What’s in a Name? Trademarks and Construction
April 25, 2022 —
Carol Wilhelm and J.P. Vogel - Construction ExecutiveEvery company, no matter the industry, relies on its name and reputation to develop customers and generate revenue. Think about the brands that dominate American culture such as Nike, Wal-Mart, Amazon or McDonald’s, then imagine those businesses without the ability to adequately protect their names, slogans and logos. No doubt the vultures would circle and brand power would most likely become short lived or otherwise diluted to the point of non-existence. The construction industry is not exempt, and the industry leaders benefit from identifiable names and logos, built over years of reputation and brand building. While the tools necessary to protect your company’s brand exist at the state and federal level, many business owners or leaders are unfamiliar with the trademark process and unaware of the consequences of not utilizing those tools.
Trademark Registration
Trademarks are “concise and unequivocal identifiers” that provide potential customers with essential information about your business. With a single word, tagline, logo, color—essentially anything that can carry meaning—potential customers learn to associate particular product or service characteristics and expected quality level with a particular source. That is, your mark is the way that consumers connect your expertise and reputation to your business and nobody else’s. It serves a critical role in reducing consumer search costs and capturing your hard-earned business opportunities.
Reprinted courtesy of
Carol Wilhelm and J.P. Vogel, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
Mr. Vogel may be contacted at jpvogel@grayreed.com
Ms. Wilhelm may be contacted at cwilhelm@grayreed.com
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Contractual Waiver of Consequential Damages
January 21, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesContractual waivers of consequential damages are important, whether they are mutual or one-sided. I believe in specificity in that the types of consequential damages that are waived should be detailed in the waiver of consequential damages provision. Standard form construction agreements provide a good template of the types of consequential damages that the parties are agreeing to waive.
But, what if there is no specificity in the waiver of consequential damages provision? What if the provision just states that the parties mutually agree to waive consequential damages or that one party waives consequential-type damages against the other party? Let me tell you what would happen. The plaintiff will argue that the damages it seeks are general damages and are NOT waived by the waiver of consequential damages provision. The defendant, on the other hand, will argue that the damages are consequential in nature and, therefore, contractually waived. FOR THIS REASON, PARTIES NEED TO APPRECIATE WHAT DAMAGES ARE BEING WAIVED OR LIMITED, AND POTENTIALLY THOSE DAMAGES NOT BEING WAIVED OR LIMITED, WHEN AGREEING TO A WAIVER OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES PROVISION!
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David Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
California Court Forces Insurer to Play Ball in COVID-19 Insurance Coverage Suit
December 13, 2022 —
Latosha M. Ellis & Yosef Itkin - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogOne of the threshold issues in COVID-19 insurance coverage cases that have been brought across the country is whether the policyholder’s allegations meet the applicable pleading standard in alleging that the virus caused physical loss or damage. In many cases, the courts have gotten it wrong, effectively holding policyholders to a higher standard than required. But recently, a California federal judge righted those wrongs by acknowledging the correct pleading standard in that case, which is whether the allegations state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). The Court, here, correctly recognized that the policyholder, the Los Angeles Lakers, met that pleading standard when it alleged that the COVID-19 virus can cause physical loss or damage by physically altering property.
In its complaint, the Los Angeles Lakers alleged that the virus physically altered its property by changing its chemical and physical property conditions, creating viral vectors that required remedial measures before the property was safe again. Los Angeles Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 591 F. Supp. 3d 672 (C.D. Cal. 2022), adhered to on reconsideration, 2022 WL 16571193 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2022). The Court agreed that these allegations by the Lakers adequately pled physical alteration to support a claim for property damage. The insurer requested reconsideration of the decision, and the Court emphatically affirmed its prior decision, explaining its rationale as follows:
The Court lacks the scientific expertise necessary to conclude, based solely on the allegations in the FAC . . . that it is not plausible for the Lakers’ property to have been physically altered by the Virus, which the Lakers adequately alleged. Consequently, the Court, in the March 17 Order, concluded that the Lakers’ theory was plausible. Whether the Lakers can actually prove its theory will be determined at summary judgment or trial.
Reprinted courtesy of
Latosha M. Ellis, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Yosef Itkin, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Ms. Ellis may be contacted at lellis@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Itkin may be contacted at yitkin@HuntonAK.com
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New Defendant Added to Morrison Bridge Decking Lawsuit
March 26, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Morrison Bridge in Multnomah County, Oregon, has added a new company to their lawsuit regarding problems with the slip-resistant FRP decking, according to The Oregonian. The county has already named the installer, the supplier, and the manufacturer. Now, they have added Hardesty & Hanover, LLP, the company “that contracted with the decking manufacturer to provide engineering and design for the project.”
The Oregonian reported that “the county has identified a construction design professional who can testify that Hardesty & Hanover made errors that contributed to the Morrison Bridge's damage,” according to the amended complaint.
First, Conway construction (the deck installer) filed suit against the decking manufacturer and supplier. Then, the “county inserted itself into the suit last fall,” stated The Oregonian, and “is seeking more than $2 million to repair or replace the decking, plus damages.” A trial is scheduled for February 2015.
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The (Jurisdictional) Rebranding of The CDA’s Sum Certain Requirement
April 15, 2024 —
Jordan A. Hutcheson and Stephanie Rolfsness - Watt TiederThe Contract Disputes Act (the “CDA”), 41 U.S.C.A. §§ 7101 et seq., which has provided the statutory framework for resolution of most contract disputes between the federal government and its contractors since 1978, has recently been the subject of changes in judicial interpretation, despite no corresponding statutory changes. The CDA’s implementing provisions in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), require that contractors submit a claim to the government in the form of written demand to a contracting officer requesting a final decision and seeking the payment of money in a sum certain prior to pursuing resolution via board or court. However, with respect to the sum certain requirement, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in late 2023 determining that this requirement “should not be given the jurisdictional brand” as it has categorically received in the past. Rather, the court concluded that the sum certain requirement is merely an element of a claim for relief under the CDA that a contractor must satisfy to recover. This rebranding does not debase the sum certain requirement, but it does indicate a renewed focus on what constitutes “jurisdictional” in government contracts litigation.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jordan A. Hutcheson, Watt Tieder and
Stephanie Rolfsness, Watt Tieder
Ms. Hutcheson may be contacted at jhutcheson@watttieder.com
Ms. Rolfsness may be contacted at srolfsness@watttieder.com
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2018 Legislative Changes Affecting the Construction Industry
June 06, 2018 —
Melinda S. Gentile - Peckar & AbramsonThe 2018 Florida Legislative Session recently concluded and a number of important construction-related House Bills (HB) and Senate Bills (SB) were presented during the Session. Florida Governor Rick Scott has 15 days to act on the legislation once each Bill has passed the House and Senate. Bills signed by the Governor go into effect on July 1, 2018, unless indicated otherwise. These Bills may impact General Contractors and Construction Managers in a number of ways, not the least of which is the period of time that a cause of action may be initiated for the design, planning or construction of an improvement.
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Melinda Gentile, Peckar & AbramsonMs. Gentile may be contacted at
mgentile@pecklaw.com
Does a Landlord’s Violation of the Arizona Residential Landlord-Tenant Act Constitute Negligence Per Se?
September 21, 2020 —
Kevin J. Parker - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIn a recent Arizona Court of Appeals case, Ibarra v. Gastelum, 2020 WL 4218020 (7/23/20), the Court of Appeals addressed the question whether – in a tenant’s personal injury claim against the landlord – a landlord’s violation of the Arizona Landlord-Tenant Act constituted negligence per se. The tenant alleged he was injured by stubbing his toe on a crack in the floor. The tenant alleged that he had made repeated demands that the landlord repair the crack. The statute required the landlord to make all repairs and do whatever is necessary to put and keep the premises in a fit and habitable condition. The tenant argued that a violation of the statute constituted negligence per se, meaning that the violation of the statute satisfied (as a matter of law) the first two elements of a negligence claim – duty and breach of duty. The tenant requested a negligence per se jury instruction. The trial court declined that request and refused to give the requested instruction. The tenant lost the jury trial and appealed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Kevin J. Parker, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Parker may be contacted at kparker@swlaw.com
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California Trial Court Clarifies Application of SB800 Roofing Standards and Expert’s Opinions
February 18, 2020 —
Scott Calkins & Anthony Gaeta - Collinsworth, Specht, Calkins & Giampaoli; Mark Chapman - Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.Collinsworth, Specht, Calkins & Giampaoli partners Scott Calkins and Anthony Gaeta obtained a trial victory when the jury returned a 12-0 defense verdict against one plaintiff homeowner, and awarded the other homeowner less than $2,000, an amount well below the defendant’s pre-trial CCP 998 Offers to Compromise. One of the main issues in the case was the application of SB800 roofing standards. Plaintiffs’ roofing expert testified in deposition no water entered the structure or passed through a moisture barrier [Civ. Code §896(a)(4)], and no materials had fallen off the roof [§896(g)(11)]. In an attempt to circumvent the applicable performance standards, Plaintiffs argued Civ. Code §869(g)(3)(A), also known as the ‘useful life’ exception, applied because the various components of the roof (nailing pattern, tiles, vents, etc.) were installed in such a manner so as to reduce the useful life of the roof. Following pre-trial motions and objections made during Plaintiffs’ direct examination, the Court ruled Section 896(g)(3)(A) did not apply to a conventional roof, as it is not a “manufactured product” as defined in §896(g)(3)(C). Plaintiffs’ roofing claims were summarily dismissed and Plaintiffs’ expert was prevented from testifying.
In contrast, the defense expert, Mark Chapman, was allowed to testify regarding his expert opinions as to the appropriate SB800 standard relative to each alleged defect and whether the standards were violated. The SB800 performance standards were included on the jury verdict form, and the jury found Mr. Chapman’s testimony compelling, which was a substantial factor in awarding only minor damages to one Plaintiff.
For more information, contact
Scott Calkins (scalkins@cslawoffices.com),
Anthony Gaeta (ageta@cslawoffices.com) or
Mark Chapman (mchapman@berthowe.com).
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