Faulty Workmanship Claims Amount to Multiple Occurrences
August 03, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn a recommended decision, the magistrate found that claims of faulty workmanship against the insured constituted multiple occurrences. Millsap Waterproofing, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90112 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2022).
Maravilla Condominiums in Galveston, Texas was damaged by Hurricane Ike in 2008. While repairing the damage caused by the hurricane, an unrelated fire broke out and damaged 77 units.
In 2010, the Maravilla Owners Association, Inc. hired several contractors, including Millsap Waterproofing, Inc. Multiple problems arose with the various contractors' work. In 2016, Maravilla sued the contractors alleging that their shoddy work damaged the condominium complex. More than 80 condominium owners intervened, alleging that Millsap negligently performed work on windows, doorways, walkways, and balconies, resulting in extensive water damage.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Louvre Abu Dhabi’s Mega-Structure Domed Roof Completed
September 24, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe final part of the Louvre Abu Dhabi’s 180-metres (almost 600 feet) long domed roof was put into place on Monday, according to Arabian Business. The 12,000 tonne dome is “made up of a steel structure, weighing 7,000 tonnes (almost as much as the Eiffel Tower), and a further 5,000 tonnes of aluminum cladding.”
Carlos Antonio-Wakim, executive director of development at master developers TDIC, stated (as quoted by Arabian Business) that construction was on schedule for the opening of the museum, which is on Saadiyat Island, by the end of next year.
“The concrete works under the dome is all done, so we have all the galleries up and fit-out of those galleries has already begun,” Antonio-Wakim told Arabian Business. “There is also a lot of electromechanical works. A complex project like this requires a lot of mechanical and electrical coordination.”
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Construction Managers, Are You Exposing Yourselves to Labor Law Liability?
February 22, 2021 —
Timothy P. Welch - Hurwitz & Fine, P.C.When dealing with construction site accidents, who a party is matters. Under Labor Law sections 200, 240(1) and 241(6) owners, contractors,
and their agents have a non-delegable duty to provide reasonable and adequate protection to workers from risks inherent at work sites, with a specific emphasis placed on elevation-related hazards. Given the near strict liability nature of Labor Law section 240(1), it is critical to identify whether a party is a proper Labor Law defendant from the get-go.
While identifying the owner (and usually the contractor) may be relatively straightforward, identifying “their agents” has proven to be a more complex undertaking. It should be noted that the requirements set forth in the Labor Law are non-delegable from the standpoint of the owner or contractor, however, the duties themselves can be assigned to “agents” of an owner or “agents” of a contractor. When such an assignment occurs, the same non-delegable duty held by the owner or contractor is imposed on the agents as well. Moreover, “once an entity becomes an agent under the Labor Law it cannot escape liability to an injured plaintiff by delegating the work to another entity.[1]”
An entity that often skirts the line between being an agent and not, is the Construction Manager. Traditionally, the Construction Manager has been found to be outside the purview of the Labor Law when its scope of work is narrowly focused on scheduling and general coordination of the construction process. However, when a Construction Manager’s scope expands, so does its risk that it may, in fact, become a proper Labor Law defendant.
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Timothy P. Welch, Hurwitz & Fine, P.C.Mr. Welch may be contacted at
tpw@hurwitzfine.com
Transportation Officials Make the Best of a Bumpy 2020
January 18, 2021 —
Jim Parsons & Aileen Cho - Engineering News-RecordThe year 2020 provided a bumpy budgetary ride for all modes of transportation, and some industry insiders don’t expect airport and transit ridership to return to pre-pandemic levels for years. Agencies are taking lessons learned, coupled with hopes for the new Biden administration, to carry on as best they can.
Reprinted courtesy of
Jim Parsons, Engineering News-Record and
Aileen Cho, Engineering News-Record
Ms. Cho may be contacted at choa@enr.com
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The Show Must Go On: Navigating Arbitration in the Wake of the COVID-19 Outbreak
July 20, 2020 —
Justin K. Fortescue, Zachery B. Roth & Marianne Bradley - White and Williams LLPThe recent COVID-19 outbreak has altered life for all of us, in ways both big and small. Unprecedented restrictions relating to the pandemic have forced individuals across the globe to change the ways in which they live and work. Perhaps not surprisingly, these restrictions have also changed the way we resolve disputes. Just as virtual conferencing has become the “new normal” for family gatherings and social events, it has also become the “new normal” for everything from mediation, to oral argument, to full-blown hearings.
To be sure, there are a number of advantages to conducting adversarial proceedings virtually. First and foremost, it results in substantial cost savings for the parties involved. In-person proceedings typically require significant travel expenses, including airline tickets, hotel reservations, and food and beverage stipends. The use of a virtual forum essentially eliminates these expenses, cutting costs dramatically for attorneys, clients, judges, and arbitrators alike.
Virtual conferencing also affords the opportunity for increased participation from party representatives living across the country, or even across the world. While demanding work schedules often make it impossible for multiple party representatives to attend a deposition, or even a hearing, in person, virtual proceedings require much less of a time commitment. Because these virtual proceedings require participants to spend less time away from other work-related obligations, party representatives are able to attend proceedings that they may otherwise have had to miss.
Reprinted courtesy of White and Williams LLP attorneys
Justin K. Fortescue,
Zachery B. Roth and
Marianne Bradley
Mr. Fortescue may be contacted at fortescuej@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Roth may be contacted at rothz@whiteandwilliams.com
Ms. Bradley may be contacted at bradleym@whiteandwilliams.com
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Fall 2024 Legislative Update:
October 28, 2024 —
Joshua Lane - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCReview of (a) RCW 60.30.010-020, (b) RCW 49.17.530, (c) RCW 19.95.020, (d) RCW 39.116.005, et seq., (e) RCW 36.70B.080, and (f) RCW 39.12.010 and .13
While much of the focus on the recent legislative updates has been on RCW 39.04.360, a number of other legislative changes may also have significant impacts on Washington’s construction industry. Six of these changes are summarized below.
A. RCW 60.30.010 and .020 (SSB 6108) – Concerning Retainage on Private Construction, Effective June 6, 2024
Last year, ESSB 5528 imposed restrictions and obligations related to retainage and timing of final payment on private (non-public works) projects. It capped retainage at 5%, required prompt payment on final payments, and required owners to accept a retainage bond on private construction projects, excluding single-family residential construction less than 12 units.
This year, SSB 6108 adds suppliers to the statutes (RCW 60.30.010 and 0.020) pertaining to retainage on private construction projects.
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Joshua Lane, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Lane may be contacted at
joshua.lane@acslawyers.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Bid Bonds: The First Preventative Measure for Your Project
September 03, 2019 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsFor this week’s Guest Post Friday, Construction Law Musings welcomes Danielle Rodabaugh. Danielle is a principal for Surety Bonds.com, an agency that issues surety bonds to individuals and businesses across the nation. She writes articles to clarify bonding rules and regulations for those who have a stake in the surety bond industry–from contractors to telemarketers, and every professional in between.
In construction we often value performance and payment bonds when considering how to protect the financial investments put into a project. We do so because these bonds provide a legal financial guarantee that the selected contractor will fulfill the contract. However, a third, equally protective kind of construction bond is often overlooked.
Before an official contract has been agreed to and successfully executed, bid bonds guarantee that the selected low-bidder will officially enter into the contract at a later date. Bidders must submit a bid bond with their bid. Without doing so, the bidder becomes non-responsive–or an invalid candidate. Sometimes we overlook the benefits provided by this kind of Virginia surety bond, and yet they frequently act as the only legal protection for a project prior to groundbreaking.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
