Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Hawaiian Electric Finalizes $2 Billion Maui Fire Settlement

November 18, 2024 — Mark Chediak - Bloomberg
Hawaiian Electric Industries formalized a $2 billion agreement to settle damage claims from a wildfire that razed the historic town of Lahaina and killed more than 100 people. The utility-owner had reached a tentative agreement in August in which it, along with other defendants including the state of Hawaii, Maui County and landowners, would pay $4 billion to resolve hundreds of lawsuits stemming from last year’s wildfire, according to a filing Tuesday. The settlements don’t resolve claims with insurers that are part of separate lawsuits. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Mark Chediak, Bloomberg

After the Fire, Should Some Parts of Los Angeles Never Rebuild?

January 28, 2025 — Akshat Rathi - Bloomberg
The fires in and around Los Angeles are coming under control. The city’s mayor has already issued an executive order to speed up rebuilding. But equally catastrophic blazes are likely to strike again on a hotter planet, raising the question of whether some parts of the region should still be considered livable. It’s not an unthinkable notion. There have been a handful of attempts at systematically moving populations away from regions severely affected by climate change. This kind of “managed retreat” has typically been applied to risks from rising sea levels, with recent programs in the US involving relocating tribal populations in Alaska and Washington. But people affected by wildfires are only just starting to see efforts from governments to help them to move away from high-risk areas, including in LA county. A California program launched last year that offered up to $350,000 in loans to those affected by fires in 2018 and 2020 to shift to safer places fully allocated its funds within weeks. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Akshat Rathi, Bloomberg

An Obligation to Provide Notice and an Opportunity to Cure May not End after Termination, and Why an Early Offer of Settlement Should Be Considered on Public Works Contracts

August 17, 2020 — Jeff Kaatz - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
In 2015, the City of Puyallup (“City”) and Conway Construction Company (“Conway”) executed a public works contract for road improvements (“Project”). On March 9, 2016, approximately four months after work started on the Project, the City issued Conway a notice of suspension and breach of contract and identified nine defective and uncorrected work and safety concerns. Conway denied any wrongdoing, and on March 25, 2016, the City issued a notice of termination for default and withheld payments due to Conway. Conway subsequently filed suit in Pierce County Superior Court and alleged the City’s termination for default breached the contract and sought a determination that the City’s termination for default was improper and should be deemed a termination for convenience. Conway sought approximately $1.25 million in damages and recovery of its attorney fees and costs. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court found the City breached the contract and awarded Conway damages, attorney fees, and costs. The City appealed.[1] On appeal, after affirming the trial court’s determination that the City improperly terminated Conway, the Court of Appeals considered two other issues raised by the City. First, whether the City was entitled to a set-off for replacing defective work discovered after Conway was terminated. Second, whether Conway is entitled to attorney fees if it did not make the statutorily required offer of settlement per RCW 39.04.240. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Jeff Kaatz, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight
Mr. Kaatz may be contacted at Jeff.Kaatz@acslawyers.com

Not Everything is a Pollutant: A Summary of Recent Cases Supporting a Common Sense and Narrow Interpretation of the CGL's Pollution Exclusion

October 26, 2020 — Philip B. Wilusz & Jeffrey J. Vita - Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Those of us who suffered through law school are familiar with the argument that there are fundamental rules applicable to contract interpretation and that a certain contract language interpretation would “swallow the rule.” However, insurance companies have long advocated for an interpretation of the CGL policy’s pollution exclusion that would “swallow the coverage” that the insureds thought they were purchasing. Insurers have successfully argued in several states that the pollution exclusion’s definition of “pollutant” should be read literally, and be applied to any “solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irritant or contaminant including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals, and waste.” As anyone with children can attest to, the range of items and substances that can be considered an “irritant” is limitless. The logical extent of the insurer’s interpretation brings to mind the high school student who, for his science fair project, convinced his fellow students to ban “dihydrogen monoxide.”1 Citing evidence such as the fact that everyone who has ever died was found to have consumed “dihydrogen monoxide,” he convinced them of the dangers of . . . water. Similarly, an overly expansive reading of the definition of “pollutant” could lead to the absurd result of even applying it to ubiquitous harmless substances such as water. The pollution exclusion, therefore, has run amok in many states and has allowed insurers to avoid liability for otherwise covered claims. Fortunately, insureds in many states have successfully argued that the pollution exclusion is subject to a more limited interpretation based on several different theories. For example, some courts have agreed that the pollution exclusion, as initially introduced by the insurance industry, should be limited to instances of traditional environmental pollution. Others have held that the exclusion is ambiguous as to its interpretation. The reasonable expectations of the insureds do not support a broad reading of the defined term “pollutant.” Below, this article addresses a number of recent decisions that have adopted a pro policyholder interpretation of the pollution exclusion. As with most insurance coverage issues, choice of law clearly matters. Reprinted courtesy of Philip B. Wilusz, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and Jeffrey J. Vita, Saxe Doernberger & Vita Mr. Wilusz may be contacted at pbw@sdvlaw.com Mr. Vita may be contacted at jjv@sdvlaw.com Read the court decision
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10 Haight Lawyers Recognized in Best Lawyers in America© 2022 and The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch 2022

September 20, 2021 — Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Three Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys were selected for Best Lawyers in America© 2022.

Bruce Cleeland – Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
Peter Dubrawski – Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
Denis Moriarty – Insurance law

Seven Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys were selected for Best Lawyers®: Ones to Watch 2022.

Courtney Arbucci – Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants; Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
Frances Brower – Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
Kyle DiNicola – Transportation Law
Arezoo Jamshidi – Appellate Practice
Jonna Lothyan – Appellate Practice
Kristian Moriarty – Transportation Law
Bethsaida Obra-White – Construction Law; Insurance Law; Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants

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Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP

Illinois Supreme Court Limits Reach of Implied Warranty Claims Against Contractors

April 10, 2019 — Thomas Cronin - Gordon & Rees Construction Law Blog
In a recent decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a purchaser of a newly constructed home could not assert a claim for breach of the implied warranty of habitability against a subcontractor where the subcontractor had no contractual relationship with the purchaser. Sienna Court Condo. Ass’n v. Champion Aluminum Corp., 2018 IL 122022, ¶ 1. The decision overruled Minton v. The Richards Group of Chicago, which held that a purchaser who “has no recourse to the builder-vendor and has sustained loss due to the faulty and latent defect in their new home caused by the subcontractor” could assert a claim of a breach of the warranty of habitability against the subcontractor. 116 Ill. App. 3d 852, 855 (1983). In Sienna Court Condo. Ass’n, the plaintiff alleged that the condo building had several latent defects which made individual units and common areas unfit for habitation. 2008 IL 122022 at ¶ 3. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that privity should not be a factor in determining whether a claim for a breach of the warranty of habitability can be asserted. Id. at ¶ 19. The Court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that claims for a breach warranty of habitability should not be governed by contract law but should instead be governed by tort law analogous to application of strict liability. Id. The Court reasoned that the economic loss rule, as articulated in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 91 (1982), refuted the plaintiff’s argument that the implied warranty of habitability should be covered by tort law. 2008 IL 122022 at ¶ 20. Under the economic loss rule, a plaintiff “cannot recover for solely economic loss under the tort theories of strict liability, negligence, and innocent misrepresentation.” National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d at 91. The Court explained that the rule prevented plaintiffs from turning a contractual claim into a tort claim. 2008 IL 122022 at ¶ 21. The Court further noted that contractual privity is required for a claim of economic loss, and an economic loss claim is not limited to strict liability claims. Id. Because the plaintiff’s claim was solely for an economic loss, it was a contractual claim in nature; therefore, the Court concluded that “the implied warranty of habitability cannot be characterized as a tort.” Id. at ¶ 22. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Thomas Cronin, Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani
Mr. Cronin may be contacted at tcronin@grsm.com

California Condo Architects Not Liable for Construction Defects?

May 13, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
Law360 reported that attorneys for the architects of a San Francisco, California condominium complex told the California Supreme Court that the designers “can’t be held liable for construction defects that caused units to overheat” and urged “the panel to reverse a lower court's ruling that the architects owed a duty of care to the condos’ buyers.” The California appeals court ruling was based on California’s Right to Repair Act, however, “that law doesn’t apply to condo conversions.” The architects argued that since Beacon was “designed and originally rolled out as rental apartments before the units were sold as condos” the Right to Repair Act doesn’t apply. However, Beacon Residential Community Association’s attorney Robert Riggs of Katzoff & Riggs “argued that the architects had a ‘cradle to grave’ involvement in the development of the Beacon.” Riggs stated, “They designed a very large building with essentially no ventilation system, along with windows that don't open.” According to Law360, “[t]he justices took the arguments under submission and did not indicate which way they would rule.” Read the court decision
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Arbitrator May Use Own Discretion in Consolidating Construction Defect Cases

September 01, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The Mississippi Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC v. Sea Breeze I, LLC. Sea Breeze contracted with Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC (HBSA) to design a condominium complex, which would be built by Roy Anderson Corporation. All parties agreed to arbitration.

Subsequently, Sea Breeze alleged defects and sought arbitration against the architectural firm and started a separate arbitration proceeding against the contractor. The special arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitrators Association determined that it would be proper to consolidate the two actions “since they arose from a common question of fact or law.” HBSA filed in chancery court seeking injunctive relief and a reversal of the decision. Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson filed a motion to compel the consolidated arbitration.

The court noted that the special arbitrator “established that the contract between Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson expressly allowed for consolidation of the two cases.” Further, the arbitrator “concluded that HBSA expressly agreed to consolidation by written consent through its 2008 letter, through which it insisted upon Roy Anderson’s involvement ‘in any mediation and/or arbitration.’”

The court concluded that the chancery court “did not have the power to fulfill HBSA’s request.” The court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment.

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FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES