Constructive Suspension (Suspension Outside of an Express Order)
December 13, 2022 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn the federal procurement arena, there is a concept known as “constructive suspension.” Constructive suspension, while known in the federal arena, should reasonably apply to all projects when work is stopped outside of an express order to stop the work based on the law below. An unreasonable suspension is an unreasonable suspension and an express order to stop the work does not negate the effects of what really amounts to a suspension.
“Constructive suspension occurs when work is stopped absent an express order by the contracting officer and the government is found to be responsible for the work stoppage.” P.R. Burke Corp. v. U.S., 277 F.3d 1346, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The government delay must be unreasonable to support a constructive acceleration claim. Id.
“To demonstrate such a constructive suspension of work, the contractor must show that the delay (1) was for an ‘unreasonable length of time,’ (2) was proximately caused by the government’s actions, and (3) resulted in some injury to the contractor.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. U.S., 2001 WL 36415627, *6 (Fed.Cl. 2001) (citation omitted). “Relative to proving that the delay was directly caused by the government, the contractor must concomitantly show that it was not delayed by any concurrent cause that would have independently generated the delay during the same time period even if it does not predominate over the government’s action as the cause of the delay.” Beauchamp Const. Co. v. U.S., 14 Cl.Ct. 430, 437 (Cl.Ct. 1988).
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Department of Transportation Revises Its Rules Affecting Environmental Review of Transportation Projects
December 04, 2018 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogOn October 29, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) published a final rule in the Federal Register which amends and revises the environmental National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) procedures rules employed by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the Federal Transit Administration (FTA). There is a renewed interest in transportation infrastructure projects, and recent legislation is intended to accelerate required environmental reviews.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Labor Code § 2708 Presumption of Employer Negligence is Not Applicable Against Homeowners Who Hired Unlicensed Painting Company
December 02, 2015 —
Kristian B. Moriarty & Yvette Davis – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Vebr v. Culp (Filed 10/28/2015, No. G050730), the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of homeowners, where an employee of an unlicensed painting company was injured on the premises. Despite the fact that the painting company was deemed unlicensed for failure to acquire workers’ compensation insurance, the negligence presumption of Labor Code § 2708 was inapplicable to the homeowners as de facto “employers" of the plaintiff.
Plaintiff, Tomas Vebr, was employed by OC Wide Painting, a licensed painting contractor. OC Wide Painting had a license issued by the California Contractors State License Board, but had filed for an exemption from the requirement that it maintain workers’ compensation insurance. The exemption was granted on the basis OC Wide Painting “did not have any employees.” However, OC Wide Painting actually had multiple employees, including Vebr. Therefore, by operation of law, the license was deemed void.
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Kristian B. Moriarty, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Yvette Davis, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at kmoriarty@hbblaw.com
Ms. Davis may be contacted at ydavis@hbblaw.com
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Water Drainage Case Lacks Standing
March 28, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals has ruled in the case La Tierra de Simmons Familia Ltd. V. Main Event Entertainment, LP. The trial court had found for Main Event. On appeal, the court threw out some of the grounds on which the trial court had reached its decision.
The case involved two commercial lots in northwest Austin, Texas. The uphill tract (Phase III of the Anderson Arbor development) diverts its runoff onto the lower tract (the “Ballard tract”). The owners of the Ballard tract claim that “the drainage system was designed or constructed in a manner that has damaged and continues to damage the Ballard tract.”
Both tracts have undergone changes of ownership since the construction of the drainage system in 2004. At the time the drainage system was constructed, the parcel was owned by Sears Roebuck and Co. Sears later sold the property. Main Event Entertainment is the current tenant. Likewise, the Ballard tract was previously owned by the Ballard Estate which sold the property to La Tierra on an “as is” basis in 2007.
After La Tierra bought the Ballard tract, La Tierra’s engineer “witnessed and videotaped what he described as ‘flooding’ on the Ballard tract caused by storm water discharge from the Anderson Arbor drainage system during a rainfall event.” La Tierra determined that an adequate drainage system would cost about $204,000. Development plans were put on hold.
La Tierra sued Main Event and various other parties associated with the uphill tract, seeking “actual damages for (1) decrease and loss in rental income due to delay in obtaining the development permit, (2) interest on carrying costs during that time period, (3) the cost to build a water conveyance system on the Ballard tract, (4) engineering fees incurred to redesign the water conveyance system, (5) unspecified out-of-pocket real estate expenses, and (6) property devaluation occasioned by the need to construct an expensive water conveyance system.” The trial court never reached these claims, ruling instead that La Tierra lacked standing, that its claims were barred under the statute of limitations, and that there was no evidence of damage.
La Tierra appealed, arguing that “(1) the summary-judgment evidence does not conclusively establish that property damage claims accrued or were discovered prior to September 11, 2007, which is within the limitations period and was after La Tierra purchased the property; (2) even if the property was damaged before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract, standing exists based on the assignments of interest from the Ballard Estate heirs, and the discovery rule tolls limitations until the injury was discovered on September 11, 2007; (3) limitations does not bar La Tierra's request for injunctive relief; (4) La Tierra's water code claim against Main Event and M.E.E.P. is viable based on their control over the drainage system, which makes them necessary and indispensable parties for injunctive relief; (5) La Tierra presented more than a scintilla of evidence to raise a fact issue on damages, causation, and other essential elements of its causes of action; and (6) the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the defendants' objections to La Tierra's summary-judgment evidence.”
The appeals court concluded that La Tierra’s second claim was irrelevant to standing, as La Tierra “obtained assignments from the Ballard Estate heirs ? nearly one year after the lawsuit was initially filed.” Nor did the court accept their first point. The water system had been operating unaltered since January, 2004, with monthly maintenance and inspection to maintain its designed operation. Further, a feasibility report La Tierra received stated that “over sixteen acres drain into those ponds, and thus onto this site.” The court noted that “the underlying facts giving rise to a cause of action were known before La Tierra acquired ownership of the Ballard tract.”
The court concluded that the drainage issue is a permanent injury, but that it “accrued before La Tierra acquired an ownership interest in the property.” As La Tierra has standing, the appeals court ruled that it was improper for the trial court to rule on the issues. The appeals court dismissed the questions of whether the case was barred under the statute of limitation and also the question of whether or not La Tierra had damages.
As the issue of standing would not allow La Tierra to bring the suit, the appeals court found for the defendants, dismissing the case for this single reason, and otherwise affirming the ruling of the lower court.
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A Guide to California’s Changes to Civil Discovery Rules
April 29, 2024 —
Lewis Brisbois NewsroomSan Diego, Calif. (April 10, 2024) - California legislators have changed the rules of discovery in civil cases through the passage of amendments to Code of Civil Procedure sections 2016.090 and 2023.050, effective January 1, 2024.
Section 2016.090 creates a new set of rules for civil litigators in cases filed on or after January 1, 2024, which permits any party to the litigation to demand initial disclosures be provided within 60-days. Such a demand can be made any time after a party has filed a responsive pleading, including a demurrer or motion to strike.
Notably, this rule requires production of all information relevant to any causes of action that are pled at the time of the demand, meaning the parties may be required to disclose information related to claims that are being challenged on demurrer or a motion to strike, such as claims for punitive damages. This statute is only implicated when one of the parties to the action makes a demand and may be modified by stipulation of the parties.
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Lewis Brisbois
California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
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There’s an Unusual Thing Happening in the Housing Market
October 03, 2022 —
Tracy Alloway - BloombergIt’s no secret that the US housing market has been softening as interest rates rise at the fastest pace in decades.
Higher mortgage rates mean the dramatic growth in home prices that we’ve seen over the past two years is beginning to slow. Sales of new homes recently came in at the weakest monthly level since 2018. Meanwhile, purchase applications are down 20% year-on-year, and so on.
But the rapid pace of rate hikes has also resulted in an interesting statistical anomaly. Months of supply — or the number of months it would take for the existing inventory of homes on the market to sell at the current sales pace — has jumped to 4.1 from a record low of just 2.1 back in January of this year. And, as Morgan Stanley strategist James Egan notes, rarely have we seen an increase of this size.
To some extent, the jump in inventory is to be expected. It’s maths. As sales volume falls while inventories rise, months of supply naturally increases.
But such a jump is intuitively striking, and the key question for housing-watchers is whether the absolute level of inventory — which is still low by many measures, even as homebuilders have ramped up construction since last year — will turn out to be more important than its rate of change. A housing market that is structurally undersupplied is going to be a lot less vulnerable to fewer sales.
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Tracy Alloway, Bloomberg
Housing Starts in U.S. Little Changed From Stronger January
March 19, 2014 —
Jeanna Smialek – BloombergHousing starts in the U.S. were little changed in February after declining less than previously estimated a month earlier, indicating the home-building industry is stabilizing after bad winter weather curbed construction.
The 0.2 percent decrease to 907,000 homes at an annualized rate last month followed a revised 909,000 pace in January, figures from the Commerce Department in Washington showed today. The median estimate in a Bloomberg survey called for a 910,000 rate after a previously reported 880,000 in January.
Warmer temperatures, a pickup in demand during the spring selling season and limited housing supply may help fuel further gains in new residential construction. The outlook for the industry later this year depends on whether hiring picks up enough to overcome higher mortgage rates and home prices.
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Jeanna Smialek, BloombergMs. Smialek may be contacted at
jsmialek1@bloomberg.net