Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Can Businesses Resolve Construction Disputes Outside of Court?
August 19, 2024 —
Scott L. Baker - Los Angeles Litigation BlogTime is of the essence in any construction project. So, if a dispute arises at any point, business owners generally wish to avoid the chance of a time-consuming case going to court.
Can California construction businesses
manage these disputes effectively outside of court? It is possible in some cases. Business owners should carefully consider these three steps.
1. Go Back to the Contract
Even if the contract is at the center of the dispute, it is important to refer to any details regarding dispute resolution included within the document. It is common for contracts to have some form of a dispute resolution clause. In such a case, both parties should follow the steps outlined in that agreement.
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Scott L. Baker, Baker & AssociatesMr. Baker may be contacted at
slb@bakerslaw.com
The Benefits of Incorporating AI Into the Construction Lifecycle
December 23, 2024 —
Ian Warner - Construction ExecutiveInterest in artificial intelligence has been spreading like wildfire over the past few years. AI is not a new term for Trimble, which has been capturing and leveraging construction data for decades. From hardware to software, the field to the office or among stakeholders, harnessing and making meaning out of data is the crux of Trimble’s business. Generative AI is simply a new set of tools that provide a richer narrative around data, making it more insightful and actionable.
As a company that helps connect stakeholders across the entire construction lifecycle—design, construction and operations/ maintenance—AI has been woven in and leveraged across a number of Trimble solutions to help contractors do more with less, while also giving them greater decision-making power and the ability to focus on other key challenges.
While the use cases for AI are diverse and ever-changing, below are a few key areas where Trimble has doubled down on AI, with the goal of making contractors’ jobs less cumbersome and repetitive, safer and more capable of being upskilled—efforts which will only continue to grow in the coming years.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ian Warner, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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A Court-Side Seat: Clean Air, Clean Water, Citizen Suits and the Summer of 2022
November 01, 2022 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThis is a selection of significant environmental and regulatory law cases decided by the federal courts after the Supreme Court’s 2021 Term concluded.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit
National Association of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications Commission
On July 12, 2022, the DC Circuit held that an order of the FCC requiring radio broadcasters to follow a prescribed five-step process to verify the identity of program sponsors was not authorized by the Communications Act. According to the court, the FCC “decreed a duty that the statute does not require, and that the statute does not empower the FCC to impose.” Here, the agency failed to identify the statutory authority it needed to authorize the issuance of such an order. While certainly not as significant as the Supreme Court’s ruling in West Virginia v. EPA, decided only a few days before this decision was released, it is a strong reminder that the courts want to know if a challenged rule is authorized by law.
Humane Society of the U.S., et al., v. U.S. Department of Agriculture
On July 22, 2022, the court decided a case involving the steps the Administrative Procedure Act and the Federal Register Act require to be taken before a final agency rule is legally promulgated. Customarily, when there has been a change in Presidential administrations, the incoming administration “quietly” withdraws rules awaiting Federal Register publication without much ceremony. The majority of this panel agreed that public notice should have been provided to the regulated community to comment on the new administration’s action to pull back a new rule which had been made available for public inspection before Federal Register publication that would have strengthened the protections afforded “show horses,” as now required by law. The court noted that “it seems clear that filing with the Federal Register constituted promulgation of a regulation even though publication may not occur until a later date.” Circuit Judge Rao filed a strong dissent. “By cutting off agency discretion at public inspection, the majority imposes judicial burden on agency procedures that conflicts with circuit precedent, the statutory framework and a longstanding regulation permitting withdrawals prior to publication.” There could be a further review of this unique ruling.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Design Firm Settles over Construction Defect Claim
July 31, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFA Pennsylvania township has announced that it has reached a settlement with the architectural firm that designed its administration building. Cee Jay Frederick Associates will be paying than $1.05 million to settle claims of defects in the design of the building.
West Whiteland’s administration building was completed in July 2007. The first leaks were noticed in November and December 2008. In response, the township stopped payments to the contractor, Magnum, Inc. Magnum sued, claiming that their work was not to blame for the leaks. Magnum joined the township in suing the design firm.
Although Cee Jay Frederick Associates will be paying the township to settle the claim, West Whiteland will be paying $75,000 of that back to the firm to settle outstanding bills that had been withheld during litigation.
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Proposed Bill Provides a New Federal Tax Credit for the Conversion of Office Buildings
September 06, 2021 —
Emily K. Bias & Brittany Griffith - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogAt the end of July 2021, a bill was introduced in the House and Senate, which, if enacted, would create a federal tax credit to fund the conversion of unused office buildings into residential, commercial, or mixed-use properties. The Revitalizing Downtowns Act (S. 2511), which is modeled after the federal historic rehabilitation tax credit, would provide a federal tax credit equal to 20 percent of “qualified conversion expenditures” with respect to a “qualified converted building.”
A “qualified converted building” means any building that (i) was nonresidential real property for lease to office tenants, (ii) has been “substantially converted” from an office use to a residential, retail, or other commercial use, (iii) in the case of conversion to residential units, is subject to a state or local affordable housing agreement or has at least 20 percent of the units rent restricted and set aside for tenants whose income is 80 percent or less of area median gross income, (iv) was initially placed in service at least 25 years before the beginning of conversion, and (v) may be depreciated or amortized.
Reprinted courtesy of
Emily K. Bias, Pillsbury and
Brittany Griffith, Pillsbury
Ms. Bias may be contacted at emily.bias@pillsburylaw.com
Ms. Griffith may be contacted at brittany.griffith@pillsburylaw.com
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First Circuit Finds No Coverage For Subcontracted Faulty Work
December 17, 2024 —
Eric Hermanson & Austin Moody - White and Williams LLPAfter almost two years' deliberation, the First Circuit last week issued its long-awaited decision in Admiral Ins. Co. v. Tocci Bldg. Corp.[1]: affirming on other grounds, and leaving in place a district court decision that found subcontracted faulty work was not an "occurrence" and did not lead to covered “property damage” under Massachusetts law.
The decision leaves Massachusetts among a number of states where general contractors should not expect coverage from their commercial general liability (CGL) insurers for damage falling within the contractor’s scope of work.
Since the "scope of work" – where general contractors are involved – often encompasses an entire project, contractors who want coverage in Massachusetts should take care to make alternative arrangements: transferring risk to subcontractors through indemnity provisions and additional-insured endorsements, or relying on other policy forms where available.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric Hermanson, White and Williams LLP and
Austin Moody, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Moody may be contacted at moodya@whiteandwilliams.com
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Corrective Action Protest Grounds for GSA Schedule Federal Construction Contractors
September 09, 2024 —
Marissa L. Downs - The Dispute ResolverA contract awarded, protested, terminated, appealed, then reinstated. It’s no secret that federal construction procurements are plagued with uncertainty. From delays, constructive suspensions, compromised supply chains, the litigation-laden critical path method, and the mandate for all construction materials used in federally funded projects for infrastructure to be produced in the United States under the Build America, Buy America Act (BABAA) (to name just a few traditional and emerging favorites), just one of these issues could fill the rest of anyone’s month with substantive research. To add one more, which is entirely unique to bid protests, federal contractors–including construction contractors–listed in a General Service Administration (GSA) Schedule may have new grounds to have a contract award reinstated that was terminated by a federal agency pending a GAO decision.
GAO Protest
An initial GAO protest filed by Deloitte & Touche LLP (Deloitte) argued that the National Geo-Spatial Intelligence Agency (Agency) wrongfully made an award to Kearney & Company, P.C. (Kearney) when the Agency: (1) improperly evaluated quotes; and (2) failed to conduct a proper best-value tradeoff analysis. At issue was a competed task order with Kearney under a GSA FSS multiple-award contract. Before the GAO issued an opinion, however, it held an unrecorded predictive-outcome conference with Deloitte and Kearney where the only mutual consensus was the likely ineligibility of all offerors for the relevant award. The Agency subsequently elected to take corrective action, terminating Kearney’s contract award for convenience, amending the solicitation to avoid issues (including undisputed issues) addressed in the GAO protest. After the Agency adopted their corrective action, the GAO protest was dismissed as academic and moot.
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Marissa L. Downs, Laurie & Brennan, LLPMs. Downs may be contacted at
mdowns@lauriebrennan.com
