CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

What is the Effect of an Untimely Challenge to the Timeliness of a Trustee’s Sale?

April 13, 2017 — Ben Reeves - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
Ever wonder what happens if a person challenges the timeliness of a trustee’s sale after the sale already occurred? Waiver of the argument of course! And, in the case of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Waltner, the affirmance of an eviction judgment. In the Waltner case, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as Trustee for WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-PR4 Trust (the “Bank”), purchased a residential property at a trustee’s sale in September 2015. The Bank gave the occupant of the house, Sarah Waltner (“Waltner”), notice to vacate the property, but she did not do so. Accordingly, the Bank filed a summary action to evict Waltner, which the trial court ultimately granted. After the trial court granted the Bank relief, Waltner filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to vacate the eviction judgment arguing, among other things, that the judgment was void because the Bank conducted the trustee’s sale after the statute of limitations expired. Both motions were denied, and Waltner appealed. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Ben Reeves, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Reeves may be contacted at breeves@swlaw.com

---

New York Appellate Team Obtains Affirmance of Dismissal of Would-Be Labor Law Action Against Municipal Entities

August 12, 2024 — Lewis Brisbois Newsroom
New York, N.Y. (July 11, 2024) - In Charlot v. City of New York, ___ A.D.3d ___, 2024 NY Slip Op 03161 (2d Dep’t 2024), New York Associate Dean Pillarella, a member of the Appellate Practice, recently obtained an affirmance of the lower court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action against the City of New York (“the City”) for failure to timely serve a notice of claim. New York Partner Meghan Cavalieri, a member of the Construction Practice, and her team authored and argued the initial motion to dismiss. The plaintiff alleged to have sustained injuries as a result of a construction-site accident on December 8, 2020, on City-owned property in the course of the construction of a school by the New York City School Construction Authority. N.Y. General Municipal Law (“GML”) § 50-e(1)(a), requires service of a notice of claim within 90 days after the claim arises as a condition precedent to the commencement of a tort action. The plaintiff served no notice of claim until June 2021 and commenced an action in January 2022, alleging violations of N.Y. Labor Law §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200. Given the plaintiff’s failure to comply with GML § 50-e(1)(a), Meghan and her team rejected the notices of claim as untimely. The plaintiff then moved for leave to deem the notices of claim timely served nunc pro tunc. In response, Meghan and her team opposed the motion and cross-moved to dismiss the action. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Lewis Brisbois

---

Unjust Enrichment and Express Contract Don’t Mix

August 23, 2021 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
I am a huge fan of clearly written construction contracts. Virginia state and federal courts will interpret contract provisions as written and will seek to enforce all of those terms where possible. Where the contract is ambiguous, we construction attorneys make money and the courts are forced to make decisions that the parties may not like. A recent case out of the Eastern District of Virginia federal court highlights the ways in which a clear contract affects the claims that can be brought and limits the scope of possible litigation. In First Call Environmental LLC v. Murphy Oil USA LLC, the Court looked at a relatively typical Owner, Contractor, Subcontractor set of agreements. In this matter, Murphy Oil entered a contract with National Rapid Response, Inc. (“NRR”) whereby NRR would provide emergency and environmental management and waste disposal services to Murphy Oil. NRR then subcontracted with the Plaintiff First Call to perform the services for Murphy Oil. First Call filed suit against Murphy Oil alleging two counts: breach of contract (based on a third-party beneficiary theory), and unjust enrichment. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

---

Florida Lien Law and Substantial Compliance vs. Strict Compliance

April 20, 2017 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
There are literally some (or, perhaps, many!) disputes that will make you say “hmm!” The “hmm” is a euphemism for “what is a party thinking?!?” The case of Trump Endeavor 12 LLC v. Fernich, Inc., 42 Fla. L.Weekly D830a (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) is one of these cases because a party (the owner) is banking its defense on a technical “all-or-nothing” argument pertaining to whether a lienor (a supplier) substantially complied with Florida’s Lien Law because a supplier’s Notice to Owner identified the wrong general contractor. This is a challenging argument because the owner has to prove how they were adversely affected / prejudiced by the lack of substantial compliance, which is not an easy burden. This case concerns the Trump National Doral Miami project. The project consisted of a lodge project and a separate clubhouse project, both of which had different general contractors. On the lodge project, the general contractor hired a painter which, in turn, procured paint from a supplier (the lienor). The supplier visited the project and obtained the Notice of Commencement from the owner so that it could perfect its lien rights. The owner furnished the supplier the Notice of Commencement for the clubhouse project that had a different general contractor. Relying on this Notice of Commencement, the supplier served a Notice to Owner. The Notice to Owner was timely serviced however it identified the wrong contractor – it identified the general contractor for the clubhouse project instead of the lodge project. Although the supplier later learned there was a different general contractor on the lodge project, it did not remedy the issue by serving a Notice to Owner on the correct contractor. Indeed, the contractor for the lodge project learned of the Notice to Owner furnished by the supplier and that the supplier was furnishing paint to the painting subcontractor for purposes of that project. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal Updates
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at Dadelstein@gmail.com

---

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Adopts New Rule in Breach-of-the-Consent-to-Settle-Clause Cases

August 19, 2015 — Sean Mahoney – White and Williams LLP
In Babcock & Wilcox Company, et al. v. America Nuclear Insurers, et al., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently held that where a liability insurer has agreed to provide a defense to its insured in an underlying tort action subject to a reservation of rights but refuses to consent to a settlement in that action, the insured may nevertheless accept the settlement over the insurer’s objection where the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and non-collusive” from the perspective of a reasonably prudent person in the insured’s position in light of the totality of the circumstances and is covered. Babcock & Wilcox Company v. America Nuclear Insurers, No. 2 WAP 2014, 2015 WL 4430352 (Pa. Jul. 21, 2015). This decision fills an important gap in Pennsylvania precedent addressing the rules applicable when an insurer refuses to consent to an insured’s settlement of a lawsuit. In Babcock, the underlying plaintiffs sued Babcock & Wilcox Company and Atlantic Richfield Company (“the Insureds”) alleging that the Insured’s nuclear facilities caused bodily injury and property damage. The Insureds’ liability insurers agreed to defend the Insureds subject to a reservation of rights. The insurers later refused to consent to an offer to settle the underlying action for a total of $80 million because they believed the Insureds were likely to succeed on the merits. Nevertheless, in 2009, the Insureds accepted that offer and settled the underlying action for $80 million, notwithstanding the insurer’s refusal. The Insureds then sought reimbursement of the $80 million settlement from their insurers, who rejected that request on the ground that the Insureds had breached the consent-to-settlement/cooperation provisions of the implicated policies. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Sean Mahoney, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Mahoney may be contacted at mahoneys@whiteandwilliams.com

---

Developer’s Failure to Plead Amount of Damages in Cross-Complaint Fatal to Direct Action Against Subcontractor’s Insurers Based on Default Judgment

January 21, 2019 — Christopher Kendrick & Valerie A. Moore - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
In Yu v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. (No. G054522, filed 12/11/18), a California appeals court held that a developer’s failure to allege the amounts of damages sought in its cross-complaint rendered default judgments against a subcontractor void and, therefore, unenforceable against the subcontractor’s insurers in a direct action under Insurance Code section 11580(b)(2). Yu, the owner, hired ATMI to develop a hotel. ATMI subcontracted with Fitch to perform stucco and paint work. Yu sued ATMI for construction defects and the developer cross-complained against its subcontractors, including Fitch, for breach of contract; warranty; indemnity, etc. Yu’s operative complaint prayed for damages “in an amount not less than $10,000,000, according to proof.” ATMI’s cross-complaint stated that it incorporated the allegations of Yu’s complaint “for identification and informational purposes only,” but “does not admit the truth of any allegations contained therein.” The cross-complaint also prayed for damages with respect to the various causes of action “in an amount according to proof.” Reprinted courtesy of Christopher Kendrick, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Valerie A. Moore, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Kendrick may be contacted at ckendrick@hbblaw.com Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

---

Ninth Circuit Upholds Corps’ Issuance of CWA Section 404 Permit for Newhall Ranch Project Near Santa Clarita, CA

April 11, 2018 — Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog
On April 9, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a unanimous opinion, rejected the challenges to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ (Corps) decision to issue a Clean Water Act (CWA) Section 404 permit to the Newhall Land and Farming Company (Newhall), which is planning a large residential and commercial project in Los Angeles County near Santa Clarita, CA (the Newhall Ranch project). The Newhall Ranch project, which involves the discharge of dredge and fill materials into the Santa Clara River, has been scaled back and modified, and the Ninth Circuit held that it is consistent with the CWA, the Corps’ regulations and procedures, as well as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and Endangered Species Act (ESA). The Ninth Circuit provides an excellent primer on the Section 404 permitting process. The case is Friends of the Santa Clara River v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Anthony B. Cavender, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP
Mr. Cavender may be contacted at anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com

---

Contingent Business Interruption Claim Denied

April 08, 2014 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The insured's claim for contingent business interruption ("CBI") coverage was denied in Millennium Inorganic Chemicals Ltd. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh Pa., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3096 (4th Cir. Feb. 20, 2014). Millenium processed titanium dioxide, a compound used for its white pigmentation, at its plant in Western Australia. Millennium purchased natural gas to process the titanium dioxide from Alinta Sales Pty Ltd., a natural gas supplier. Alinta purchased gas from Apache Corporation. Once Apache processed the natural gas, it was injected into a pipeline. The gas from Apache's facility was commingled with that obtained from other producers, resulting in a mix of gas in a single pipeline. Alinta had sole ownership of the gas once it entered the pipeline. Under Alinta's contract with Millennium, title to the gas passed to Millenium only at the time of delivery, i.e., when the gas left the pipeline and was delivered to Millennium's facility through a separate delivery line. Millennium had no contract or business relationship with Apache, and the contract it had with Alinta made no reference to Apache. An explosion occurred at Apache's facility causing its natural gas production to cease. As a result, Millennium's gas supply was curtailed, and it was force to shut down its operations for a number of months. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

---