Alaska Supreme Court Dismisses Claims of Uncooperative Pro Se Litigant in Defect Case
August 11, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe Alaska Supreme Court found that in the case of Khalsa v. Chose, Ms. Khalsa? failure to cooperate with the courts has obligated them to dismiss her claims against Mr. Chose. Ms. Khalsa bought a home kit from Mandala Custom Homes of Nelson, British Columbia, Canada. Mr. Chose, one of the owners of Mandala was paid by Ms. Khalsa to supervise assembly in Fairbanks. After construction, the roof developed leaks. Ms. Khalsa stated that when climbing a ladder to inspect a skylight leak, she fell and injured herself.
During the subsequent suit, Khalsa proved uncooperative. She skipped a pretrial conference. She attended a hearing that set discovery deadlines but then did not comply with discovery, including her failure to provide medical records documenting her injuries. She eventually said that she would only be able to travel from Arizona to Alaska if the defendants paid for her and her caretaker?s expenses.
When finally deposed, Khalsa terminated the deposition after five minutes, alleging the deposition was “intentionally designed to cause [her] to endure further emotional distress, due to the psychological trauma . . . that was caused or contributed to by the defendants.”
Eventually, the lower court sanctioned her twice. In July, 2008, the court concluded that her failure to provide medical records required dismissal of her injury lawsuit. In October of that year, the court dismissed all remaining claims due to her “pattern of excuses and long delays in providing information for discovery culminating in her refusal to participate in her deposition by the defendants.” Further, Khalsa has argued that the trial court displayed “prejudice and bias toward the pro se plaintiff.”
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected all of Ms. Khalsa?s claims, dismissing her case. They did, however, note that she has thirty days to file an appeal.
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A Homeowner’s Subsequent Action is Barred as a Matter of Law by way of a Prior “Right to Repair Act” Claim Resolved by Cash Settlement for Waiver of all Known or Unknown Claims
February 26, 2015 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq., Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq., and David A. Napper, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinDavid Belasco v. Gary Loren Wells et al. (2015) B254525
OVERVIEW
In a decision published on February 17, 2015, the Second District Court of Appeal made clear that settlement agreements containing waivers of unknown claims in connection with a construction of a property, absent fraud or misrepresentation, will be upheld. In brief, the homeowner plaintiff had made a claim against the builder pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 896 (“Right to Repair”) and settled for a cash payment and obtained a Release of all Claims including for all known and unknown claims. The court held that homeowner’s subsequent construction defect claim was barred pursuant to the terms and conditions of the earlier release.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff and Appellant, David Belasco ("Belasco"), purchased a newly construction home in Manhattan Beach from builder Gary Loren Wells ("Wells"). Two years after purchasing the property, Belasco filed a Complaint for construction defects, which eventually resulted in settlement between the parties. The settlement agreement included a California Civil Code Section 1524 waiver of all known or unknown claims with the word "claims" defined in part as “any and all known and unknown construction defects." Six years later in 2012, Belasco filed a Complaint alleging a claim, amongst others, that the defective and leaky roof breached the statutory warranty on new construction under California Civil Code section 896 ("Right to Repair Act").
Relying on San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048, Wells and Wells' surety, American Contractors Indemnity Company (collectively "Wells"), filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the 2012 action was barred by the settlement of Belasco’s prior Complaint against Wells for construction defects to his home. When the trial court ruled in favor of Wells, Belasco appealed. Belasco, a patent attorney, made the following contentions:(1) the general release and section 1542 wavier in the settlement agreement for patent construction defects is not a "reasonable release" of a subsequent claim for latent construction defects within the meaning of section 929 and the “Right to Repair” Act; (2) a reasonable release can only apply to a "particular violation" and not to a latest defect under the language of section945.5, subdivision (f), and the settlement was too vague to be valid because it does not reference a "particular violation;" (3) section 932 of the California Civil Code specifically authorizes an action on "[s]subsequently discovered claims of unmet standards;" (4) public policy prohibits use of a general release and section 1542 waiver to bar a subsequent claim for latent residential construction defects; and (5) a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Belasco's fraud and negligence claims that would have voided the settlement pursuant to section 1668.
Pursuant to the "Right to Repair Act" Section 929 subsection (a), a builder can make a cash offer in lieu of a repair and the homeowner is free to accept or reject such offer. Section 929subsection (b) goes on to state that
"[t]he builder may obtain a reasonable release in exchange for the cash payment. The builder may negotiate the terms and conditions of any reasonable release in terms of scope and consideration in conjunction with a cash payment under this chapter."
The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that the prior cash settlement, with a release and section 1524 wavier, was a "reasonable release" under the language of California Civil Code Section 929.
On multiple occasions, the Court noted that Belasco is an attorney and was represented by an attorney during the negotiation of the settlement agreement. By executing the agreement with express language regarding what claims were to be release, Belasco released Wells of "any and all claims" due to "any and all known and unknown construction defects." The Court reasoned that because Belasco is an attorney in his own right, he should have understood the import of the Section 1542 waiver and had the opportunity to reject or revise the settlement agreement prior to binding himself to it. The Court further found that the agreement "could not have been more clear" regarding the waiver of all unknown and known construction defect claims and therefore was not vague. Belasco's additional contentions were found to be without merit because Belasco availed himself of the statutory remedy of a cash settlement in lieu of repairs and voluntarily entered into a negotiated settlement agreement. Lastly, Belasco failed to present any evidence regarding his misrepresentation claim.
When a homeowner files a "Right to Repair Act" claim, often it seems that only two options exist: either repair the alleged defects or go to court. However, Belasco is a reminder to builders that the "Right to Repair Act" does offer an avenue for settlement. The Second District Court of Appeal presented a clear, unqualified opinion regarding the validity and enforceability of settlement agreements releasing all known or unknown construction defects in a single family home case. The Court will hold parties to the settlements they agree to. This is especially so when one of the parties is an attorney and provides deposition testimony expressly acknowledging that he understood the scope of the agreement. Attorneys for builders should always include a waiver of all known and unknown claims, which pursuant to Belasco and San Diego Hospice, will ensure that any future claims at the property will be effectively barred by the terms of the settlement agreement.
Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys
Richard H. Glucksman,
Jon A. Turigliatto and
David A. Napper
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
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Insurer's Motion to Dismiss "Redundant Claims" Denied
June 21, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe insurer's motion to dismiss was more appropriate for an eventual summary judgment motion and was consequently denied. Sivan Lam v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81262 (M.D. Fla. April 12, 2024).
Lam suffered a loss to her home due to Hurricane Ian. When only a portion of the claim was paid, Lam sued his insurer, Scottsdale, for breach of contract (Count I) and declaratory relief (Count II).
Scottsdale argued that Lam's request for declaratory relief was redundant of her breach of contract claim. The court noted that Rule 12 (b)(6), Fed. R. Civil P., was a vehicle to challenge a claim's sufficiency. Redundancy was not insufficiency, and it was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 12 (b)(6).
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Real Estate & Construction News Round-Up (02/15/23) – Proptech Solutions, Supply Chain Pivots, and the Inflation Reduction Act
March 06, 2023 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThis week’s round-up explores how proptech could alleviate the financial burden of property owners’ vacant office space, manufacturing firms are bolstering the industrial real estate sector, a 200-MW Texas project is first to leverage IRA tax credit for stand-alone energy storage, and more.
- Proptech could serve as an economic regenerator to the rise in empty office space that has recently become a major financial liability for businesses. (Joe Dyton, Connected Real Estate Magazine)
- The global business process outsourcing (BPO) industry and accompanying real estate infrastructure that supports it should be aware of the potential impact of AI chatbots becoming capable of optimizing customer service with minimal human input. (Zain Jaffer, Forbes)
- Industrial real estate is being bolstered by manufacturing firms increasingly returning their operations to the U.S., which was already one of the hottest commercial property sectors in the last decade. (JLL)
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Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
Update Coverage for Construction Defect Claims in Colorado
February 11, 2013 —
Tred R. Eyerly Whether construction defect claims against an insured contractor or subcontractor are covered is undergoing an intense debate in Colorado that is reminiscent of the current coverage battle in Hawaii.
Although I missed the case until recently, the decision in Colo. Pool Sys. v. Scottsdale Ins Co., 2012 Colo. App. LEXIS 1732 (Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2012), appears to divert from a prior case from the Colorado Court of Appeals, Gen. Sec. Indem. Co. v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009). Gen. Security held that faulty workmanship, standing alone, was not an "accident." Gen. Security was heavily relied upon by the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals when it found construction defects arose from breach of contract and were not covered under a liability policy. See Group Builders v. Admiral Insurance Co., 123 Haw. 142, 231 P.3d 67 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010).
In Colo. Pool Sys., Colorado Pool hired subcontractors to construct a poll's concrete shell. After the shell was poured, an inspection noticed that some re-bar was too close to the surface. The owner turned to its general contractor, White Construction Group, and demanded that the pool be removed and replaced. White turned to Colorado Pool, who notified its carrier, Scottsdale.
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Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Delaware State Court Holds that Defective Workmanship Claims do not Trigger Coverage by a Builder’s Commercial General Liability Policy
April 15, 2015 —
Marc S. Casarino – White and Williams LLPGuided by federal case law, on March 31, 2015 a Delaware state court held for the first time in Westfield Ins. Co. v. Miranda & Hardt Contracting and Building Services LLC that a builder’s poor workmanship is not an occurrence for which the builder’s insurance policy affords coverage. In the underlying case giving rise to the coverage dispute, a homeowner alleged that a builder deviated from approved building plans, used inadequate materials, improperly installed materials, violated building codes, and fraudulently represented that a home was properly constructed. The homeowner sued the builder under theories of negligence, negligence per se, and fraud. The insurer denied the builder’s request for defense and indemnification for the homeowner’s claims, citing in part that the allegations of defective workmanship did not qualify as an “occurrence” as defined by the builder’s insurance policy.
The builder did not dispute that the underlying complaint alleged defective workmanship. However, the builder asserted that because it had not yet been proven that its work was defective, the insurer had prematurely denied coverage. The court properly rejected the builder’s argument, and reiterated that under Delaware law the court must compare the allegations of the complaint to the insurance policy terms to make a coverage determination. Whether the complaint’s allegations are ultimately meritorious is irrelevant to the initial coverage determination according to the court.
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Marc S. Casarino, White and Williams LLPMr. Casarino may be contacted at
casarinom@whiteandwilliams.com
Do Not Pass Go! Duty to Defend in a Professional Services Agreement (law note)
April 03, 2019 —
Melissa Dewey Brumback - Construction Law in North CarolinaRecently a client asked me to review a contract for his Firm. The Owner, who had prepared the draft, had inserted a rather stringent “duty to defend” clause.
As I told my client, a duty to defend clause is not a good idea for a couple of reasons. First, if you agree to provide a defense, what that means is that you are footing the bill for the Owner if the Owner is sued by another party. Think about that for a minute. You are paying legal fees for someone else’s legal defense. You may or may not be able to direct the litigation or have a say in who is hired. Can you say open check book?
Secondly, and more importantly, the duty to defend is almost never insurable. What that means is that your professional liability carrier will not be footing the bill—your Firm will be doing it. This is not a case of adding the Owner as an additional insured, so do not confuse the two. Agreeing to a duty to defend is an extremely burdensome, and potentially costly, mistake.
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Melissa Dewey Brumback, Ragsdale Liggett PLLCMs. Brumback may be contacted at
mbrumback@rl-law.com
Construction Law Alert: Appellate Court Rules General Contractors Can Contractually Subordinate Mechanics Lien Rights
November 26, 2014 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic, Jessica M. Lassere Ryland, & Colin T. Murphy - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Moorefield Construction, Inc. v. Intervest-Mortgage Investment Co., 230 Cal. App. 4th 146 (4th Dist. 2014), a California appellate court upheld an agreement executed by a general contractor which subordinated its mechanic’s lien to a construction lender’s deed of trust.
In 2006, developer DBN Parkside LLC ("DBN") purchased land in San Jacinto, California (the "property") to build a medical complex (the "project"). DBN hired Moorefield Construction, Inc. (“Moorefield”) to act as general contractor and sought funding for the project from Intervest-Mortgage Investment Company (“Intervest”). Prior to the recordation of the construction loan, and unbeknownst to Intervest, Moorefield cleared and grubbed the project site. Pursuant to the construction loan agreement, Intervest required DBN to assign its rights and remedies under the construction contract to Intervest. Under its construction contract, Moorefield agreed to subordinate its lien rights to the construction loan.
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
Jessica M. Lassere Ryland and
Colin T. Murphy
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com; Ms. Lassere Ryland may be contacted at jlassere@hbblaw.com; and Mr. Murphy may be contacted at cmurphy@hbblaw.com
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