Time is Money. Unless You’re an Insurance Company
December 02, 2015 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogBenjamin Franklin may never have been President but he’s better known than most of them. Not least of all for his pithy quotes on a wide range of subjects:
On personal finance – “A penny saved is a penny earned.”
On education – “Tell me and I forget, teach me and I remember, involve me and I learn.”
On getting real – “In this world nothing can be said to be certain, except death and taxes.”
On guests – “Guests, like fish, begin to smell after three days.”
On lawyers – “A countryman between two lawyers is like a fish between two cats.”
On beer – “In wine there is wisdom, in beer there is freedom, in water there is bacteria.”
But if you were to pick one theme that seems to recur the most in Franklin’s quotes, it would be productivity:
“Time is money.”
“By failing to prepare, you are preparing to fail.”
“Never leave that till tomorrow which you can do today.”
“Early to bed and early to rise, makes a man happy, wealthy and wise.”
But, as the next case, Grebow v. Mercury Insurance Company, Case No. B261172, California Court of Appeals for the Second District (October 21, 2015), illustrates, sometimes the most efficient way of doing things may not necessarily be the most financially prudent way of doing things.
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com
Construction and Contract Issues Blamed for Problems at Anchorage Port
August 27, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
A third-party audit of the construction at the Port of Anchorage has found fault with the design provided by the engineers. In response, PND, the engineering firm involved, has claimed that it was not their design, but faulty construction of it that lead to an interruption in the construction project.
Separately, the Office of the Inspector General has called into question how MARAD, the agency which oversaw the port construction, handled the planning and contracts for the project.
Control of the project has been taken over by the Municipality of Anchorage, and they have called into question PND’s open cell sheet pile design and PND’s design of the dock infrastructure. Simpson, Gumpertz and Heger reviewed the design, comparing it to a design provided by CH2M Hill, and found that the PND design was inadequate. A contract was subsequently awarded to CH2M Hill.
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of
Florida Supreme Court: Notice of Right to Repair is a CGL “Suit,” SDV Amicus Brief Supports Decision
January 10, 2018 — Gregory Podolak & Brian Clifford - SD&V Case Alert
Construction policyholders in Florida have been given substantial ammunition to compel general liability insurers to provide a defense against pre-suit accusations of defective work. Florida is one of approximately thirty (30) states that require property owners to serve contractors with notice and an opportunity to repair construction defects before filing suit. Only a few states have addressed whether a CGL policy should provide a defense for similar processes. Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., decided late in December by the Florida Supreme Court, acknowledged that the 558 process is a “suit,” thus impeding insurers from refusing a defense during this notice period.
Section 558.004(1), Florida Statutes (2012) requires a property owner alleging construction defects to serve a written notice to repair on the contractor before filing an action in court. Altman Contractors built a condominium in Broward County, Florida. In 2012, the condominium owners alleged defects in accordance with Section 558. Altman demanded that its general liability carrier, Crum & Forster, defend and indemnify it against the 558 notices. Crum & Forster denied coverage, claiming that 558 notices are not a “suit” as defined by the policy.
Reprinted courtesy of Gregory Podolak, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C. and Brian Clifford, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Mr. Podolak may be contacted at gdp@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Clifford may be contacted at bjc@sdvlaw.com
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of
Constructive Change Directives / Directed Changes
June 06, 2018 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
rime contracts typically contain a constructive change directive clause. A constructive change directive also goes by the acronym CCD (and for purposes of this article, such changes will be referred to as a CCD), however it can also be known as a Work Change Directive, Interim Directed Change, or Directed Change, depending on the type of contract beign utilized. An owner can order a CCD, versus issuing the contractor a formalized change order, as a mechanism to direct the prime contractor to perform work if there is a dispute as to contract amount, time, or scope. Just because an owner issues a CCD does not mean the owner is conceding that it owes the contractor a change order. Rather, the owner is ordering the CCD as a mechanism to keep the project moving forward notwithstanding a disagreement with the contractor as to the price or time impact. Standard form construction agreements such as the AIA, EJCDC, or ConsensusDocs, will have a standard provision dealing with change directives where the owner can order the contractor to proceed with work in the absence of a change order. In the federal government context, most construction contracts will contain a changes clause that authorizes the government to formally direct changes; and, there is authority for contractors to equitably pursue a constructive change based on certain directives or instructions issued by the government. Naturally, from the contractor’s perspective, this CCD provision is an important consideration as it could likely require the contractor to finance a change to the owner’s project, particularly if there is a scope dispute where the owner does not believe the contractor is entitled to any change order. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal Updates
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dadelstein@gmail.com
CA Supreme Court Expands Scope of Lawyers’ Statute of Limitations to Non-Legal Malpractice Claims – Confusion Predicted for Law and Motion Judges
August 26, 2015 — David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Lee v. Hanley (S220775 – Filed 8/20/2015), the California Supreme Court clarified the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 by holding that its limitations period applies to claims against attorneys “whose merits necessarily depend on proof that an attorney violated a professional obligation in the course of providing professional services.” Although it resolved a district split by finding that the statute governs for non-legal malpractice claims against attorneys including those of non-clients, by having the statute’s applicability “turn on the conduct alleged and ultimately proven, not on the way the complaint was styled,” this 5-2 decision also increased the specter of creative pleading and lengthy litigation.
In Lee, the client had advanced $120,000 to cover attorney’s fees, costs and expert witness fees for the underlying litigation. After the case settled, the attorney advised the client that she had a credit balance of approximately $46,000. In response to her demand for a refund, the attorney then advised the client that she did not have a credit balance. More than one year later, the client filed suit to recover the $46,000, plus interest. The trial court sustained the attorney’s demurrer based on the one-year statute of limitations in section 340.6. The appellate court, however, reversed, reasoning that the client’s claim could be construed as one for conversion, in which case section 340.6 would not apply.
Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com
Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of
The Future Looks Bright for Construction in 2015
January 21, 2015 — Craig Martin – Construction Contractor Advisor
Associated Builders and Contractors’ Construction Executive has painted a rosy outlook for the upcoming year. ABC’s Chief Economist predicts a 7.4 percent increase in total nonresidential spending for 2015. This is great news for a construction industry that has climbing out of the recession through fits and starts over the last several months. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Craig Martin, Lamson, Dugan and Murray, LLP
Mr. Martin may be contacted at cmartin@ldmlaw.com
Texas Legislature Puts a Spear in Doctrine Making Contractor Warrantor of Owner Furnished Plans and Specifications
May 31, 2021 — Paulo Flores, Timothy D. Matheny & Jackson Mabry - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
The Texas Legislature has just sent Senate Bill 219 (“S.B. 219”) to the Governor for signature; if this legislation is signed by the Governor, it will further erode the Texas legal doctrine that makes the contractor the warrantor of owner-furnished plans and specifications unless the prime contract specifically places this burden on the owner.
Background
49 states follow what is known as the Spearin doctrine (named after the U.S. Supreme Court case of United States v. Spearin) in which owners warrant the accuracy and sufficiency of owner-furnished plans and specifications. Texas, on the other hand, follows the Texas Supreme Court created Lonergan doctrine, which has been an unfortunate presence in Texas construction law since 1907. In its “purest form,” as stated by the Texas Supreme Court, the Lonergan doctrine prevents a contractor from successfully asserting a claim for “breach of contract based on defective plans and specifications” unless the contract contains language that “shows an intent to shift the burden of risk to the owner.” Essentially, this then translates into the contractor warranting the sufficiency and accuracy of owner-furnished plans and specifications, unless the contract between them expressly places this burden on the owner. Over the years some Texas courts of appeal had ameliorated this harsh doctrine, but in 2012, the Texas Supreme Court indicated Lonergan was still the law in Texas, in the case of El Paso v. Mastec. In 2019, the Texas Legislature took the first step toward hopefully abrogating the Lonergan doctrine by implementing a new Chapter 473 to the Texas Transportation Code with respect to certain projects undertaken by the Texas Department of Transportation, and Texas political subdivisions acting under the authority of Chapters 284, 366, 370 or 431 of the Transportation Code, adopting, as it were, the Spearin Doctrine in these limited, transportation projects. Now, the legislature has further chipped away at the Lonergan doctrine with the passage of S.B. 219.
Reprinted courtesy of Paulo Flores, Peckar & Abramson, P.C., Timothy D. Matheny, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and Jackson Mabry, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Flores may be contacted at PFlores@Pecklaw.com
Mr. Matheny may be contacted at tmatheny@pecklaw.com
Mr. Mabry may be contacted at jmabry@pecklaw.com
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of
Appeal of an Attorney Disqualification Order Results in Partial Automatic Stay of Trial Court Proceedings
October 11, 2017 — Howard M. Garfield & Renata L. Hoddinott - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In URS Corporation v. Atkinson/Walsh Joint Venture (No. G055271 filed September 26, 2017), Division Three of the Fourth Appellate District dealt with, for the first time, the question of whether an appeal of an attorney disqualification order results in an automatic stay of the trial proceedings and, if so, how far the automatic stay extends.
The underlying action involved a construction dispute between a contractor and subcontractor. During the pendency of that action, one party’s counsel filed a motion to disqualify another party’s counsel based on an alleged misuse of mediation-privilege protected documents. The trial court granted the disqualification motion and the disqualified counsel promptly filed a notice of appeal. The trial court then denied an application to stay proceedings pending the appeal, rejecting the assertion that the appeal automatically stayed the underlying proceedings.
Reprinted courtesy of Howard M. Garfield, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Renata L. Hoddinott, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Garfield may be contacted at hgarfield@hbblaw.com
Ms. Hoddinott may be contacted at rhoddinott@hbblaw.com
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of
