Seattle Washington Building Expert Directory

MBS’s $500 Billion Desert Dream Just Keeps Getting Weirder

August 29, 2022 — Vivian Nereim - Bloomberg
One day last September, a curious email arrived in Chris Hables Gray’s inbox. An author and self-described anarchist, feminist, and revolutionary, Gray fits right into Santa Cruz, Calif., where he lives. He’s written extensively about genetic engineering and the inevitable rise of cyborgs, attending protests in between for causes such as Black Lives Matter. While Gray had taken some consulting gigs over the years, he’d never received an offer like this one. The first shock was the money: significantly more than he’d earned from all but one of his books. The second was the task: researching the aesthetics of seminal works of science fiction such as Blade Runner. The biggest surprise, however, was the ultimate client: Mohammed bin Salman, the 36-year-old crown prince of Saudi Arabia. MBS, as he’s known abroad, was in the early stages of one of the largest and most difficult construction projects in history, which involves turning an expanse of desert the size of Belgium into a high-tech city-region called Neom. Starting with a budget of $500 billion, MBS bills Neom as a showpiece that will transform Saudi Arabia’s economy and serve as a testbed for technologies that could revolutionize daily life. And as Gray’s proposed assignment suggested, the crown prince’s vision bears little resemblance to the cities of today. Intrigued, Gray took the job. “If I can be honest with how I see the world, I’ll pretty much put my work out to anyone,” he says. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Vivian Nereim, Bloomberg

The ‘Sole Option’ Arbitration Provision in Construction Contracts

July 16, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
On his Best Practices Construction Law blog, Matthew Devries discussed how the “at its sole option…has the right to demand arbitration” can “be a good provision if you are the party who has that option.” For instance, Devries cites the case Archer Western Contractors, LLC v Holder Construction Company, where “the Georgia Court of Appeals recently affirmed the trial court’s decision to grant a contractor’s motion to compel arbitration with a ‘sole option’ provision.” Devries stated that “it is important to review carefully the disputes clause in your construction contract to fully understand who has the right to demand arbitration and what rules will apply.” Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of

Prime Contractor & Surety’s Recovery of Attorney’s Fees in Miller Act Lawsuit

February 02, 2017 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Can a claimant recover attorney’s fees in a Miller Act payment bond dispute even though the Miller Act does not contain a prevailing party attorney’s fee provision? Yes, if the underlying contract that formed the basis of the suit provided for attorney’s fees. What about a prime contractor and surety—can they recover their attorney’s fees if they prevail in a Miller Act payment bond claim and the underlying contract provides a basis for fees? The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S.A. f/u/b/o RMP Capital Corp. v. Turner Construction Co., 2017 WL 244066 (11th Cir. 2017) seemingly just answered this question in the affirmative when it reversed a lower court’s ruling that precluded a prime contractor and surety that prevailed in a Miller Act claim from recovering their attorney’s fees[.] Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal Updates
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dadelstein@gmail.com

Miller Act Bond Claims Subject to “Pay If Paid”. . . Sometimes

November 04, 2019 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
The Federal Miller Act is a great tool that subcontractors and suppliers on Federal projects can use for collection of wrongfully withheld amounts due. However, as a recent federal case from the Eastern District of Virginia points out, the construction contract’s terms affect when a subcontractor or supplier can use this great collection tool and how much it can recover. In Aarow v Travelers the Court looked at the interaction between a typical termination clause, a “pay when paid” clause, and the Miller Act. The key facts are these. The general contractor on the project at issue, Syska, did not get paid some disputed amounts by the owner and subsequently did not pay Aarow, the plaintiff and a subcontractor on the project. Aarow then refused to continue work and was terminated by Syska who then took over the completion of the work. Aarow sued, seeking damages for the value of its work prior to the termination. Travellers, the surety defended stating that, if Aarow was properly terminated for cause by Syska, then Aarow was not entitled to payment under the contract until such time as the work was completed and accepted by the owner. The termination clauses are set out in the linked opinion. The Court agreed with Travelers, stating that the pay when paid clause created a situation whereby Aarow could not stop work merely because of a non-payment by Syska attributed to non-payment by the owner. The Court was clear in stating that the Miller Act trumps “pay when paid” in instances where the only cause for non-payment is non-payment by an owner. The Court then reasoned that it is the interaction between the termination and “pay when paid” provisions, and not the “pay when paid” clause itself, that exonerated Travelers because it created the default by Aarow due to its refusal to continue work. In short, Aarow was properly terminated for cause because it left the job without justification and therefore Travelers was not liable. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

Hunton Insurance Recovery Lawyers Ranked by Chambers as Top Insurance Practitioners

May 27, 2019 — Michael S. Levine - Hunton Andrews Kurth
Hunton Andrews Kurth insurance recovery partner, Lorie Masters, received a top “Band 1” ranking by Chambers and Partners in the Insurance: Policyholder category for the District of Columbia, and a “Band 2” ranking in the Insurance: Dispute Resolution: Policyholder – USA – Nationwide category. Hunton Andrews Kurth insurance recovery associate, Andrea DeField, also was recognized by Chambers in the Associate to Watch: Insurance: Florida category. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com

Policy Language Matters: New Jersey Court Bars Cleanup Coverage Under Broad Policy Terms

May 15, 2023 — Stacy M. Manobianca - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
The New Jersey Appellate Division in Handy & Harman v. Beazley USA Services, Inc., provided clarity regarding the interpretation of the Prior or Pending Litigation Exclusion in a site-specific environmental liability insurance policy. In Handy & Harman, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination that the insurer was not required to defend or indemnify its policyholder, a metal etching company. The court held that the Prior or Pending Litigation Exclusion (which applied to prior litigation and prior claims) barred coverage for natural resource damages sought in the current litigation because (1) an Administrative Consent Order (“ACO”) is a claim; and (2) the underlying lawsuit was based on the same environmental contamination as addressed in the ACO.1 Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Stacy M. Manobianca, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Manobianca may be contacted at SManobianca@sdvlaw.com

Title II under ADA Applicable to Public Rights-of-Way, Parks and Other Recreation Areas

June 29, 2017 — Richard E. Morton - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Plaintiff Ivana Kirola, who suffers from cerebral palsy, sued the City and County of San Francisco, in a class action contending certain public areas, including rights-of-way, pools, parks and other recreation areas, did not meet the mandate of Title II of the American With Disabilities Act (Kirola v. City and County of San Francisco, 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, No. 14-17521, 2017 DJDAR 5982). Title II provides that no qualified individual with a disability “shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Title II’s implementing regulations mandate that each facility constructed after January 26, 1992 be “readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” And, for each facility “altered after January 26, 1992,” the altered portion must, “to the maximum extent feasible,” be likewise accessible. The Federal Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board creates nonbinding Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) to ensure compliance with Title II, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) adopt its own binding regulations, consistent with the ADAAG standards. Here, the District Court interpreted ADAAG standards as not applying to public rights-of-way, parks, and playground facilities. The District Court concluded that none of Kirola’s experts were reliable in their interpretation of the standards and how the standards applied to the public rights-of-way, etc. Conversely, the District Court concluded that all of the city’s experts were reliable. It thus disregarded and discarded every ADAAG violation identified by Kirola’s experts, accepting only the small number of violations identified by the city’s experts. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Richard E. Morton, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Morton may be contacted at rmorton@hbblaw.com

Terminating Contracts for Convenience — “Just Because”

June 28, 2021 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
Termination for convenience provisions are important provisions to include in construction contracts. These are provisions that allow a party to terminate the contract for ANY REASON. No cause is needed to exercise the termination for convenience provision. In other words, the terminating party does not have to demonstrate the other party breached the contract. A termination for convenience can be exercised “just because.” Typically, the party providing the service should not get to terminate for convenience. However, the party receiving the service will want to be afforded this contractual right. For example, an owner (receiving a service) will want to include a termination for convenience provision with its prime contractor (providing a service). And, a general contractor (receiving a service) will want to include a termination for convenience provision in its subcontract with its subcontractor (providing a service). However, a general contractor providing a service for an owner, or a subcontractor providing a service to a general contractor, should not be able to terminate the contract for their convenience “just because” a better opportunity comes along. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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