Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.
April 28, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFIn the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”
The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”
According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”
The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”
The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”
The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.” The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”
Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”
The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”
In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”
The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”
In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”
The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”
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Florida’s Fourth District Appeals Court Clarifies What Actions Satisfy Florida’s Construction Defect Statute of Repose
November 14, 2018 —
Rahul Gogineni - The Subrogation SpecialistIn Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla.App. LEXIS 13019, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently concluded that the date on which the plaintiffs provided a pre-suit notice in compliance with §558.004 of Florida’s construction defect Right-to-Cure statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., is the date on which the plaintiff commenced a “civil action or proceeding,” i.e. an “action,” within the meaning of Florida’s construction defect statute of repose, Florida Statue § 95.11(3)(c). Thus, reversing the decision of the trial court, the Fourth District held that the plaintiffs timely-filed their construction defect action against the defendants.
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Rahul Gogineni, White and Williams LLPMr. Gogineni may be contacted at
goginenir@whiteandwilliams.com
Let’s Get Specific: Rhode Island Court Asserts Jurisdiction Over Out-of-State Manufacturer
February 04, 2025 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Federal Ins. Co. v. J. Gallant Elec. Servs., Inc. No. 1-22- CV-00123-MSM-LDA, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 218185, the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island considered whether it could exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state, third-party defendant. The court granted the third-party defendant’s first motion to dismiss for lack of general jurisdiction but permitted the parties to conduct jurisdictional discovery. After the close of jurisdictional discovery, the third-party defendant renewed its motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. This time, the court found that, based on the record, it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the third-party defendant.
The plaintiff, Federal Insurance Company (Insurer), brought this subrogation action after its insured, the Town of Westerly, sustained a water loss at a public elementary school in 2020. The water loss occurred while the school was undergoing renovations. A defendant, Advanced Safety Systems (Advanced), was retained to replace the fire suppression system in the computer server room. Advanced subcontracted with defendant J. Gallant Electrical Services (Gallant) to replace the electrical service panel for the sprinkler system. Gallant was in process of deenergizing the fire suppression system when the system discharged, causing damage to the equipment in the server room. After paying its insured for the damage, Insurer sued Advanced and Gallant for negligence and breach of contract, alleging that Gallant was careless in causing the system to discharge.
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Gus Sara, White and WilliamsMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Implied Warranties for Infrastructure in Florida Construction Defect Claims
December 30, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFThe homeowners in the Lakeview development built by Maronda Homes in Orange County, Florida started having water and drainage problems shortly after the homeowners association took control of the community. They fought their case all the way to the Florida Supreme Court, where the question was whether implied warranties of fitness covered the community’s infrastructure.
William Martin III, writing on the DestinLog, notes that previous Florida Supreme Court decisions went the other way. In a case involving a seawall, the court held that “unless the seawall was part of or in connection with the construction of a home or in support of a residence.” In the Lakeview case, they determined that the community’s infrastructure was just that: “essential to the habitability of the residence.” The court specifically included roads for ingress and egress, drainage systems to divert flooding, retention ponds to correct water flow damage, and underground pipes which are necessary for living accommodations.”
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Residential Construction: Shrinking Now, Growing Later?
August 17, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFJim Haugey, the Chief Economist for Reed Construction Data noted that new residential construction spending fell 0.2% in June and a slightly larger drop of 0.5% in residential remodeling. While economic growth is still low, Haugey states that homebuilders have “record low inventories.” He forecasts a shrinkage of 1.5% in 2011, followed by about 20% growth in 2012.
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Reminder: Your MLA Notice Must Have Your License Number
November 26, 2014 —
Christopher G. Hill – Construction Law MusingsRemember a couple of years ago when the Virginia mechanic’s lien rules changed to require inclusion of a claimant’s contractor’s license number (where a license is required)? If not, then this is a reminder of that particular wrinkle in the strictly interpreted mechanic’s lien statute. This requirement applies to all mechanic’s lien memoranda and, like all parts of this crazy statute, will invalidate a lien if not met. Well, another change to the statute happened with a bit less fanfare.
The change back in 2013 that came along with the license number requirement for a lien memorandum is a change in the mechanic’s lien agent notice requirement that applies to residential construction. The basic requirement, namely that those performing residential construction must notify any mechanic’s lien agent (“MLA”) listed on a building permit within 30 days of starting work that they are on the job and could file a lien, has not changed. What the amendments to the lien statutes in 2013 added was a requirement that the notice, like a lien memorandum, must include the contractor’s or subcontractor’s license number.
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Christopher G. Hill, Law Office of Christopher G. Hill, PCMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
What is the Effect of an Untimely Challenge to the Timeliness of a Trustee’s Sale?
April 13, 2017 —
Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogEver wonder what happens if a person challenges the timeliness of a trustee’s sale after the sale already occurred? Waiver of the argument of course! And, in the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Waltner, the affirmance of an eviction judgment.
In the Waltner case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-PR4 Trust (the “Bank”), purchased a residential property at a trustee’s sale in September 2015. The Bank gave the occupant of the house, Sarah Waltner (“Waltner”), notice to vacate the property, but she did not do so. Accordingly, the Bank filed a summary action to evict Waltner, which the trial court ultimately granted.
After the trial court granted the Bank relief, Waltner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to vacate the eviction judgment arguing, among other things, that the judgment was void because the Bank conducted the trustee’s sale after the statute of limitations expired. Both motions were denied, and Waltner appealed.
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Ben Reeves, Snell & WilmerMr. Reeves may be contacted at
breeves@swlaw.com
Is There Direct Physical Loss Under A Property Policy When COVID-19 is Present?
April 06, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMost property policies provide coverage for property damage only when there is "direct physical loss" to covered property. Early indications are that COVID-19 remains on surfaces. The duration can last from a few hours to three weeks, depending on the type of surface material. If an employee is infected and the store or restaurant must closed because the virus may rest on surfaces within the building, is there direct physical loss, even though the building structure itself is unharmed?
To answer this question, cases from jurisdictions outside Hawaii may provide guidance. In a case from Louisiana, the homeowner had to move out of her home when excessive levels of organic lead were discovered in the kitchen, living room, master bedroom, and attic. Widder v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 82 So. 3d 294 (La. Ct. App. 2011). The insurer denied coverage because there was no direct physical loss. The trial court agreed; since the home was still intact, no direct physical loss had occurred, so there was no coverage under the policy. The appellate court reversed. It compared the presence of inorganic lead in the home to cases that found a direct physical loss from the existence of Chinese drywall, from which gaseous fumes were released, rendering the home unusable or uninhabitable. Physical damage was not necessary.
What if smoke from a nearby wildfire fills an outdoor theater, forcing cancellation of performances and loss of business income? This was the situation in Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass'n v. Great Am. Inc. Co., 2016 U.S. DIst. LEXIS 74450 (D. Ore. Jun 7, 2016). Wildfires in the area caused smoke, soot, and ash to accumulate on the surface of seats and concrete ground of the open-air theater. The air quality was poor, but no federal, state or local agency ordered cancellation of the performances. Further, the theater did not suffer any permanent or structural damage to its property. The insurer denied coverage, contending that the loss or damage must be structural to the building itself. After all, the smoke in the air at the theater did not require any repairs to the structure of the property. The court disagreed. The theater sustained "physical loss or damage to property" when the wildfire smoke infiltrated the theater and rendered it unusable for its intended purpose. The decision in Oregon Shakespeare Festival was eventually vacated by a joint stipulation of the parties. Oregon Shakespeare Festival Ass'n v. Great Am. Ins.Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33208 (D. Ore. March 6, 2017), but the reasoning is still sound.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
