Tokyo Building Flaws May Open Pandora's Box for Asahi Kasei
October 28, 2015 —
Kathleen Chu, Joji Mochida & Katsuyo Kuwako – BloombergJapanese real estate investment trusts are joining apartment owners and regulators in pushing Asahi Kasei Corp. for answers on an apartment building sagging sideways on the outskirts of Tokyo, as concerns are mounting that it may not be an isolated case.
REITs including Advance Residence Investment, Nippon Accommodation Fund Inc., Daiwa House Residential Investment Corp. and Japan Rental Housing Investment Inc. have all asked Asahi Kasei for details on what other buildings might be flawed, according to the trusts. Asahi Kasei disclosed on Thursday the names of prefectures where the company has undertaken work in the past 10 years on more than 3,000 buildings, after the land ministry requested the data. The sites include 342 schools, 257 medical and health-care facilities, 696 housing complexes and 217 office buildings, the firm said.
Asahi Kasei, the subcontractor of the project, said a unit didn’t properly install foundation piles at an apartment building in Yokohama, and the division falsified data on the work. The scandal has sent Asahi Kasei’s shares down more than 21 percent since Oct. 13, when news of the flawed building first emerged. Shares of Sumitomo Mitsui Construction Co., the contractor, plunged 25 percent and those of Mitsui Fudosan Co., which sold units at the Yokohama project in 2006, have tumbled 5 percent since then. All three companies said that the impact of the incident on their earnings is not yet clear.
Reprinted courtesy of Bloomberg reporters
Kathleen Chu,
Joji Mochida and
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Wisconsin Supreme Court Abandons "Integrated Systems Analysis" for Determining Property Damage
September 12, 2023 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Wisconsin Supreme Court departed from its previous mechanism for determining property damage under the "integrated systems analysis" and found the insurers were not entitled to summary judgment as determined by the trial court. 5 Walworth, LLC v. Engerman Contracting, Inc., 2023 Wis. LEXIS 152 (Wis. June 20, 2023).
5 Walworth LLC hired Engerman as general contractor to construct a swimming pool complex. Engerman subcontracted with Downes Swimming Pool Co., Inc. to construct the pool complex. Otto Jacobs supplied Downes with a ready-mixed concrete called shotcrete, commonly used in swimming poll construction.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Class Action Certification by Association for “Matters of Common Interest”
August 24, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesAssociations have authority to pursue as a class, on behalf of all of their respective members, lawsuits “concerning members of common interest to the members.” Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.221. This includes, but is not limited to, the common property or the areas in which the association is responsible. But, what about matters or elements for which the association is not responsible or does not own? For example, issues or damages relative to a specific unit or owner that are prevalent throughout?
The Third District Court of Appeal addressed this question in Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v. Latitude on the River Condominium Association, Inc., 45 Fla. L. Weekly D1518a (Fla. 3d DCA 2020) when in affirmed a class certification by a condominium association relating to the removal and replacement of the condominium building’s defective fire sprinkler system. In affirming the class certification by the condominium association, the Third District maintained:
Rule 1.221 expressly authorizes condominium associations to “institute, maintain, settle, or appeal actions or hearings in its name on behalf of all association members concerning matters of common interest to the members.” “[A]s to controversies affecting the matters of common interest . . ., the condominium association, without more, should be construed to represent the class composed of its members as a matter of law.” “[T]he common interest provision of the rule has been interpreted to permit a class action by the association for a construction defect located physically within a unit, rather than in the common elements, if the defect is prevalent throughout the building.” We, therefore, cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding that damages resulting from the replacement of the fire-sprinkler system throughout the building were a matter of common interest for purposes of certification at this stage of the litigation.
Allied Tube and Conduit Corp, supra (internal citations omitted).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Citigroup Reaches $1.13 Billion Pact Over Mortgage Bonds
April 09, 2014 —
Dakin Campbell – BloombergCitigroup Inc. (C) agreed to pay $1.13 billion to settle claims from mortgage-bond investors as it seeks to curb liabilities tied to the financial crisis. It took a $100 million first-quarter charge.
The 68 securitization trusts covered by the settlement issued a combined $59.4 billion in mortgage-backed securities from 2005 to 2008, the New York-based bank said yesterday in a statement. The agreement covers 18 investors represented by Gibbs & Bruns LLP and trustees have until June 30 to accept the deal, the law firm said in a separate statement. The accord must be approved by the Federal Housing Finance Agency.
Citigroup, the third-biggest U.S. bank, is resolving a portion of liabilities tied to mortgages it packaged and sold to investors in the run-up to the 2008 crisis. JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM) and Bank of America Corp. (BAC), the two largest U.S. lenders, previously agreed to multibillion-dollar settlements with Gibbs & Bruns clients.
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Dakin Campbell, BloombergMr. Campbell may be contacted at
dcampbell27@bloomberg.net
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFSafety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
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New World Cup Stadiums Failed at their First Trial
March 12, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFProblems abounded at the inaugural match at one of the new World Cup stadiums in Manaus, Brazil, reported The News Tribune. Problems also were reported at the Arena da Amazonia. Bathrooms weren’t completed, roofs leaked, and some fans were sold tickets for seats that didn’t exist. Furthermore “construction material could be seen in some places and many wheelchair fans had difficulties accessing their seats.”
"This is a critical point that needs to be reevaluated, it can't happen again," said Miguel Capobiango, one of the officials in charge of World Cup preparations in Manaus, as quoted by The News Tribune. "But this is why we have these test events."
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Not So Fast, My Friend: Pacing and Concurrent Delay
April 25, 2022 —
William E. Underwood - ConsensusDocsWhen critical path activities are delayed by the owner (or another party), contractors will sometimes “pace,” or slow down, other activities to match the owner-caused delay. After all, why should the contractor hurry up and wait? But paced activities can often appear as concurrent delays on a project’s overall schedule. And all too often, contractors fail to contemporaneously document their efforts to pace work. Not only can this create avoidable disputes with owners and other contractors, but it can also create future roadblocks to the recovery of delay damages. This article examines the interplay between pacing and concurrent delay[1] and what contractors should do to minimize risk and preserve their rights to obtain more than a simple time extension for project delays.
Pacing versus Concurrent Delay
As a basic matter, most contracts allocate responsibility/liability for a schedule delay to the party that caused the delay. For example, if an owner is contractually required to provide equipment for a contractor to install, then the owner likely bears responsibility for any delays caused if the equipment is delivered late. If, however, the contractor was also behind schedule on other activities during this time and the project would have been delayed regardless of the owner’s late deliveries, then the delay is probably concurrent. And the contractor will generally be entitled to only an extension of time, and no other monetary relief.
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William E. Underwood, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Underwood may be contacted at
wunderwood@joneswalker.com
