Endorsement Excludes Replacement of Undamaged Property with Matching Materials
August 20, 2019 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court approved the insurer's endorsement which stated the insured would not pay for undamaged property in order to match damaged property. Noonan v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 15545 (May 24, 2019).
After hail and wind damaged part of the roof in the insureds' home, American Family inspected the roof and determined that it had suffered $12,000 in damage. The insureds disputed this amount and demanded an appraisal to provide a binding estimate of the amount of loss. American Family asked the appraisers to divide their estimate into two categories - one for replacing damaged shingles and another for replacing undamaged shingles that would not match those needed to replace the damaged ones. The appraisers did not do so. They instead found that replacing the entire roof would cost $141,000 and noted there was a matching issue because alternative products did not match the current shingles on the roof.
Of the $141,000 needed to replace the entire roof, American Family estimated that $87,232.98 was due to the costs of matching. The insureds sued. The district court remanded the case to the appraisers to clarify the award by differentiating the costs attributable to the actual roof damage from those attributable to shingle matching. The appraisers clarified the award and reported that actual damages were $66,619, meaning that $74,381 was attributable to matching. American Family then paid the actual damages, less the deductible, but refused to pay the rest.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
White and Williams Earns Tier 1 Rankings from U.S. News "Best Law Firms" 2020
December 22, 2019 —
White and Williams LLPWhite and Williams has achieved national recognition from U.S. News and World Report as a "Best Law Firm" in the practice areas of Insurance Law and Media Law. Our Boston, New York and Philadelphia offices have also been recognized in their respective metropolitan regions in several practice areas. Firms included in the “Best Law Firms” list are recognized for professional excellence with persistently impressive ratings from clients and peers. Achieving a tiered ranking signals a unique combination of quality law practice and breadth of legal experience.
National Tier 1
Insurance Law
National Tier 3
Media Law
Metropolitan Tier 1
Boston
Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
Delaware
Product Liability Litigation – Defendants
New Jersey
Labor Law – Management
Philadelphia
Commercial Litigation
Insurance Law
Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants
Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants
Personal Injury Litigation – Plaintiffs
Metropolitan Tier 2
Boston
Insurance Law
Delaware
Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants
New Jersey
Employment Law - Management
Litigation - Labor & Employment
Philadelphia
Bet-the-Company Litigation
Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants
Media Law
Real Estate Law
Tax Law
Trusts & Estates Law
Metropolitan Tier 3
New York City
Bankruptcy and Creditor Debtor Rights / Insolvency and Reorganization Law
Philadelphia
Appellate Practice
Construction Law
First Amendment Law
Litigation – Construction
Litigation – Labor & Employment
Patent Law
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White and Williams LLP
Can Businesses Resolve Construction Disputes Outside of Court?
August 19, 2024 —
Scott L. Baker - Los Angeles Litigation BlogTime is of the essence in any construction project. So, if a dispute arises at any point, business owners generally wish to avoid the chance of a time-consuming case going to court.
Can California construction businesses
manage these disputes effectively outside of court? It is possible in some cases. Business owners should carefully consider these three steps.
1. Go Back to the Contract
Even if the contract is at the center of the dispute, it is important to refer to any details regarding dispute resolution included within the document. It is common for contracts to have some form of a dispute resolution clause. In such a case, both parties should follow the steps outlined in that agreement.
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Scott L. Baker, Baker & AssociatesMr. Baker may be contacted at
slb@bakerslaw.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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In Florida, Exculpatory Clauses Do Not Need Express Language Referring to the Exculpated Party's Negligence
October 02, 2015 —
Edward Jaeger & William Doerler – White and Williams LLPIn Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So.3d 256 (Fla. 2015), the Supreme Court of Florida considered whether a party to a contract, in order to be released from liability for its own negligence, needs to include an express reference to negligence in an exculpatory clause. The court held that, unlike an indemnification clause, so long as the language in an exculpatory clause is clear, the absence of the terms “negligence” or “negligent acts” in an exculpatory clause does not, for that reason alone, render the exculpatory clause ineffective.
Background
Give Kids the World, Inc. (“GKW”) is a non-profit organization that provides free vacations to seriously ill children and their families at GKW’s resort village. To use the resort, vacationers have to fill out an application. Stacy and Eric Sanislo filled out an application to bring their seriously ill child to the village for a vacation and GKW accepted their application. Upon arriving at the resort, the Sanislos filled out a liability release form.
Reprinted courtesy of
Edward Jaeger, White and Williams LLP and
William Doerler, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Jaeger may be contacted at jaegere@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Doerler may be contacted at doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
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Properly Trigger the Performance Bond
January 04, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesOriginally Published by CDJ on January 5, 2017
A performance bond is a valuable tool designed to guarantee the performance of the principal of the contract made part of the bond. But, it is only a valuable tool if the obligee (entity the bond is designed to benefit) understands that it needs to properly trigger the performance bond if it is looking to the bond (surety) to remedy and pay for a contractual default. If the performance bond is not properly triggered and a suit is brought upon the bond then the obligee could be the one materially breaching the terms of the bond. This means the obligee has no recourse under the performance bond. This is a huge downside when the obligee wanted the security of the performance bond, and reimbursed the bond principal for the premium of the bond, in order to address and remediate a default under the underlying contract.
A recent example of this downside can be found in the Southern District of Florida’s decision in Arch Ins. Co. v. John Moriarty & Associates of Florida, Inc., 2016 WL 7324144 (S.D.Fla. 2016). Here, a general contractor sued a subcontractor’s performance bond surety for an approximate $1M cost overrun associated with the performance of the subcontractor’s subcontract (the contract made part of the subcontractor’s performance bond). The surety moved for summary judgment arguing that the general contractor failed to property trigger the performance bond and, therefore, materially breached the bond. The trial court granted the summary judgment in favor of the performance bond surety. Why?
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Amazon Hits Pause on $2.5B HQ2 Project in Arlington, Va.
March 27, 2023 —
Jim Parsons - Engineering News-RecordAmazon is tapping the brakes on its $2.5-billion HQ2 second headquarters project in Arlington County, Va., announcing an indefinite delay to the start of the program’s 2.8-million-sq-ft second phase, known as PenPlace.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at enr@enr.com
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Yes, Indeedy. Competitive Bidding Not Required for School District Lease-Leasebacks
October 01, 2014 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogRemember when you discovered that the tooth fairy wasn’t real?
It was kind of a bummer on one hand learning that it wasn’t a fairy that magically appeared to swap your tooth for cold hard cash, but rather your mom or, visual horrors, dad.
At the same time, it was, to your nearly-halfway-to-a-decade-on-this-planet-wizened-six-year-old mind, confirmation of what you had a sneaking suspicion was the case in any event.
And, so it is with the next case.
Lease-Leasebacks
In California, most public school construction projects are built using the traditional design-bid-build project delivery method in which a design professional designs the project, the project is put out for competitive bid and the selected contractor builds the project.
But not all school construction projects are built this way.
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Garret Murai, Kronick Moskovitz Tiedemann & GirardMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@kmtg.com
