Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Measure of Damages for a Chattel Including Loss of Use
November 16, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a non-construction case, but an interesting case nonetheless, the Second District Court of Appeals talks about the measure of damages when dealing with chattel (property) including loss of use damages. Chattel, you say? While certainly not a word used in everyday language, a chattel is “an item of tangible movable or immovable property except real estate and things (such as buildings) connected with real property.” Equipment, machinery, personal items, furniture, etc. can be considered chattel.
With respect to the measure of damages for a chattel:
“Where a person is entitled to a judgment for harm to chattels not amounting to a total destruction in value,” the plaintiff may make an election out of two theories of recovery in addition to compensation for the loss of use. Badillo v. Hill, 570 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 928 (Am. Law Inst. 1939)). In addition to compensation for the loss of use, the plaintiff may elect either “the difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the value after the harm” or “the reasonable cost of repairs or restoration where feasible, with due allowance for any difference between the original value and the value after repairs.” Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 928).
Sack v. WSW Rental of Sarasota, LLC, 45 Fla.L.Weekly D2306a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
Sack is a good example of a case dealing with the measure of damages with a chattel, here, an aircraft, including loss of use damages.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
What are Section 8(f) Agreements?
July 02, 2018 —
Wally Zimolong – Supplemental Conditions Like many areas of federal labor law, there are different rules for construction industry employers. One major difference is in how employers become unionized. Typically, under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, a union becomes a collective bargaining agent of employees only after a majority of employees show support for union representation. In other words, the employees chose whether to be represented by a particular union. However, under Section 8(f) of the NLRA, construction industry employers can choose to become union without any showing of majority support by employees. In fact, construction industry employers don’t need to have any employees at all to sign a “8(f) agreement.” Thus, these agreements have become known as pre-hire agreements.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLCMr. Zimolong may be contacted at
wally@zimolonglaw.com
FIFA Inspecting Brazil’s World Cup Stadiums
March 26, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFRepresentatives from FIFA have returned to Brazil to conduct inspections of the World Cup stadiums, according to the San Francisco Chronicle. Even though Brazil had told FIFA they would have all twelve done by the end of 2013, only nine are finished. Furthermore, “infrastructure work in many of the 12 host cities remains far from completed.”
“This is the last occasion for the organizers to take stock of the operational preparations before the respective FIFA World Cup installations begin to be implemented in all 12 host cities,” FIFA said in a statement, as quoted in the San Francisco Chronicle.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
No Coverage for Additional Insured
December 17, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiTwo insurers disputed who was responsible for coverage the additional insured contractor. Endurance Am. Spec. Ins. Co. v. Century Sur. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19194 (2nd Cir. Nov. 4, 2015). The district court granted summary judgment to Endurance, finding there was coverage for the additional insured general contractor after being sued by an employee of a subcontractor.
Century's policy included an Action Over Exclusion clause, which excluded insurance coverage for injury to certain employees as follows:
Exclusions:
. . .
e. Employer's Liability
"Bodily injury" to:
(1) an "employee" of the
named insured arising out of and in the course of:
- (a) Employment by the named insured; or
- (b) Performing duties related to the conduct of the named insured's business.
The named insured was Pinnacle Construction & Renovation Corp.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Biden’s Buy American Policy & What it Means for Contractors
February 22, 2021 —
Meredith Thielbahr & Nicole Lentini - Gordon & Rees Construction Law BlogJanuary 25, 2021, President Biden signed an Executive Order (EO) “Ensuring the Future is Made in All America by All of America’s Workers”, which seeks to bolster U.S. manufacturing through the federal procurement process. Note that, just six day earlier, on January 18, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Counsel issued a final rule implementing former President Trump’s July 2019 EO, titled “Maximizing Use of American-Made Goods, Products, and Materials” (EO No. 13881) on the then-current Buy American standards. For context, Trump’s proposed revisions – adopted and implemented by the FAR Council earlier this year – imposed three (3) significant changes worth noting: (1) increasing the percentage of domestic content (other than iron or steel) from 50% to 55% that an end product must contain in order to qualify as a “domestic end product”; (2) implementing an even higher increase in the domestic content requirement for iron and steel products to at least 95% U.S. “predominately” iron or steel product; and (3) increasing the price evaluation preference for domestic offerors from 6% to 20% (for other than small business) and 30% (for small businesses). The FAR’s rule became effective January 21, 2021, and applies to solicitations issued on or after February 22, 2021, and resulting contracts let. Biden’s EO rescinds Trump’s EO No. 13881 “to the extent inconsistent with [Biden’s] EO.” However, when dissected, it is clear Biden’s Buy American plan does little to modify thresholds inconsistent with the Trump Administration; rather, the White House’s latest EO implements changes in the form of BA administration. Nonetheless, Biden’s EO does expressly note that it supersedes and replaces Trump’s EO on the same issues.
Reprinted courtesy of
Meredith Thielbahr, Gordon & Rees and
Nicole Lentini, Gordon & Rees
Ms. Thielbahr may be contacted at mthielbahr@grsm.com
Ms. Lentini may be contacted at nlentini@grsm.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
California Cracking down on Phony Qualifiers
July 23, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFGarret Murai in his California Construction Law Blog stated that “California’s Senate Bill 862, and amended Business and Professions Code 7068.1” has given the California Contractors State License Board (CSLB) “additional enforcement authority to crack down on phony qualifiers by allowing the CLSB to take disciplinary action against a qualifier and a licensee if the qualifier is not actively involved in the construction activities of the licensee’s business.”
Murai explained that “[r]enting a qualifier means that you pay an individual who holds a California contractor’s license to act as the Responsible Managing Officer (RMO) or Responsible Managing Employee (RMO) of a construction company when they have no actual involvement in the day-to-day operations of the company.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
California Judicial Council Votes to Rescind Prohibitions on Eviction and Foreclosure Proceedings
September 28, 2020 —
David Rao & Lyndsey Torp - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogThe California Judicial Council’s emergency rules staying evictions and judicial foreclosures are coming to an end.
On March 27, 2020, the Governor of California issued executive order N-38-20, giving the Judicial Council emergency authority to act in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. On April 6, 2020, the Judicial Council of California voted to approve temporary emergency rules of court. Rule 1 prohibited the issuance of a summons, or the entering of a default, in an eviction action for both residential and commercial properties except as necessary to protect public health and safety. Rule 1 also continued all pending unlawful detainer trials for at least 60 days, with no new trials being set until at least 60 days after a request was filed. Rule 2 stayed all pending judicial foreclosure actions, tolled the statute of limitations, and extended the deadlines for responding to such actions.
Rule 1 and Rule 2 were to remain in effect until 90 days after the Governor declared the state of emergency resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic lifted, or until repealed by action of the Judicial Council. On August 13, 2020, the Judicial Council voted 19-1 to sunset Rule 1 and Rule 2 as of September 1, 2020. Beginning September 2, 2020, California state courts are authorized to issue summons on unlawful detainer actions, enter defaults, and set trial dates on request. Stays on pending judicial foreclosure actions will be lifted.
Reprinted courtesy of
David Rao, Snell & Wilmer and
Lyndsey Torp, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Rao may be contacted at drao@swlaw.com
Ms. Torp may be contacted at ltorp@swlaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
