General Contractor Intervening to Compel Arbitration Per the Subcontract
December 06, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIt is not uncommon that a general contractor’s subcontract will include an arbitration provision. Or it will allow the general contractor to select binding arbitration as the method to resolve disputes at the general contractor’s SOLE OPTION. A general contractor’s subcontract should absolutely give the general contractor this important right. (Keep this in mind when drafting dispute resolution provisions for a general contractor.)
It is also not uncommon for a subcontractor the sue a general contractor’s payment bond surety, and NOT the general contractor. One reason to do this is to create an argument to avoid the dispute resolution provision in the subcontract. (Another reason is to avoid any pay-if-paid defense.) When this occurs, a general contractor may still want to arbitrate the subcontractor’s payment bond dispute and a way to do so is for the general intervene in the lawsuit and move to compel arbitration. Sometimes, it is even practical for the general contractor to immediately initiate the arbitration process against the subcontractor, particularly if the general contractor wants to assert a counterclaim, so that the motion to compel is supported by the formal demand for arbitration (and filed with the American Arbitration Association or other body administering the arbitration). I have done this on a number of occasions.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
No Global MDL for COVID Business Interruption Claims, but Panel Will Consider Separate Consolidated Proceedings for Lloyds, Cincinnati, Hartford, Society
August 24, 2020 —
Eric B. Hermanson & Konrad R. Krebs - White and WilliamsIn a widely anticipated ruling, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has denied two motions to centralize pretrial proceedings in hundreds of federal cases seeking coverage for business interruption losses caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Panel has ordered expedited briefing on whether four separate consolidated proceedings should be set up for four insurers – Cincinnati, Society, Hartford, and Lloyds – who appear to be named in the largest number of claims.
In seeking a single, industry-wide MDL proceeding, some plaintiffs had argued that common questions predominated across the hundreds of pending federal suits: namely, [1] the question of what constituted ‘physical loss or damage’ to property, under the allegedly standardized terms of various insurers’ policies; [2] the question whether various government closure orders should trigger coverage under those policies, and [3] the question whether any exclusions, particularly virus exclusions, applied.
Reprinted courtesy of
Eric B. Hermanson, White and Williams and
Konrad R. Krebs, White and Williams
Mr. Hermanson may be contacted at hermansone@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Krebs may be contacted at krebsk@whiteandwilliams.com
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Liability Policy’s Arbitration Endorsement Applies to Third Party Beneficiaries, Including Additional Insureds
May 11, 2020 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co. v. SMG Holdings, Inc. (No. C082841; filed 12/31/19, ord. pub. 1/28/20), a California appeals court held that a binding arbitration clause in an insurance policy extends to a third party, such as an additional insured.
In Philadelphia v. SMG, Philadelphia issued a general liability policy to a youth organization, Future Farmers of America (FFA), that had contracted to use the Fresno Convention Center for its annual convention. The contract required FFA to obtain liability insurance and to name the property manager, SMG, and the City of Fresno, as additional insureds. Philadelphia issued FFA a commercial lines CGL policy with an endorsement affording coverage to “managers, landlords, or lessors of premises” for “liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of that part of the premises leased or rented” to the named insured. It also covered “any person or organization where required by a written contract executed prior to the occurrence” but only for liability arising from the named insured’s negligence.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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General Contractor/Developer May Not Rely on the Homeowner Protection Act to Avoid a Waiver of Consequential Damages in an AIA Contract
August 04, 2011 —
Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCRecently, in Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC v. Zero Energy, LLC, et al., Case No. 10CV1094, Boulder County District Court Judge Ingrid S. Bakke entered a ruling and order on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Determination of Question of Law Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) on Issue of Damages. The Order found that the Plaintiff was not a homeowner intended to be protected by the Homeowner Protection Act (the “HPA”) and thus could not pursue its claims for consequential damages against Defendant.
By way of background, on June 18, 2008, Plaintiff Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC (“Caribou”) entered into a Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor AIA Document A114-2001 (the “Contract”) with Defendant Zero Energy, LLC (“Zero Energy”). Plaintiff hired Zero Energy to serve as a general contractor for the construction of a single-family home in the Caribou Ridge subdivision in Nederland, Colorado. A provision in the contract contained a mutual waiver of consequential damages (“Waiver”).
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Reprinted courtesy Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
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Ohio Supreme Court Rules That Wrongful Death Claims Are Subject to the Four-Year Statute of Repose for Medical Claims
January 16, 2024 —
Lewis Brisbois NewsroomCleveland, Ohio (January 2, 2024) - In a landmark 4-3 ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio ruled on December 28 that wrongful death claims are subject to the four-year statute of repose contained in O.R.C. 2305.113(C) (“Medical Claim Statute of Repose”). Everhart v. Coshocton County Memorial Hospital, Slip No. 2023-Ohio-4670. Statutes of repose create an absolute bar to filing a lawsuit. When applicable, they bar plaintiffs from filing claims outside a specified time frame. The Medical Claim Statute of Repose creates a four-year window for commencing medical claims, which begins to run from “the occurrence of the act or omission constituting the alleged basis of the medical…claim.” O.R.C. 2305.113(C)(1). Medical claims commenced after the four-year period are barred.
The primary question before the Court was whether a wrongful death claim, which is separate and distinct from a medical negligence claim, can qualify as a “medical claim” within the context of the Medical Claim Statute of Repose. The Court answered in the affirmative. A wrongful death claim can qualify as a medical claim if the wrongful death claim “…arises out the medical diagnosis, care, or treatment, of any person.” O.R.C. 2305.113(E)(3). According to the majority, a wrongful death claim can fall within the broad definition of “medical claim” and, if it does, is subject to the Medical Claim Statute of Repose.
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Lewis Brisbois
Big Policyholder Win in Michigan
January 05, 2017 —
Jeremiah M. Welch – Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Jeremiah Welch and
Michael Barrese recently had a big win in front of the Michigan Court of Appeals.
The case (Skanska-Schweitzer v. Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan) involved Skanska’s claim for defense and indemnity from Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Michigan for an injury to an elementary school student arising out of the removal of playground equipment by a landscaping company, Horrocks. Farm Bureau denied coverage because it claimed that the work was not part of Horrocks’ contract with the project owner and therefore Skanska, the construction manager, did not qualify as an additional insured on the policy.
SDV argued that the AI endorsement did not specify that Horrocks’ work be performed as part of its contract with the owner; it only required that the work be performed “for Skanska.”
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Jeremiah M. Welch, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Welch may be contacted at
jmw@sdvlaw.com
In Florida, Exculpatory Clauses Do Not Need Express Language Referring to the Exculpated Party's Negligence
October 02, 2015 —
Edward Jaeger & William Doerler – White and Williams LLPIn Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So.3d 256 (Fla. 2015), the Supreme Court of Florida considered whether a party to a contract, in order to be released from liability for its own negligence, needs to include an express reference to negligence in an exculpatory clause. The court held that, unlike an indemnification clause, so long as the language in an exculpatory clause is clear, the absence of the terms “negligence” or “negligent acts” in an exculpatory clause does not, for that reason alone, render the exculpatory clause ineffective.
Background
Give Kids the World, Inc. (“GKW”) is a non-profit organization that provides free vacations to seriously ill children and their families at GKW’s resort village. To use the resort, vacationers have to fill out an application. Stacy and Eric Sanislo filled out an application to bring their seriously ill child to the village for a vacation and GKW accepted their application. Upon arriving at the resort, the Sanislos filled out a liability release form.
Reprinted courtesy of
Edward Jaeger, White and Williams LLP and
William Doerler, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Jaeger may be contacted at jaegere@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Doerler may be contacted at doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
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Federal Court Holds That Other Insurance Analysis Is Unnecessary If Policies Cover Different Risks
September 28, 2020 —
Craig Rokuson - Traub Lieberman Insurance Law BlogIn Greater Mutual Insurance Company v. Continental Casualty Company, 2020 WL 5370419 (S.D.N.Y. September 8, 2020), the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York had occasion to consider the “other insurance” provisions of a commercial general liability policy, issued by Greater Mutual Insurance Company (“GNY”), and a directors and officers (“D&O”) policy, issued by Continental, to the same insured. The GNY policy covered, inter alia, property damage caused by an occurrence, as well as “personal advertising injury,” defined to include “[t]he wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor.” The Continental D&O policy covered claims for wrongful acts, including “wrongful entry or eviction, or other invasion of the right to private occupancy. . . .” Unlike the GNY policy, however, the Continental policy expressly excluded coverage for damage to tangible property.
In the underlying action, the plaintiffs alleged that the insured engaged in construction work to fix a leak from a terrace on the seventeenth floor. In doing so, the insured accessed the plaintiffs’ roof terrace. The plaintiffs alleged that the construction workers installed and stored construction materials on the roof terrace, making the plaintiffs unable to access the terrace. Plaintiffs also alleged that their deck furniture may have suffered damage, and that the workers had a “direct line of sight” into their unit, resulting in the plaintiffs having to leave their unit frequently. Causes of action were for property damage, constructive eviction, partial constructive eviction, and invasion of privacy.
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Craig Rokuson, Traub LiebermanMr. Rokuson may be contacted at
crokuson@tlsslaw.com
