Be Strategic When Suing a Manufacturer Under a Warranty with an Arbitration Provision
October 02, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesI’ve said this before, and I’ll say it again: arbitration is a creature of contract. If you don’t want to arbitrate, don’t agree to an arbitration provision as the means to resolve your dispute. Now, with that said, there are times you may not have a choice. An arbitration provision in a warranty from a manufacturer of a product is an example. If you are procuring the product, you are agreeing to the terms of the express warranty. Manufacturers are not negotiating their product warranty on a case-by-case basis considering they are not typically the ones selling the product directly to the end user. This does not mean that is a bad thing. It just means if you elect to sue the manufacturer directly for an alleged product defect or under the terms of the warranty, you should read the warranty and consider the strategic aspect that suing the manufacturer will have on your case.
In SICIS North America, Inc. v Sadie’s Hideaway, LLC, 48 Fla.L.Weekly D1581c (Fla. 1st DCA 2023), an owner elected to sue a tile manufacturer, a general contractor, the architect, and a window and door company. One of the arguments the owner raised was that exterior tiles installed were defective. The tiles were procured by the general contractor. The owner sued the general contractor under various theories and sued the tile manufacturer for breaches of warranty and negligence. The general contractor asserted a crossclaim for indemnification against the tile manufacturer. The tile manufacturer moved to compel the owner’s claim and the general contractor’s crossclaim to arbitration since there was an arbitration provision in the warranty documents and the general contractor’s indemnification claim arose from that transaction. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the appellate court reversed:
First, because [the owner] was suing [the tile manufacturer] based upon the written warranty, it was bound by the arbitration provision contained in [the general contractor’s] agreement with [the tile manufacturer]. As the Florida Supreme Court has explained, “[W]hen a plaintiff sues under a contract to which the plaintiff is not a party . . . we will ordinarily enforce an arbitration clause contained in that contract, absent some other valid defense. . . .” . [The owner] had no valid defense against arbitration, a fact which it apparently realized when it voluntarily dismissed its express warranty claim after the notice of appeal and initial brief were filed.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Construction Litigation Roundup: “Too Soon?”
July 02, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyNot at all, said the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a case dealing with the timing of filing of a claim for indemnity.
In the case, a Louisiana intermediate appellate court had earlier ruled in very short order on a supervisory writ application (reversing the trial court) that a claim for indemnity (based upon an indemnity clause in a construction contract) was “premature” until a “determination that damages are actually owed and the indemnitee sustains a loss. … At this time, the lawsuit is still pending against [the putative indemnitee], and no determination of liability had been made; thus, there is no obligation for indemnity and defense costs. … Stated differently, indemnity (or reimbursement) is not available at this time because [the indemnitee] has not discharged a liability which [the indemnitor] should have assumed or otherwise suffered any loss or damages. … Accordingly, [the] cause of action for indemnity and defense is not ripe for adjudication.” Bennett v. Demco Energy Servs., LLC, 2023-0581 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/11/23); 2023 La. App. LEXIS 1449.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
California Mediation Confidentiality May Apply to Third Party “Participants” Retained to Provide Analysis
November 02, 2017 —
Tony Carucci - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogCalifornia Evidence Code section 1119 governs the general admissibility of oral and written communications generated during the mediation process. Section 1119(a) provides that “[n]o evidence of anything said or any admission made
for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . is admissible or subject to discovery, and disclosure of the evidence shall not be compelled, in any . . . civil action . . . .” Cal. Evid. Code § 1119(a) (emphasis added). Similarly, section 1119(b) bars discovery or admission in evidence of any “writing . . . prepared
for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, a mediation . . . .” Cal. Evid. Code § 1119(b) (emphasis added). Finally, section 1119(c) provides that “[a]ll communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between
participants in the course of a mediation . . . shall remain confidential.” Cal. Evid. Code § 1119(c) (emphasis added).
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Tony Carucci, Snell & WilmerMr. Carucci may be contacted at
acarucci@swlaw.com
General Contractor Intervening to Compel Arbitration Per the Subcontract
December 06, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIt is not uncommon that a general contractor’s subcontract will include an arbitration provision. Or it will allow the general contractor to select binding arbitration as the method to resolve disputes at the general contractor’s SOLE OPTION. A general contractor’s subcontract should absolutely give the general contractor this important right. (Keep this in mind when drafting dispute resolution provisions for a general contractor.)
It is also not uncommon for a subcontractor the sue a general contractor’s payment bond surety, and NOT the general contractor. One reason to do this is to create an argument to avoid the dispute resolution provision in the subcontract. (Another reason is to avoid any pay-if-paid defense.) When this occurs, a general contractor may still want to arbitrate the subcontractor’s payment bond dispute and a way to do so is for the general intervene in the lawsuit and move to compel arbitration. Sometimes, it is even practical for the general contractor to immediately initiate the arbitration process against the subcontractor, particularly if the general contractor wants to assert a counterclaim, so that the motion to compel is supported by the formal demand for arbitration (and filed with the American Arbitration Association or other body administering the arbitration). I have done this on a number of occasions.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Insurance Law Client Alert: California Appeals Court Refuses to Apply Professional Services Exclusion to Products-Completed Operations Loss
March 19, 2014 —
Valerie A. Moore and Chris Kendrick - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn North Counties Engineering v. State Farm (No. A133713, filed 3/13/14), State Farm insured an engineering company under CGL insurance that had a professional services exclusion and included products-completed operations (PCO) coverage. The owner of the engineering company, NCE, contracted with a winery to construct a dam and associated works. Also on the project was the owner's son, who had his own construction company, NCD. There were multiple contracts, both oral and written, variously naming one company or the other. The evidence later showed that the father performed hands-on work for the project.
After completion, the winery was sued over sediment and erosion caused by the dam. State Farm denied coverage on the ground that the professional services exclusion applied, as well as a mistaken belief that the policy had no PCO coverage. State Farm then changed its position and agreed to defend, but only going forward. The insured sued State Farm over past defense fees, alleging breach of contract and bad faith. The case went to trial and after testimony detailing State Farm's claim handling, the trial judge granted a nonsuit, finding that the professional services exclusion barred all coverage:
"[I]f you look at the pleadings, the legal pleadings and the contracts, the NCE role is, as the engineering company, the support company, and that company was overseeing the [sic] NCD to make sure that whatever they did was done right.... NCE is the expert on the job, the professional providing professional services, design and construction, and also overseeing the work of NCD, the son’s business, which is doing more of the physical activity.... That takes professional expertise and I think all of what Mr. Akerstrom did was professional.... It was this professional work, and not 'something incidental to their professional involvement' that gave rise to the underlying actions. In this situation, it’s not a malpractice or E and O policy. It’s a business policy, which has good benefits, but is subject to the professional services exclusion."
Reprinted courtesy of
Valerie A. Moore and
Chris Kendrick of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com; Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
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The Great Fallacy: If Builders Would Just Build It Right There Would Be No Construction Defect Litigation
January 21, 2015 —
David McLain – Colorado Construction LitigationAs the 2015 Colorado legislative session gets into full swing, there is a lot of anticipation and discussion regarding this year’s construction defect reform bill. It seems like every time a reporter broaches this issue in an article, there is a quote from a plaintiffs’ attorney stating that if builders would just build homes right, there would be no need for construction defect litigation. This is the sentiment expressed in the site www.BuildOurHomesRight.com.
The problem with this argument is that it assumes that the “construction defects” for which associations sue are those only that affect the performance of the homes, or are likely to affect the performance of the homes during the useful life of the component at issue. Unfortunately, this is simply not the case. Over the years, the plaintiffs’ bar has stacked the deck, so to speak, making actionable every technical building code violation, regardless of whether it has any impact, or will ever likely have any impact, on the performance of the homes involved.
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David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Clean Water Act Cases: Of Irrigation and Navigability
January 06, 2020 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe federal courts have recently decided two significant Clean Water Act (CWA) cases: State of Georgia, et al. v. Wheeler, where the US District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held that the 2015 rulemaking proceeding of EPA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers redefining the term “Waters of the United States” in the CWA violated the Act as well as the Administrative Procedure Act; and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s Associations, et al. v. Glaser, where the appeals court ruled that the lower court erroneously interpreted a CWA NPDES permitting exception involving agricultural return flows.
An Absence of Navigability: State of Georgia, et al. v. Wheeler
Decided on August 21, 2019, the district court, one of the few courts to grapple with the rule’s compliance with the CWA and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), held that the agencies’ redefinition of the terms “Interstate Waters,” “Tributaries” and “Adjacent Waters” violated the CWA by reading “navigability” out of the new definitions, or by failing to adhere to the Supreme Court’s rulings in the 2005 case of Rapanos v. United States, in particular Justice Kennedy’s concurrence regarding the application of the “significant nexus” in case-by-case adjudications as to whether a particular body of water was covered by the Act. Moreover, some provisions of the rule conflicted with the APA because they were not a logical outgrowth of the rules proposed by the agencies in 2014, and on which they solicited comments, and other determinations were not supported by a reasonable explanation. In addition, without a clear statement from Congress that it supported the rule’s effect of increasing the nature and extent of enhanced federal jurisdiction over waters subject to the CWA, the court was loathe to approve the rule. Accordingly, the rule was remanded to the agencies for additional review consistent with this decision.
This decision is of particular importance as it may well be the first case to subject this new EPA rule—the linchpin of much of EPA’s regulation under the CWA—to extended review. (Other courts have only been asked to enjoin the rule, which involves a different type of review.)
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Surprising Dismissal of False Claims Act Case Based on Appointments Clause - What Does It Mean?
October 15, 2024 —
Steven H. Lee - Lewis Brisbois NewsroomAtlanta, Ga. (October 1, 2024) - In a surprising turn of events, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida recently dismissed a False Claims Act (FCA) lawsuit brought by relator Clarissa Zafirov against Florida Medical Associates, LLC, and other defendants. U.S. District Judge Kathryn Kimball Mizelle
ruled that the FCA’s qui tam provisions, which allow private individuals to bring lawsuits on behalf of the government, violate the Constitution’s Appointments Clause.
This decision follows another unexpected ruling by U.S. District Judge Aileen Cannon in the Southern District of Florida, where the court similarly dismissed an indictment against former President Donald Trump based on the same constitutional clause.
At the heart of these rulings is the argument that FCA relators - who decide whom to sue, which legal theories to pursue, and how to proceed - exercise significant executive authority. Because they are not appointed by the President, a department head, or a court, the judges concluded that these relators hold their positions unconstitutionally. As a result, Judge Mizelle dismissed the case entirely.
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Steven H. Lee, Lewis BrisboisMr. Lee may be contacted at
Steven.Lee@lewisbrisbois.com
