A Court-Side Seat: Permit Shields, Hurricane Harvey and the Decriminalization of “Incidental Taking”
May 31, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThis is a brief review of some of the significant environmental (and administrative law decisions) released the past few weeks.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
On April 22, 2021, the Court decided two important administrative law cases: Carr, et al. v. Saul and AMG Capital Management v. Federal Trade Commission.
Carr, et al. v. Saul
In this case, the constitutionality of Social Security Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) hearing disability claims disputes was at issue. More precisely, were these ALJs selected in conformance with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution? A similar issue was litigated in the case of Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission. There, the Court held that many of the agency’s ALJs were not selected in conformance with the Appointment’s Clause. Here, the Court held that this issue could be decided by the courts without compelling the litigants to first exhaust their administrative remedies. Thousands of ALJs are employed by the federal government, and it may take some time to resolve this question for every agency.
AMG Capital Management v. Federal Trade Commission
In this case, the court held, unanimously, that the Commission does not presently have the authority to employ such equitable remedies as restitution or disgorgement.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Real Estate & Construction News Roundup (5/1/24) – IMF’s Data on Housing, REITs Versus Private Real Estate, and Suburban Versus Urban Office Property Market
May 28, 2024 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogIn our latest roundup, apartment sales fall for seventh straight quarter, raising real estate capital proves challenging, aspiring homeowners face strong obstacles, and more!
- Rent increases have softened across the U.S. over the last year, and the combination of high home prices, elevated mortgage rates and low housing inventory creates strong obstacles for aspiring homeowners. (Alex Gailey, Bankrate)
- The housing market is showing innovative efforts to combat the inventory crisis with initiatives including repurposing commercial properties into residential units. (Angel Smith, Yahoo)
- Apartment sales fell for the seventh straight quarter in Q1, dropping 25% year over year to $20.6 billion. (Leslie Shaver, Multifamily Dive)
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Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Lease-Leaseback Battle Continues as First District Court of Appeals Sides with Contractor and School District
August 17, 2017 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogEarlier, we wrote about Davis v. Fresno United School District (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 261, a Fifth District California Court of Appeals decision that sent shock waves through the school construction industry and raised questions regarding the use of California’s lease-leaseback method of project delivery (Education Code sections 17400 et seq.).
California’s lease-leaseback method of project delivery provides an alternative project delivery method for public school districts than the usual design-bid-build method of project delivery. Under the lease-leaseback method of project delivery, a school district leases its property to a developer, who in turn builds a school facility on the property and leases it back to the school district. One of the benefits of the lease-leaseback method of project delivery is that school districts do not need to come up with construction funds to build school facilities since they pay for the construction over time through their lease payments to the developer. Critics, however, argue that because lease-leaseback projects do not need to be competitively bid, they are ripe for cronyism between developers and school districts.
In Davis, a taxpayer successfully brought suit against the Fresno Unified School District challenging the propriety of a lease-leaseback project because the entirety of the District’s “lease payments” occurred while the project was being constructed and thus, successfully argued the taxpayer, there was no “true” lease of a facility since it was under construction.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
RCW 82.32.655 Tax Avoidance Statute/Speculative Building
August 29, 2018 —
Scott R. Sleight - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC BlogWith land prices increasing, developers are looking for opportunities to save on development costs, including cost saving tax strategies. Thus, we have seen increasing interest in development strategies that offer tax savings. One strategy is speculative building: Owners of property who self-perform construction avoid sales tax and B&O tax on the self-performed scope. See Blog Article Posted April 9, 2013, titled What Is A Speculative Builder? In addition, the Department of Revenue has provided an explanation of speculative building.
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Scott R. Sleight, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Sleight may be contacted at
scott.sleight@acslawyers.com
Contract Terms Can Impact the Accrual Date For Florida’s Statute of Repose
October 19, 2017 —
William L. Doerler - White and Williams LLPWhen the validity of a construction defect claim depends on whether the claim is barred by the applicable state’s statute of repose, it is important to review the statute to identify when claims subject to the statute of repose accrue. In Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 219 So.3d 93 (Fla. Ct. App. (5th Dist.) 2017), the Court of Appeals of Florida clarified the accrual date for the statute of repose in cases where the accrual date depends on a construction contract’s completion date. Pursuant to Busch, the date of full performance under the contract, not the building’s purchase closing date, is the date on which claims accrue.
In Busch, Timothy Busch (Busch), pursuant to a Purchase and Sale Agreement, contracted to have Lennar Homes build him a house. Nearly ten years after closing on the home, Busch served Lennar Homes with a notice of construction defects, as required by Florida’s right-to-repair act. Shortly thereafter, but more than 10 years after the home’s closing date, Busch filed suit against Lennar Homes, alleging that there were multiple construction defects associated with the home. Lennar Homes, relying on Florida’s statute of repose, Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(c), filed a motion to dismiss Busch’s complaint.
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
How a Maryland County Created the Gold Standard for Building Emissions Reduction
May 24, 2021 —
Pam McFarland - Engineering News-RecordMontgomery County, Md. is generating significant buzz among U.S. municipalities aiming to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from buildings.
Reprinted courtesy of
Pam McFarland, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
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Construction Defect Risks Shifted to Insurers in 2013
December 11, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFRecent court decisions have tended to view construction defects as covered under insurance policies, “allowing construction companies to shift the costs of their faulty workmanship to their insurers, thereby reversing the previous public policy trend against coverage for such claims.” John Husmann and Adam Fleischer of Bates Carey Nicolaides review some of the 2013 decisions that reversed “the previous public policy trend against coverage for such claims.”
They note that “for some time, courts have recognized that there is a public policy against allowing construction companies to get paid to perform faulty workmanship, and then force their insurers to be the financers for the repair and replacement costs.” But in 2013, the courts “strayed from those public policy considerations upon which previous decisions relied.”
With reference to specific cases and decisions, they discuss three ways in which the courts have change course. The first is whether faulty workmanship is an “occurrence.” The next is if faulty workmanship is covered when it damages non-faulty work of the same project. And finally, whether exclusions for particular parts of the property extend to the work done in that area.
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