Virginia Allows Condominium Association’s Insurer to Subrogate Against a Condominium Tenant
August 10, 2020 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Erie Insurance Exchange v. Alba, Rec. No. 190389, 2020 Va. LEXIS 53, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether the trial court erred in finding that a condominium association’s property insurance provider waived its right of subrogation against a tenant of an individual unit owner. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the insurance policy only named unit owners as additional insureds, not tenants, and thus the subrogation waiver in the insurance policy did not apply to tenants. The court also found that the condominium association’s governing documents provided no protections to the unit owner’s tenant because the tenant was not a party to those documents. This case establishes that, in Virginia, a condominium association’s insurance carrier can subrogate against a unit owner’s tenant where the tenant is not identified as an additional insured on the policy.
The Alba case involved a fire at a condominium building originating in a unit occupied by Naomi Alba (Alba), who leased the condominium under a rental agreement with the unit owner, John Sailsman (Sailsman). The agreement explicitly held Alba responsible for her conduct and the conduct of her guests. An addendum to the lease stated that Sailsman’s property insurance only applied to the “dwelling itself” and that Alba was required to purchase renters insurance to protect her personal property. Along with the rental agreement, Alba received the condominium association’s Rules & Regulations, Declarations and Bylaws.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Colorado HB 13-1090: Concerning Payment of Amounts Due Under a Construction Agreement
February 21, 2013 —
David M. McLain — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCOn January 17, 2013 Representative Fischer introduced House Bill 13-1090 into the Colorado House of Representatives. HB 1090 was assigned the House Business, Labor, Economic and Workforce Development Committee.
The bill, sponsored by Senator Tochtrop in the Senate, sets the following requirements for both private and public construction contracts:
The owner and contractor must make regular progress payments approximately every 30 days to contractors and subcontractors for work actually performed.
To receive the progress payments, the contractor and subcontractor must submit a progress payment invoice plus any required documents.
A contractor must pass on the progress payment to the subcontractor within 5 days or by the end of the billing cycle.
Interest accrues on unpaid progress payments.
A contract may extend a billing cycle to 60 days, but the contract must duly warn of this.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David M. McLainmclain@hhmrlaw.com
Good Signs for Housing Market in 2013
December 20, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFDan Green, a loan officer at Waterstone Mortgage, is optimistic about the construction market in 2013. He notes that the rise in building permit, housing starts, and housing completions are all good signs. Mortgage rates are still low, making these new homes attractive to buyers.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Global Emissions From Buildings, Construction Climb to Record Levels
November 28, 2022 —
Gautam Naik - BloombergCarbon-dioxide emissions from building construction and operations hit an all-time high in 2021, according to the most recent data, a sign that the push to decarbonize the industry by 2050 may be slipping out of reach.
Energy-related emissions from the operation of buildings reached 10 gigatonnes of CO2 equivalent, 5% higher than 2020 levels and 2% more than the pre-pandemic peak in 2019, according to data compiled by the Global Alliance for Buildings and Construction. Operational energy demand in buildings for heating, cooling, lighting and equipment rose about 4% from 2020 levels, the group said.
While investments in building energy efficiency increased 16% last year to $237 billion, the growth in floor space outpaced efficiency efforts. As a result, “the gap between the climate performance of the sector and the 2050 decarbonization pathway is widening,” the report concluded.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gautam Naik, Bloomberg
A License to Sue: Appellate Court Upholds Condition of Statute that a Contracting Party Must Hold a Valid Contractor’s License to Pursue Action for Recovery of Payment for Contracting Services
June 21, 2017 —
Omar Parra & Jesse M. Sullivan - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPCalifornia Business & Professions Code section 7031(a) requires a party to have contractor’s license in order to maintain an action for compensation for services performed for which a contractor’s license is needed. In Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc. v. Space Exploration Technologies Corp., No. B269186 (2017 WL 2544856) (Cal. Ct. App. June 13, 2017), the Court of Appeal for the Second Appellate District considered the scope of this statute in denying, in part, Phoenix Mechanical Pipeline, Inc.’s (“Phoenix Pipeline”) appeal of a trial court ruling granting Space Exploration Technologies Corporation’s (“SpaceX”) demurrer to Phoenix Pipeline’s second amended complaint, without leave to amend.
Phoenix Pipeline filed the underlying lawsuit for, among other claims, breach of contract and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from an agreement with SpaceX for Phoenix Pipeline to perform various plumbing, concrete removal and electrical services. Phoenix Pipeline alleged SpaceX paid for such services from 2010 to October 2013, but failed to pay Phoenix for services performed from October 2013 to August 2014, totaling just over $1,000,000. According to Phoenix Pipeline, this work was performed pursuant to a series of invoices, which constituted individual agreements between SpaceX and Phoenix Pipeline.
Reprinted courtesy of
Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Jesse M. Sullivan, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com
Mr. Sullivan may be contacted at jsullivan@hbblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Dispute Resolution Provision in Subcontract that Says Owner, Architect or Engineer’s Decision Is Final
March 29, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn subcontracts, it is not uncommon to see a provision that says something to the effect:
Should any dispute arise between the parties respecting the true construction or interpretation of the Plans, Specifications and/or the Contract Requirements, the decision of the Owner or the Owner’s designated representative as set forth in the General Contract shall be final.
This is a provision in a subcontract dealing with dispute resolution, typically when there is a dispute as to whether the subcontractor is performing extra-contractual or base contract work regarding an “interpretation of the Plans, Specifications, and/or the Contract Requirements.” It is not uncommon for there to be a dispute as to whether certain work is within the subcontractor’s scope of work or outside the subcontractor’s scope of work and subject to a change order.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
North Carolina Weakened Its Building Codes in 2013
October 09, 2018 —
Ari Natter - BloombergFive years ago, encouraged by home builders and an anti-regulatory zeal, lawmakers in North Carolina joined other states in weakening building code requirements.
It’s a decision they may regret as Hurricane Florence takes aim at the Carolinas.
The Legislature in 2013 increased the amount of time between updates to its building code from three years to six. That means that updates that set new standards for elevating the floors in flood-prone homes aren’t in effect, according to the Federal Alliance for Safe Homes Inc., a non-profit disaster safety organization.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Ari Natter, Bloomberg
