One More Mechanic’s Lien Number- the Number 30
March 06, 2023 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsI’ve spoken here often about the numbers
90 and 150 as they relate to
Virginia mechanic’s liens. These numbers are important for all mechanic’s liens in Virginia, whether commercial or residential (meaning liens for 1 and 2-family homes). There is another number, 30, that is important for those construction contractors that perform work on single and two-family homes. Where a mechanic’s lien agent is named on the building permit (or possibly just named if not stated on the permit), and
among other requirements,
Va. Code 43-4.01 requires that, in order to have lien rights at the project, the contractor must provide notice to the mechanic’s lien agent within 30 days of beginning work that it is performing work and shall seek payment for the work.
Further, the mechanic’s lien agent notice must contain the following:
(i) the name, mailing address, and telephone number of the person sending such notice, (ii) the person’s license or certificate number issued by the Board for Contractors pursuant to Chapter 11 (§ 54.1-1100 et seq.) of Title 54.1, if any, and the date such license or certificate was issued and the date such license or certificate expires, (iii) the building permit number on the building permit, (iv) a description of the property as shown on the building permit, and (v) a statement that the person filing such notice seeks payment for labor performed or material furnished.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Don’t Ignore a Notice of Contest of Lien
April 29, 2024 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesA recent case, Jon M. Hall Company, LLC v. Canoe Creek Investments, LLC, 49 Fla.L.Weekly D812a (Fla. 2d DCA 2024), demonstrates four important things when it comes to liens:
- An owner can shorten the time period to foreclose on the lien, whether against the real property or a lien transfer bond, to 60 days by recording a notice of contest of lien;
- An owner can transfer a lien to a lien transfer bond during litigation;
- An owner can record a notice of contest of lien to force the lienor to amend its lawsuit to sue the lien transfer bond surety within 60 days; and
- A contractors’ failure to amend its lawsuit to sue the lien transfer bond within 60 days will extinguish its rights to pursue a claim against the lien transfer bond, and will otherwise extinguish the lien, fairly or unfairly.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Subcontractor Not Estopped from Enforcing Lien Not Listed In Bankruptcy Petition
March 01, 2017 —
Chadd Reynolds – Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPIn Stock Building Supply, Inc. v. Platte River Insurance Co.,[1] the Court of Appeals dealt with issues of judicial estoppel, bankruptcy, retroactive application of statutory lien amendments, and the full payment defense.
The owner, Madison Retail-Suwanee, LLC (“Madison”) hired Cannon/Estapa General Contractors, Inc. (“Cannon”) to be the general contractor for the construction of a shopping center (“the Project”). Cannon subcontracted with Stock Building Supply (“Stock”) to supply labor, materials, and services for the Project. Cannon failed to complete the project and Madison had yet to pay Cannon the full contract price. In 2007, Stock timely filed a lien on the Project and obtained a judgment against Cannon for the amount due under the subcontract. Platte River Insurance Company (“Platte”), the surety, issued a bond to discharge Stock’s lien. Consequently, Stock pursued an action against Platte to collect the judgment in the amount of $93,865.27.
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Chadd Reynolds, Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Reynolds may be contacted at
reynolds@ahclaw.com
Connecticut Supreme Court Finds Faulty Work By Subcontractor Constitutes "Occurrence"
July 31, 2013 —
Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiThe U.S. District Court in Alabama certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court: Is damage to a project caused by faulty workmanship "property damage" resulting from an "occurrence"? With some qualification, the Connecticut Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Capstone Building Corp. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., SC 18886 (Conn. June 11, 2013).
Captsone Development agreed to coordinate and supervise construction on a building at the University of Conneticut. Capstone Building was the general contractor. UConn secured an OCIP policy from American Motorist Insurance Company ("AMICO"). More than three years after completion, UConn notified the insureds of alleged defects in the project, including elevated levels of carbon monoxide. The source of the leak was the individual hot water heaters in residential units and insufficient draft of exhaust from the heater.Other defects were found during an investigation.
The insureds tendered to AMICO. Coverage was denied because the liability arose out of the insureds' own work.The insureds settled with UConn, paying $1 million each. The insureds then sued AMICO in Alabama and the question was certified to the Connecticut Supreme Court.
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Tred EyerlyTred Eyerly can be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Plans Go High Tech
April 25, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFOne construction executive described it as “the wave of the future.” What is it? Accessing building plans on an iPad. According to an article in MacWorld, several companies are now offering solutions to distribute and update construction plans on iPads. Changes to plans and notes can be distributed quickly through cloud computing.
Alan Dillon, a senior superintendent at DPR Construction told MacWorld, “I can take my iPad into the field and have my whole set of drawings.” He described a set of drawings for a large construction project as “five or six inches thick.” Danielle Douthet, of Level 10 Construction said it “can help everyone be on the same page more quickly, and make sure that everybody is working off the most current set of documents.”
And it’s not just building plans. Other firms offer building management applications designed to be taken into the field on mobile devices.
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Ill-fated Complaint Fails to State Claims Against Broker and FEMA
September 10, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiA complaint lodged against the insureds' broker and FEMA was dismissed for failure to state a claim. Lopez v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109803 (E.D. La. Aug. 8, 2014).
The insureds held a Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP) issued by FEMA, but sold by the broker. The insureds alleged that their property was totally destroyed by Hurricane Isaac. FEMA paid the insureds $234,513.02 for damage to their dwelling and $80,566.17 for its contents, for a total of $315,079.19. This was $34,920.81 below the policy limits. The insureds sued, claiming FEMA negligently miscalculated their damages, misvalued their property, and improperly adjusted their claim. The insureds also alleged that the broker failed to properly advise them regarding the nature of their coverage, the true value of their property, or to purchase the correct amount of insurance on their behalf.
The negligent procurement claim against the broker failed because the insureds did not allege any specific facts tending to establish that the broker failed to use reasonable diligence in procuring their insurance. Likewise, the negligent misrepresentation claim against the broker was dismissed. Insurance agents had a duty to supply their customers with correct information, and they could be liable for negligent misrepresentation if they provided incorrect information and an insured was damaged. Here, the insureds did not allege a breach of the duty to supply correct information.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Without Reservations: Fourth Circuit Affirms That Vague Reservation of Rights Waived Insurers’ Coverage Arguments
January 09, 2023 —
Lara Degenhart Cassidy & Matthew J. Revis - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogThe Fourth Circuit recently affirmed insurance coverage for a South Carolina policyholder based on the “axiomatic principle” that an insurer which fails to fully and fairly articulate its potential coverage defenses in a reservation of rights letter loses the right to contest coverage on those grounds.
Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owner’s Assoc. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. 19-2009, 2022 WL 17592121 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Harleysville Group Insurance v. Heritage Communities, Inc., 803 S.E.2d 288 (S.C. 2017)). More particularly, in Stoneledge, the Fourth Circuit affirmed per curiam a South Carolina District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of a homeowners association that had successfully sued its general contractors for construction defects and was seeking to recover the damages owed from the contractors’ insurers. The Fourth Circuit agreed that the insurers’ vague reservation of rights letters failed to reserve the defenses on which the insurers purported to deny coverage.
The question before the court in Stoneledge was whether the two insurers that had each agreed to defend their respective general-contractor insureds in the homeowner association’s underlying litigation had sufficiently informed their policyholders of their coverage positions. Specifically, the court considered whether the insurers provided notice of their intention to challenge coverage on specific bases and explained why those bases applied in their respective reservation of rights letters. Both of the insurers’ letters followed the typical approach of identifying various policy provisions and exclusions and outlining the general mechanics of those provisions, but they fell short of applying the provisions or exclusions to the facts in the case at hand. Further, the letters stated that the insurers would reevaluate how the provisions applied as the underlying case progressed. One of the insurer’s letters expressed doubt as to coverage but did not offer any analysis on the reasons for the prospective coverage denial.
Reprinted courtesy of
Lara Degenhart Cassidy, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Matthew J. Revis, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Ms. Cassidy may be contacted at lcassidy@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Revis may be contacted at mrevis@HuntonAK.com
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