Court of Appeals Upholds Default Judgment: Serves as Reminder to Respond to Lawsuits in a Timely Manner
October 02, 2023 —
Anna Basnaw - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCIn
Cyrus Way Partners, LLC. (“Cyrus”) v. Cadman, Inc. (“Cadman”), the primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Cadman’s motion to vacate the default judgment under Civil Rules 55 and 60. A default judgment is a legal ruling that can be entered in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant fails to respond to a lawsuit. If that happens, the court may resolve the lawsuit without hearing from the other side. In Washington, a party typically has 20 days to appear in a suit before being at risk for default judgment. If a default judgment is entered for the plaintiff, the defendant can move to vacate the default judgment, meaning the defendant hopes the court will set aside the default judgment as if it never happened. In this case, Cadman, the defendant, presents several ultimately unsuccessful arguments for why the default judgment in favor of Cyrus, the plaintiff, should be vacated.
Cyrus and Orca Beverage Inc. (“Orca”) are under common ownership. In 2018, Cyrus began a project to build a warehouse for Orca, which included the construction of a large concrete slab. Cadman was hired to supply the concrete. Cyrus hired Olympic Concrete Finishing Inc. (“Olympic”) to finish the concrete. On April 1, 2018, Cadman poured the concrete, and Olympic finished the slab. The next day, Cyrus noticed several problems with the slab, which experts hired by both Cyrus and Cadman opined were caused by an abnormally high air content in the concrete.
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Pine River’s Two Harbors Now Targets Non-Prime Mortgages
November 05, 2014 —
Jody Shenn - BloombergCount Two Harbors Investment Corp. (TWO) among investors looking for profits in riskier home loans -- and expecting a market for bonds backed by them to re-emerge even with safer issuance showing limited signs of life.
The real-estate investment trust, whose 74 percent total return over the past three years is almost double that of peers, recently told the lenders that have been selling it big, high-quality mortgages that it’s now also seeking to purchase non-prime loans and those with low down payments, Chief Investment Officer Bill Roth said today during a conference call for analysts and investors.
“Our expectation and certainly hope would be as this market opens up and becomes fairly meaningful that a securitization market would develop,” he said. Of course, he sees the timeline as “probably measured in years, not months.”
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Jody Shenn, BloombergMs. Shenn may be contacted at
jshenn@bloomberg.net
Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect
May 19, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFWSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.
The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”
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Appraisers May Determine Causation
January 21, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiIn a case of first impression, the Iowa Court of Appeals held that an appraisal may determine issues of causation. North Glenn Homeowners Association v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 854 N.W. 2d 67 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014).
On July 15, 2009, North Glenn Homeowners Association submitted a claim to State Farm for hail damage on the roof. The claim was paid. North Glenn did not repair all of the damage, instead deciding to use some of the money to make other repairs to the property.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Florida’s Fourth District Appeals Court Clarifies What Actions Satisfy Florida’s Construction Defect Statute of Repose
November 14, 2018 —
Rahul Gogineni - The Subrogation SpecialistIn Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla.App. LEXIS 13019, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently concluded that the date on which the plaintiffs provided a pre-suit notice in compliance with §558.004 of Florida’s construction defect Right-to-Cure statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., is the date on which the plaintiff commenced a “civil action or proceeding,” i.e. an “action,” within the meaning of Florida’s construction defect statute of repose, Florida Statue § 95.11(3)(c). Thus, reversing the decision of the trial court, the Fourth District held that the plaintiffs timely-filed their construction defect action against the defendants.
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Rahul Gogineni, White and Williams LLPMr. Gogineni may be contacted at
goginenir@whiteandwilliams.com
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
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Be Careful with Good Faith Payments
February 24, 2020 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsSometimes doing the expedient thing and what looks good at the time can come back to bite you. Just ask 3M Company.
In Faneuil, Inc. v. 3M Co., the Virginia Supreme Court considered a customer services subcontract between Faneuil and 3M relating to a toll collection contract 3M entered into with ERC. The subcontract had a “pay if paid” clause in it requiring payment to 3M from ERC before ERC was required to pay Faneuil, a written change order provision and a base monthly payment to Faneuil for the services that could be reduced in the event of less than expected toll collections. Further, the subcontract stated that if either party settled 3rd party claims, that settlement would not bind the other party to the subcontract absent consent or Court order.
Faneuil was then alleged to have been required to provide “Special Services” relating to manual identification of license plates and other information necessary for toll billing due to 3M’s alleged failure to provide adequate imaging services. Faneuil requested (without written change order) and 3M promised to pay extra for these services. When 3M was slow to pay for the special services, Faneuil did what you would expect and threatened to stop providing them. Instead of contesting the right to the work, 3m made sporadic “good faith” payments to induce continued Special Services from Faneuil. Eventually 3M’s issues caused ERC to stop payments and thus 3M stopped paying Faneuil. 3M then settled the payment claims with ERC and still failed to pay Faneuil.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Court of Appeals Affirms Dismissal of Owner’s Claims Based on Contractual One-Year Claims Limitations Period
October 04, 2021 —
Cassidy Ingram - Ahlers Cressman & SleightIn a recent unpublished decision – Tadych v. Noble Ridge Construction, Inc.– the Washington State Court of Appeals, Division One, held that a one-year contractual claim limitations clause was valid and enforceable. The Tadych decision is important because it reiterates the strict approach courts will take to a claim limitations clause less than the statutory six years for breach of contract claims prescribed by RCW 4.16.040(1). In other words, when the parties agree to shorten the limitations period, the agreement will be enforced barring any procedural or substantive unconscionability.
In Tadych, plaintiff owners (the Tadychs) contracted with defendant contractor (Noble Ridge Construction, Inc., or NRC) for the construction of a custom home in 2012. The contract provided a one-year claim limitations clause in which claims could be raised, and that all claims not raised in the one-year period would be waived. In December 2013, as the project neared completion, the Tadychs met with NRC to identify any outstanding project issues. The Tadychs noted several, including rainwater pools at the landing at the bottom of the stairs and several nicks and cracks on the stucco exterior walls.
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Cassidy Ingram, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMs. Ingram may be contacted at
cassidy.ingram@acslawyers.com
