Sales of U.S. New Homes Decline After Record May Revision
July 30, 2014 —
Victoria Stilwell – BloombergFewer new U.S. homes were sold in June than forecast and May data showed the biggest downward revision on record, painting a picture of a housing market that is struggling to gain traction.
Sales of newly built homes declined 8.1 percent to a 406,000 annualized pace, the fewest since March and less than any economist surveyed by Bloomberg forecast, Commerce Department figures showed today in Washington. That followed a May reading of 442,000 that was 12.3 percent lower than estimated last month.
Restrictive lending rules, limited land supply, higher mortgage rates and more expensive properties are keeping a lid on how much the housing recovery can accelerate. Continued employment gains and bigger increases in wages will be needed to support further growth in the industry, which has stalled since interest rates started climbing last year.
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Victoria Stilwell, BloombergMs. Stilwell may be contacted at
vstilwell1@bloomberg.net
COVID-19 Vaccine Considerations for Employers in the Construction Industry
July 11, 2021 —
Maggie Spell - ConsensusDocs1. Can employers in the construction industry require employees to receive a COVID-19 vaccine as a condition of employment?
In short, it depends. Back in December 2020, the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) explained that, generally speaking (and under federal law), employers can require employees to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. However, there are a few caveats.
First, certain employees may need to be excused from a mandatory vaccination requirement as a reasonable accommodation unless it will present undue hardship. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), employers must provide reasonable accommodations to employees with a covered disability that prevents them from receiving the vaccine. (Fact sheets for the COVID-19 vaccines include examples of some of the underlying medical conditions that may result in an accommodation request.) And under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employers are similarly required to provide reasonable accommodations to employees with sincerely held religious beliefs, practices, or observances that prevent them from getting the vaccine. Employers requiring the vaccination would be wise to consult with an experienced employment lawyer before denying an accommodation. Accommodation issues stemming from administration of the COVID-19 vaccine (and COVID-19 more generally) are likely to plague employers for a while, so getting ahead of this issue is key.
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Maggie Spell, Jones Walker LLPMs. Spell may be contacted at
mspell@joneswalker.com
More Business Value from Drones with Propeller and Trimble – Interview with Rory San Miguel
August 10, 2017 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessHere’s my interview with Rory San Miguel, CEO of Propeller Aerobotics, a UAV tech company. We’re discussing the use of drones in construction and the company’s recently announced collaboration with Trimble to deliver efficient UAV workflows.
You’re a co-founder of Propeller. How did your company come about?
I met Francis (Propeller co-founder) in 2013 at a drone delivery startup called Flirtey. There we worked closely on drone technology as engineers but ultimately felt like there were nearer term revenue opportunities for drones in the mapping/surveying space. We quickly spun out to start Propeller and have focussed on making drone data easy for construction, mining, quarries and landfills since then.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
info@aepartners.fi
Render Unto Caesar: Considerations for Returning Withheld Sums
January 18, 2021 —
William E. Underwood Partner, Jones Walker LLP - ConsensusDocsWithholding sums during a dispute can be an effective and perfectly legitimate means to protect against the harms caused by another party’s breach. However, withholding too much money during a dispute can turn a position of strength into one of weakness.
“Why should I fund the other side’s litigation war chest?” and “Isn’t this just a display of weakness?” are common questions raised by contractors when this issue is discussed. Often, the contractor is well within its contractual or legal rights to withhold money from a breaching subcontractor (another topic for another day). But it may not always be in a contractor’s best interest to withhold every single penny available.
This article addresses some of the long-term implications for failing to return withheld sums, including the potential to recover attorneys’ fees, possible bad faith, accruing interest, and overall litigation costs. Admittedly, it can be hard to give money back in the middle of a dispute. But sometimes it can positively impact the overall outcome of the case.
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William E. Underwood, Jones Walker LLP (ConsensusDocs)Mr. Underwood may be contacted at
wunderwood@joneswalker.com
A Vision and Strategy for the Adoption of Open International Standards
November 18, 2019 —
Aarni Heiskanen - AEC BusinessThe final report of RASTI is now available in English. The project outlined a national vision and strategy for the adoption of open international standards in the real estate and construction industries. The Finnish version includes several appendices.
One of the frameworks that RASTI devised was a built environment life-cycle process map. It is derived from the model of Antti Autio of the Ministry of the Environment.
The map presents the processes of the four “lanes”: the customer’s/users value creation processes, public sector processes, information work, and production. Ideally, data and information flow across the processes, using open standards.
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Aarni Heiskanen, AEC BusinessMr. Heiskanen may be contacted at
aec-business@aepartners.fi
Asserting Non-Disclosure Claim Involving Residential Real Property and Whether Facts Are “Readily Observable”
September 29, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesUnder Florida law, there is a claim dealing with the purchase and sale of residential real property known as a Johnson v. Davis or a non-disclosure claim: “[W]here the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller is under a duty to disclose them to the buyer.” Lorber v. Passick, 46 Fla.L.Weekly D1952a (Fla. 4th DCA 2021). A seller’s duty to disclose extends to a seller’s real estate agent/broker. Id.
A non-disclosure claim is asserted by the buyer of residential real property when the buyer discovers defects or damages with the real property that he believes materially affects the value of the property. While there may be the sentiment these are easy claims to prove, they are not.
Remember, a non-disclosure claim deals with facts that materially affect the value of residential real property and are NOT readily observable. The use of the language “readily observable” has been found to mean:
“[I]nformation [that] is within the diligent attention of any buyer. To exercise diligent attention…a buyer would be required to investigate any information furnished by the seller that a reasonable person in the buyer’s position would investigate and take reasonable steps to ascertain the material facts relating to the property and to discovery them—if, of course, they are reasonably ascertainable.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
CA Supreme Court Finds “Consent-to-Assignment” Clauses Unenforceable After Loss Occurs During the Policy Period
August 26, 2015 —
Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Fluor Corporation v. Superior Court (No. S205889; filed 8/20/15), the California Supreme Court overruled its earlier decision in Henkel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 934, holding that notwithstanding the presence of a consent-to-assignment clause in a liability policy, Insurance Code section 520 bars an insurer from refusing to honor the insured’s assignment of coverage after a loss has taken place during the policy period.
In Henkel, the Supreme Court limited the ability of corporate successors to obtain coverage under predecessors’ policies on a contract theory. The Henkel Court held that where a successor corporation contractually assumed liabilities of the predecessor corporation, the insurance benefits would not automatically follow. The Henkel Court ruled that if the predecessor company’s policy contains a consent-to-assignment clause, any assignment of insurance policy benefits to a successor corporation required the insurer’s consent. The Court said that policy benefits are not transferable choses in action unless at the time of corporate transfer they could be reduced to a monetary sum certain. The Court reasoned that historic product or environmental liabilities might not even be known to the predecessor at that time, much less reduced to a sum certain, so coverage for such risks could not be considered a transferable chose in action. Thus, where the liability was inchoate at the time of the corporate transaction, the Henkel Court said that coverage would not necessarily follow because the insurer’s duties had not yet attached.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com; Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
