Superior Court Of Pennsylvania Holds That CASPA Does Not Allow For Individual Claims Against A Property Owner’s Principals Or Shareholders
January 07, 2015 —
William J. Taylor and Michael Jervis – White and Williams LLPIn Scungio Borst Assocs. v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that an individual principal/shareholder of a property owner could not be held personally liable as an “agent of the owner” for unpaid invoices, penalties, and attorneys fees under the Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (CASPA), 73 P.S. §§ 501-516, even though the property owner itself had failed to make payments allegedly due under a construction contract.
CASPA is a Pennsylvania statute which is designed to protect contractors and subcontractors from nonpayment and which, to that end, establishes rules and deadlines for payment under construction contracts between property owners, contractors, and subcontractors. An owner or contractor who does not adhere to the Act’s payment requirements is subject to the imposition of interest, penalties, and attorneys’ fees. In this recent case, the property owner, a limited liability company, had retained the plaintiff contractor to perform construction services on a condominium project. Upon completion of the work, the contractor was not paid approximately $1.5 million that it was owed under the contract. The contractor filed suit under CASPA to obtain the payment it was owed plus interest, penalties and fees, and named both the property owner and its individual principal as defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment to the individual principal on all claims asserted against him, and the contractor appealed, arguing that CASPA allows for claims against both a property owner and its principal when the principal is an “agent of the owner acting with the owner’s authority.”
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael Jervis, White and Williams LLP and
William J. Taylor, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Jervis may be contacted at jervism@whiteandwilliams.com; Mr. Taylor may be contacted at taylorw@whiteandwilliams.com
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Quick Note: Third-Party Can Bring Common Law Bad Faith Claim
July 01, 2019 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA third-party claimant may bring a common law bad faith claim against a defendant’s liability insurer. Mccullough v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, 2019 WL 2076192, *2 (S.D.Fla. 2019). “A bad faith claim may be brought by a third party absent an assignment from the [defendant] insured.” Id. This can only be done in the third-party bad faith context with the argument that the insurer’s “bad faith” conduct resulted in a judgment against the defendant-insured in excess of the policy limits. However, in any third-party bad faith claim (and, really, bad faith claim in general), coverage must first be determined under the policy.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Flag on the Play! Expired Contractor’s License!
October 02, 2015 —
Yas Omidi – California Construction Law BlogIt’s football season again. Which means, of course, that in addition to touch downs and field goals, you’ll also see hooting and hollering when the ref throws down a yellow flag signaling that a foul has been committed.
In Judicial Council of California v. Jacob Facilities, Inc., Case Nos. A140890, A141393 (August 20, 2015), The California Court of Appeals for the First District threw down its own yellow flag under the dreaded Business and Professions Code section 7031, finding that a contractor was required to disgorge all monies received on a project – to the tune of a whopping $18 million – when its parent company allowed the subsidiary’s contractor’s license to lapse when it rebranded a new company to perform the work of the old company but never formally assigned the contract. I think someone in marketing may be in big trouble.
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Yasmeen, Omidi, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMs. Omidi may be contacted at
yomidi@wendel.com
Governor Bob Ferguson’s Recent Executive Orders – A Positive Sign for Washington’s Construction Industry
January 21, 2025 —
Ryan Sternoff & Trygve Groh - Ahlers Cressman & SleightOn January 15th, in his first act as Washington’s Governor, Bob Ferguson signed three executive orders, two of which may have a direct impact by removing some of the “red tape” that stifles Washington’s construction industry. This appears to be a positive sign that the Governor’s office is focused on pragmatic action, rather than partisan politics.
Executive Order 25-02 is entitled “Assessing Regulatory Efficiency and Addressing Washington’s Affordable Housing Crisis” and directs all executive and small cabinet agencies (collectively, “State Agencies”) to review their rules and regulations and prepare a report for the Governor’s Office that identifies rules or regulations that impact the construction of new housing. The reports will also identify rules or regulations that are no longer necessary and can be rescinded, rules or regulations that can be amended to speed up housing construction. The reports will include descriptions of proposed amendments to such rules and regulations. The reports must be provided to the Governor’s Office within sixty days.
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Ryan Sternoff, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMr. Sternoff may be contacted at
ryan.sternoff@acslawyers.com
London's Walkie Talkie Tower Voted Britain's Worst New Building
September 03, 2015 —
Neil Callanan – BloombergThe skyscraper at 20 Fenchurch Street in the City of London, nicknamed the Walkie Talkie, is the worst new building in Britain, according to a panel assembled by Building Design magazine.
The 37-story tower, designed by Rafael Vinoly, was made famous two years ago when a beam of light reflected from the building melted parts of a Jaguar sports car. The problem has since been remedied by developers Land Securities Group Plc and Canary Wharf Group Plc.
It is a challenge finding anyone who has something positive to say about this building,” Thomas Lane, editor of the magazine for architects, said in a statement on Thursday. “Londoners now have to suffer views of this bloated carbuncle crashing into London’s historic skyline like an unwelcome guest at a party from miles away.”
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Neil Callanan, Bloomberg
Court Affirms Summary Adjudication of Bad Faith Claim Where Expert Opinions Raised a Genuine Dispute
July 06, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn 501 East 51st Street etc. v. Kookmin Best Ins. Co., Ltd. (No. B293605, filed 4/2/20, ordered pub. 4/16/20), a California appeals court affirmed summary adjudication and dismissal of a bad faith claim based on the genuine dispute doctrine.
501 East 51st Street Long-Beach-10, LLC (501) was the owner of a 10-unit apartment complex, insured by Kookmin Best. In 2017, an underground water main alongside the building burst which, according to 501, caused the building to move and crack. 501 made a claim and supplied a geotechnical report finding cracks in the foundation walls, cracks in the stucco and significant floor deformation and tilting near the water leak. The engineer’s opinion concluded that that “existing building distress was substantially contributed to by the water main break. The water introduced to the soil medium appears to have triggered differential foundation movement causing the stress features to develop.”
Kookmin retained its own engineers to investigate, who returned an opinion that the leak had exacerbated long-term pre-existing settlement which would continue. Under the policy, damage to the building caused by earth movement and settlement were excluded, but water damage resulting from an “accidental discharge” of water was covered. Kookmin then obtained an opinion from coverage counsel, who opined that only damage allocable to the water leak would be covered.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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The Privacy Shield Is Gone: How Do I Now Move Data from the EU to the US
February 08, 2021 —
Heather Whitehead - Newmeyer DillionFollowing the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union (EU) in case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v. Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems (known as “Schrems II”), companies in the United States can no longer rely on the Privacy Shield, the framework developed by the US Department of Commerce, and the European Commission and Swiss Administration to promote transatlantic commerce while protecting personal data.
Schrems II Invalidated the Privacy Shield and Creates Uncertainty
Schrems II concluded that the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield Framework is no longer a valid mechanism to comply with EU data protection requirements when transferring personal data from the EU to the United States. Further, in a subsequent decision, the Swiss Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner concluded that the data protection of the Privacy Shield does not provide an adequate level of protection for data transfer from Switzerland to the US pursuant to their Federal Act on Data Protection.
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Heather Whitehead, Newmeyer DillionMs. Whitehead may be contacted at
heather.whitehead@ndlf.com
