Court Orders House to be Demolished or Relocated
April 26, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorezCDJ STAFFDecision Affirmed in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by the trial court in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate. In the trial case, Central Arkansas Foundation Homes (CAFH) sought payment for a home built for Choate, while Choate alleged that the builders committed multiple construction defects including using the wrong foundation materials and positioning the house in the wrong direction.
After the house was built, CAFH contacted Choate regarding payment, however, Choate alleged that the finished product did not match the contract. “ After CAFH completed construction, it obtained permanent home financing for Choate and tried to contact her to close the transaction. Choate did not respond until October 2005, when she sent CAFH a list of alleged construction defects, including that the house was facing in the wrong direction; that it was not built on a slab; and that the fireplace, garbage disposal, driveway, and storage area were missing. CAFH replied to Choate in writing, telling her that she had until January 6, 2006, to close on the house or CAFH would sell it. The correspondence enclosed worksheets showing that the amount Choate would owe at closing exceeded $94,000, which included interest that had accrued on the as-yet unpaid construction loan.”
Initially, the court found in favor of CAFH. “On April 18, 2007, Choate’s attorney withdrew from representing her. Soon thereafter, CAFH’s attorney asked the court to set a final hearing on the case. The attorney purportedly sent Choate a letter by regular mail on May 15, 2007, advising her that the case was set for trial on July 9, 2007. Choate, however, did not appear. CAFH did appear, and its general manager, John Oldner, testified to events leading up to the case and the amount of damages claimed. According to Oldner, the interest on the construction loan had accrued to the point that CAFH now sought $104,965.88 from Choate. The court found in favor of CAFH and entered judgment for that amount, plus attorney fees, on July 18, 2007. The court ruled that CAFH could sell the house and either remit any excess to Choate or look to Choate for the deficiency if the sales price did not cover the judgment.”
However, Choate successfully argued that she did not receive notice of the trial. A new trial was ordered, and the outcome was quite different. “On June 6, 2008, the circuit court entered judgment for Choate, ruling that the house was not in substantial compliance with the parties’ contract and that the contract should be rescinded. The court found that the house suffered from numerous construction defects, that the contract contemplated a slab rather than a concrete-pier foundation, and that CAFH ignored Choate’s complaints that the house was facing the wrong way. The judgment directed CAFH to hold Choate harmless on the construction loan, to deed Choate’s two acres back to her, and to remove the house from Choate’s property.”
The Court of Appeals “found that Choate would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of the septic systems and utility lines that CAFH installed on her land. The court therefore awarded $5340 to CAFH as a quantum-meruit recovery for the value of that work. CAFH contends that the award is not sufficient, but we see no clear error.” In the end, the Court of Appeals provided this reason for declining to reverse the trial court’s decision: “The court in this case apparently concluded that the house constructed by CAFH was so fundamentally at odds with Choate’s contractual expectations that she was not unjustly enriched and should simply be, as nearly as possible, returned to the status quo ante. Accordingly, the court ordered the house removed from her property and permitted CAFH to either relocate the house or salvage the house’s materials and unused appliances. We decline to reverse the court’s weighing of the equities in this manner.”
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Lien Attaches To Landlord’s Interest When Landlord Is Party To Tenant Improvement Construction Contract
January 03, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIf you are a landlord / lessor, then you want to maximize the protections afforded to you under Florida’s Lien Law in Florida Statute s. 713.10. These protections are designed to protect your property from liens for improvements performed by your tenant / lessee. The intent is that if you comply with s. 713.10, then a tenant improvement contractor’s recourse is against the leasehold interest, and NOT against the interest of the real property (or your interest as the landlord / lessor). Needless to say, it is imperative that a landlord / lessor make efforts to comply with this section when a tenant is performing tenant improvements, even when the landlord is contributing money to those improvements.
Section 713.10 provides in material part:
(1) Except as provided in s. 713.12, a lien under this part shall extend to, and only to, the right, title, and interest of the person who contracts for the improvement as such right, title, and interest exists at the commencement of the improvement or is thereafter acquired in the real property. When an improvement is made by a lessee in accordance with an agreement between such lessee and her or his lessor, the lien shall extend also to the interest of such lessor.
(2)(a) When the lease expressly provides that the interest of the lessor shall not be subject to liens for improvements made by the lessee, the lessee shall notify the contractor making any such improvements of such provision or provisions in the lease, and the knowing or willful failure of the lessee to provide such notice to the contractor shall render the contract between the lessee and the contractor voidable at the option of the contractor.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Personal Guarantor Cannot Escape a Personal Guarantee By…
June 02, 2016 —
David Adelstein – Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a prior article, I discussed the point that a
personal guarantor cannot escape a contractual requirement of a
personal guarantee merely by executing the guarantee as a corporate officer.
The recent decision Frieri v. Capital Investment Services, Inc., 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1189a (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) illustrates this point. In this case, a company hired an individual to help grow that company’s business. The contract required the individual to invest $6 Million into a trust in consideration of the company’s president transferring substantial shares of the company into the trust. The objective was that the trust would own the controlling shares of the company. The money was transferred. However, the shares were never placed in the trust and the trust never received controlling interest in the company.
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David M. Adelstein, Kirwin NorrisMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Court Strikes Expert Opinion That Surety Acted as a “De Facto Contractor”
November 27, 2023 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesDesignating and admitting experts is a vital component of any construction dispute. Many construction disputes require experts. Many construction disputes can only be won with the role of an expert. Thus, experts and construction disputes go hand-in-hand. No doubt about it! Time needs to be spent on developing the right expert opinions to support your burden of proof. This means you want to designate the right expert that can credibly and reliably render an expert opinion.
It is common for one party to move to strike the testimony and expert opinions of another party. This is referred to as a Daubert motion. Sometimes the motion is about gamesmanship. Sometimes it is to see how the judge rules on the issue. Sometimes there is a legitimate reason associated with the expert opinion. And, sometimes, it is a combination of the above. Regardless of the reason, parties know the weight expert opinions can have and, therefore, treat the opinions seriously prompting the Daubert motion.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Colorado Hotel Neighbors Sue over Construction Plans
October 02, 2015 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFNeighbors of the Sky Hotel in Aspen, Colorado, filed suit against the owners “alleging that the construction project will impede access to their units and steal their airspace,” reported the Aspen Daily News Online.
The problem, the plaintiff suit alleges, is that the Sky’s plan would close the “east-west alley,” which is also used by the condo complex: “Owners, renters and guests mainly use the alley, which is configured for one-way traffic entering on Durant Avenue and exiting at Original Street, to access their condos in the Chaumont, says the 12-page complaint filed by local attorney Jody Edwards.”
The plaintiffs are demanding that the plan be voided or at least require the issues in the suit to be addressed. They are also seeking attorney and other costs.
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Ninth Circuit Issues Pro-Contractor Licensing Ruling
July 18, 2018 —
Amy L. Pierce – Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogOn July 10, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued its much anticipated and a pro-contractor ruling in MP Nexlevel of California, Inc. v. CVIN LLC. The appeal arose from a dispute over the scope of a California specialty contractor’s license and, more particular, involved whether the subcontractor’s performance of certain work was outside the scope of its license constituting a breach of contract and resulting in the contractor not being entitled to payment for its work (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 7031(a)). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the matter, finding that “Nexlevel’s work here was ‘incidental and supplemental’ to the installation of these fiberoptic systems,” as contemplated by Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 16, § 831.
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Amy L. Pierce, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLPMs. Pierce may be contacted at
amy.pierce@pillsburylaw.com
Georgia Federal Court Holds That Pollution Exclusion Bars Coverage Under Liability Policy for Claims Arising From Discharge of PFAS Into Waterways
December 18, 2022 —
Paul Briganti - White and WilliamsOn December 5, 2022, the U.S. District Court for the District of Georgia held that a total pollution exclusion (TPE) in a CGL policy relieved the insurer of any obligation to defend or indemnify a recycling company in a putative class action alleging PFAS contamination of Georgia waterways. See Grange Ins. Co. v. Cycle-Tex Inc., et al., Order, Civ. A. No. 4:21-cv-00147-AT (N.D. Ga. Dec. 5, 2022). The decision adds to a slowly-developing body of case law addressing coverage issues arising out of PFAS-related claims.
In Grange, the insured, Cycle-Tex, Inc., was the operator of a thermoplastics recycling facility in Dalton, Georgia. Cycle-Tex and other defendants – which included chemical suppliers, carpet manufacturers, intermediaries, the City of Dalton and the Dalton-Whitfield Solid Waste Authority – were named in a putative class action complaint alleging that residents of Dalton had been injured as a result of the defendants’ discharge of PFAS into local waterways. The complaint sought damages for: (1) alleged harm to the residents’ health by virtue of ingesting contaminated water; (2) alleged property damage resulting from the contamination of the public water supply; and (3) the payment of surcharges and heightened water rates as a result of the alleged contamination.
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Paul Briganti, White and WilliamsMr. Briganti may be contacted at
brigantip@whiteandwilliams.com
A Landlord’s Guide to California’s New Statewide Rent Control Laws
May 18, 2020 —
Colton Addy - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogApplicability of California’s Rent Control Laws: California Civil Code Sections 1946.2 and 1947.12 took effect on January 1, 2020, and implement statewide rent control in California for most residential properties. The rent control laws, however, do not apply to a rental property that was issued a certificate of occupancy in the last 15 years. (Civ. Code §§ 1947.12(d)(4), 1946.2(e)(7)). The statutes also do not apply to most single-family residences, provided that (a) the owner is not a real estate investment trust, a corporation, or a limited liability company where one of the members is a corporation, and (b) the required statutory language is included in the lease agreement for tenancies commencing or renewing on or after July 1, 2020. (Civ. Code §§ 1947.12(d)(5), 1946.2(e)(8)).
Annual Increases Permitted Under California’s Rent Control Laws: Commencing on January 1, 2020, unless otherwise permitted by California law, a Landlord cannot increase the gross rental rate for a rental unit over a continuous 12-month period more than the change in the regional cost of living index where the property is located plus 5%, and gross rental rate increases are subject to a maximum cap of 10% over a continuous 12-month period regardless of the change in the cost of living index. (Civ. Code § 1947.12(a)(1)). The gross rental rate is determined using the lowest rental amount charged in any month in the immediately preceding 12 months. (Id.) Any incentives, discounts, concessions, or credits are not taken into account. (Id.) Even if a rent increase does not exceed the amount permitted under the statute, a Landlord is prohibited from increasing rent more than twice in any continuous 12-month period. (Civ. Code § 1947.12(a)(2)).
Retroactive Applicability of Restrictions on Rent Increases: Although the statute took effect on January 1, 2020, the statute retroactively applies to all rent increases that occurred on or after March 15, 2019. (Civ. Code § 1947.12(h)(1)). If a landlord increased the rent amount more than the amount permitted under California Civil Code Section 1947.12(a)(1) after March 15, 2019, and prior to January 1, 2020, the rent amount on January 1, 2020, is reduced to the amount of the rent on March 15, 2019, plus the maximum permissible increase under California Civil Code Section 1947.12(a)(1). (Civ. Code § 1947.12(h)(2)). The Landlord does not have to refund the tenant any rent payments that were in excess of the permissible rent increase that the tenant made prior to January 1, 2020. (Id.)
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Colton Addy, Snell & WilmerMr. Addy may be contacted at
caddy@swlaw.com
