Contractual Fee-Shifting in Litigation: Who Pays the Price?
December 31, 2024 —
Caitlin Kicklighter - ConsensusDocsWhen disputes on a construction project escalate to litigation, general contractors may find themselves entangled in a costly and time-consuming legal battle. One important concept to understand is contractual fee-shifting under a “prevailing party” provision, which can significantly impact damages recovered in litigation. The general rule, known as the “American Rule,” requires each party to pay its own legal costs, including attorney’s fees, expert witness expenses, and other court-related costs. This differs from other legal systems where the losing party typically pays the winning party’s fees. One exception to the American Rule is contractual fee-shifting, specifically through “prevailing party” provisions, which allows for the award of attorney’s fees and costs when explicitly provided for in a contract.
This article explores this exception to the American Rule, delves into the challenges posed by prevailing party provisions, and shares tips to consider for drafting these clauses to improve clarity and minimize uncertainty in the face of litigation.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Caitlin Kicklighter, Jones Walker LLPMs. Kicklighter may be contacted at
ckicklighter@joneswalker.com
Construction Litigation Roundup: “Sudden Death”
October 17, 2023 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyIt’s not football, though. Rather, just when you thought it was safe in Louisiana to wait to file a garden-variety construction contract payment claim, an appellate court slams the door on it – applying a statute of “repose” to your claim.
“Personal actions” – such as an action on contract – are generally subject in Louisiana to a 10-year “liberative prescription,” the applicable statute of limitations pursuant to Louisiana Civil Code article 3499.
Like some other states, Louisiana has a statute of “repose” – imposing “peremption” rather than prescription for claims having to do with construction projects – limiting those claims (generally speaking) to five years post-completion. Like other statutes of “repose,” Louisiana Revised Statute 9:2772 provides that claims on construction projects may not be filed after five years, a duration which is not subject to interruption or extension.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
United States Supreme Court Backtracks on Recent Trajectory Away from Assertions of General Jurisdiction in Mallory v. Norfolk Southern
August 01, 2023 —
Charles S. Anderson - Lewis BrisboisWashington, D.C. (June 28, 2023) – On June 27, 2023, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a sharply divided opinion that appears to backtrack on the Court’s steady trajectory away from assertions of general jurisdiction in recent years, e.g. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011), Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014), BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, 2017, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). Relying on a case from 1917, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. of Philadelphia v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U. S. 93 (1917), Justice Gorsuch, writing on behalf of the plurality, (Justices Gorsuch, Thomas, Sotomayor, and Jackson) (Justice Alito concurring) found that Norfolk Southern “consented” to jurisdiction in Mallory via 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301(a)(2)(i),(b) by registering to do business in Pennsylvania. This statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. §5301, specifically permits jurisdiction over a corporation “incorporat[ed] under or qualifi[ed]as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth … for any cause of action that may asserted against him, whether or not arising from acts enumerated in this section.”
In Pennsylvania Fire, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution in connection with a Missouri law that required an out-of-state insurance company desiring to transact any business in the state to file paperwork agreeing to (1) appoint a state official to serve as the company’s agent for service of process and (2) accept service on that official as valid in any suit. After more than a decade of complying with the law, Pennsylvania Fire was served with process and argued that the Missouri law violated due process. The Court unanimously found that there was “no doubt” that Pennsylvania Fire could be sued in Missouri because it had agreed to accept service of process in Missouri on any suit as a condition of doing business there.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Charles S. Anderson, Lewis BrisboisMr. Anderson may be contacted at
Charles.Anderson@lewisbrisbois.com
CDJ’s #5 Topic of the Year: Beacon Residential Community Association v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, et al.
December 31, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFSteven M. Cvitanovic and Whitney L. Stefko of Haight Brown & Bonesteel analyzed the Beacon decision, and discussed how it affects developers and general contractors: “On July 3, 2014, the California Supreme Court (the “Court”) came out with its decision in Beacon Residential Community Association v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, et al. The Beacon decision settled a long-standing dispute in California about whether design professionals such as architects and engineers owe a duty to non-client third parties. In finding that the plaintiffs in Beacon could state a claim against the architects of the Beacon project, the Court also sowed the seeds of change in the way contracts are structured between developers, architects, engineers, and even general contractors.”
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
No Duty To Defend Additional Insured When Bodily Injury Not Caused by Insured
July 26, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court found there was no duty to defend a suit for bodily injury against the additional insured where the injury was not caused by the insured. Consigli Constr. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95339 (D. Mass. June 21, 2017).
Consigli was the general contractor for a renovation project at a high school. Among the subcontractors was American Environmental, Inc., who was responsible for demolishing concrete floors within the existing structures, and Costa Brothers, who did the masonry work. Wellington M. Ely was an employee of Costa Brothers and worked as a mason on the project.
Costa Brothers had a CGL policy with Travelers. As a subcontractor, Costa Brothers agreed to name Consigli as an additional insured on its policy.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Governor Inslee’s Recent Vaccination Mandate Applies to Many Construction Contractors and their Workers
September 13, 2021 —
Brett M. Hill - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCThis month Governor Jay Inslee enacted COVID vaccination requirements that apply to certain construction contractors and their workers in Washington state. Inslee’s vaccine proclamation becomes effective October 18, 2021 and requires construction contractors, subcontractors, and their workers to be fully vaccinated to perform work onsite on certain covered projects.
The following are types of covered projects where the vaccine mandate applies:
- State agencies: All contractors working at projects for Washington state agencies (including WSDOT, DES, DNR, etc.) if the work is required to be performed in person and onsite, regardless of the frequency or whether other workers are present. The vaccine mandate applies to indoor and outdoor settings and there is no exemption even if social distancing requirements can be met.
- Education/Higher Education/Child Care: All contractors performing work onsite for K-12, higher education (community colleges, technical colleges, and 4-year universities), child care and other facilities where students or persons receiving services are present. New and unoccupied projects are exempt but it does apply to public and private projects.
- Medical facilities: All contractors performing work at a “healthcare setting” where patients receiving care are present. “Healthcare setting” is defined as any public or private setting that is primarily used for the delivery of in-person health care services to people. “Healthcare setting” includes portions of a multi-use facility, but only the areas that are primarily used for the delivery of health care, such as a pharmacy within a grocery store. Additional information is on the state’s Q&A page.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Brett M. Hill, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Hill may be contacted at
brett.hill@acslawyers.com
What You Should Know About Liquidated Damages and Liability Caps for Delay and Performance Liquidated Damages
May 06, 2024 —
Chris Cazenave - ConsensusDocsLiquidated damage clauses are omnipresent in today’s construction contracts—often considered in early negotiations to provide a degree of certainty and limit financial liability.
There are two principal types of LDs appearing in construction contracts—(i.) damages for delay when a contractor fails to deliver a project by a certain milestone; and (ii.) performance damages when a contractor fails to meet specific performance requirements. Differentiating between LDs for delay and LDs for performance—especially when both LD types are combined in the same contract—is key to risk awareness and allocation during contract negotiations and throughout performance.
This article briefly outlines what you should know about LDs for delay and LDs for failing to meet certain performance requirements. The article also covers how contractors can allocate and cap risks based on risks each party can either manage, insure, or otherwise limit.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Chris Cazenave, Jones Walker LLPMr. Cazenave may be contacted at
ccazenave@joneswalker.com
