decisions have two key takeaways and provide a roadmap for policyholders in all jurisdictions. First, the Cinemark decision recognizes that the alleged presence of COVID-19 viral particles that physically altered the policyholder’s property is sufficient under federal pleading standards and controlling state law. In its motion, FM relied on Judge Mazzant’s recent decision in Selery Fulfillment, Inc. v. Colony Insurance Co., No. 4:20-CV-853, 2021 WL 963742 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2021), which dismissed a lawsuit alleging that the policyholder’s losses were caused by government orders that closed its business, rather than from the actual presence of the virus on its property. The Court held that government orders alone do not constitute physical loss or damage, and declined to rule on whether the physical presence of the virus does. Judge Mazzant reached the same conclusion weeks later in Aggie Investments, L.L.C. v. Continental Casualty Co., No. 4:21-CV-0013, 2021 WL 1550479 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 20, 2021). Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Joseph T. Niczky, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com Mr. Niczky may be contacted at jniczky@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
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California Supreme Court Adopts Vertical Exhaustion for Long-Tail Claims

June 15, 2020 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
In another round of litigation involving coverage issues between Montrose Chemical Corporation and its insurers, the California Supreme Court ruled in favor of Montrose, adopting vertical exhaustion of excess policies. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Calif. v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 9 Ca. 5th 215 (2020). In 1990, the United States and the State of California sued Montrose for contamination from 1947 to 1982 caused by Montrose's facility manufacturing insecticides. Montrose had primary and excess liability policies from defendant insurers between 1961 and 1985. Forty insurers collectively issued more than 115 excess policies, which collectively provided coverage sufficient to indemnify Montrose's anticipate total liability. Primary coverage was exhausted. Each excess policy provided that Montrose had to exhaust the limits of its underlying coverage before there would be excess coverage. Which excess carrier could be called on first was the issued before the California Supreme Court. Montrose proposed a rule of "vertical exhaustion" or "elective stacking," whereby it could access any excess policy once it exhausted other policies with lower attachment points in the same policy period. The insurers, in contract, argued for "horizontal exhaustion," whereby Montrose could access an excess policy only after it exhausted other policies with lower attachment points from every policy period in which the environmental damage resulting in liability occurred. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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