Liquidated Damages: Too High and It’s a Penalty. Too Low and You’re Out of Luck.
November 21, 2022 —
Christian Fernandez - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogLiquidated damages provisions in commercial and residential real estate contracts play a vital role when a transaction goes south, and should be given careful consideration when negotiating a real estate contract. Liquidated damages may be referred to in a variety of ways, such as “earnest money,” a “good-faith deposit,” or a “non-refundable deposit,” but each typically denote a negotiated amount of money that a seller is entitled to retain should a buyer breach a purchase and sale agreement. The purpose of liquidated damages is to provide the parties with certainty when actual damages arising from a breach of contract may be difficult to calculate. Accordingly, liquidated damages provisions alleviate the need for potentially expensive litigation associated with proving damages.
While parties are free to negotiate the amount of liquidated damages, the amount must approximate the loss anticipated at the time of contracting, or the loss that actually occurs as a result of a breach. Arizona courts have held that where the amount of liquidated damages is unreasonably large when compared to the anticipated loss or actual loss, the liquidated damages provision is unenforceable as a penalty. A breaching party faced with high liquidated damages will often seek to invalidate the provision as a penalty. If a court agrees, the non-breaching party may still recover damages, but must go through the process of proving such damages. Therefore, when negotiating a real estate contract, consideration should be given as to whether a liquidated damages amount is arbitrarily high when compared to an anticipated loss in the event of a breach.
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Christian Fernandez, Snell & WilmerMr. Fernandez may be contacted at
cfernandez@swlaw.com
No Coverage for Faulty Workmanship Based Upon Exclusion for Contractual Assumption of Liability
August 06, 2019 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe Supreme Court for West Virginia determined the policy's contractual assumption exclusion barred coverage for the general contractor based upon claims of faulty workmanship. J.A. St & Assocs. v. Bitco Gen. Ins. Corp., 2019 W. Va. LEXIS 205 (May 1, 2019).
J.A. Street & Associates, Inc. entered a contract with the developer, Thundering Herd Development, L.L.C., to build a commercial shopping center on seventy-eight acres of land. Street agreed to oversee the site preparation for the development and the construction of many of the buildings. Thundering Herd retained an engineering firm, S&ME, Inc. to do geotechnical exploration and to provide advice regarding land preparation for the shopping center. Thundering Heard also entered an agreement with the Target Corporation to construct a store on a pad to be prepared at the shopping center.
Street hired subcontractors to prepare the site by grading the land and installing fill material. A slope was constructed at the rear of the proposed Target site, but it failed, causing a landslide, damage to the pad, and damage to adjacent property owned by a third party. Thundering Heard incurred $721,875 in additional costs to repair this slope, reconstruct the Target site, and compensate the neighbor for the damage to the adjacent property.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurer Unable to Declare its Coverage Excess In Construction Defect Case
January 06, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Several other insurance companies were party to this case. In the earlier case, the US District Court of Appeals for Arizona had granted a summary judgment to Ohio Casualty Group and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. At the heart of it, is a dispute over construction defect coverage.
The general contractor for Astragal Luxury Villas, GFTDC, contracted with American Family to provide it with a commercial liability policy. Coverage was issued to various subcontractors by Ohio Casualty and National Fire. These policies included blanket additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to GFTDC. The subcontractor policies had provisions making their coverage excess over other policies available to GFTDC.
The need for insurance was triggered when the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association filed a construction defect claim in the Arizona Superior Court. CFTDC filed a third-party claim against several subcontractors. The case was settled with American Family paying the settlement, after which it filed seeking reimbursement from the subcontractor’s insurers. The court instead granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty and National Fire.
American Family appealed to the Ninth Circuit for a review of the summary judgment, arguing that the “other insurance” clauses were “mutually repugnant and unenforceable.” The Ninth Circuit cited a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals that held that “where two policies cover the same occurrence and both contain ‘other insurance’ clauses, the excess insurance provisions are mutually repugnant and must be disregarded. Each insurer is then liable for a pro rate share of the settlement or judgment.”
The court noted that unlike other “other insurance” cases, the American Family policy “states that it provides primary CGL coverage for CFTDC and is rendered excess only if there is ‘any other primary insurance’ available to GFTDC as an additional insured.” They note that “the American Family policy purports to convert from primary to excess coverage only if CFTDC has access to other primary insurance as an additional insured.”
In comparison, the court noted that “the ‘other insurance’ language in Ohio Casualty’s additional insured endorsement cannot reasonably be read to contradict, or otherwise be inconsistent with, the ‘other primary insurance’ provision in the American Family policy.” They find other reasons why National Fire’s coverage did not supersede American Family’s. In this case, the policy is “written explicitly to apply in excess.”
Finally, the Astragal settlement did not exhaust American Family’s coverage, so they were obligated to pay out the full amount. The court upheld the summary dismissal of American Family’s claims.
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Georgia Supreme Court Addresses Anti-Indemnity Statute
October 21, 2019 —
David R. Cook - AHC Construction and Procurement BlogIn prior blog posts, we addressed Georgia’s anti-indemnity statute. One of the posts addressed the statute in the context of an electric utility easement near an airport. That case made its way to the Supreme Court Georgia, which provided some additional clarity to the statute. Milliken & Co. v. Georgia Power Co., — Ga. –, 829 S.E.2d 111 (2019).
When a plane crashed and several passengers and crew died or were injured, their representatives sued several defendants, including a nearby plant owner, Milliken & Company (“Milliken”), based on claims that transmission lines on Milliken’s property were too close to the runways, were too high, and encroached on the airport easements. Milliken cross claimed against Georgia Power Company (“GPC”). Milliken’s claim was based on an easement it granted to GPC, which required GPC to indemnify it for any claims arising out of GPC’s construction or maintenance of the transmission lines.
On appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether the clause was unenforceable under O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b). In general, “a party may contract away liability to the other party for the consequences of his own negligence without contravening public policy, except when such agreement it prohibited by statute.” Id. at 113 citing Lanier at McEver v. Planners & Eng’rs Collaborative, 284 Ga. 204, 205 (2008). As one such statute, O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) applies when an indemnification provision (i) “relates in some way to a contract for construction, alteration, repair, or maintenance of certain property” and (ii) “promises to indemnify a party for damages arising from that own party’s sole negligence.” Id. at 114 (internal punctuation omitted).
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David R. Cook, Autry, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
When to use Arbitration to Resolve Construction Disputes
February 25, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFOn the blog Construction Contractor Advisor, Craig Martin answers the question of whether arbitration is always the best choice for resolving construction claims. His answer: “Some claims may benefit from arbitration, but the benefit is not always clear.”
Martin brings forth four points to consider. First, AIA Contracts do not “push Arbitration.” Second, the cost of arbitration may be expensive: “You could well spend over $5,000 just to have the arbitrator decide your case—again, not to mention your own attorneys fees.” Third, arbitration doesn’t avoid discovery. And finally, “mediation is always an option, regardless of which way you pursue your claim.”
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Assert a Party’s Noncompliance of Conditions Precedent with Particularity
July 26, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesConstruction contracts oftentimes and should contain conditions precedent to payment. Conditions precedent apply to both progress payments and final payment. The conditions precedent operate such that payment is NOT due until the conditions are satisfied. The satisfaction of the conditions precedent triggers the payor’s obligation to pay.
If a dispute arises due to the payee’s noncompliance with conditions precedent to payment, the noncompliance should be asserted with particularity in the answer and affirmative defenses. For example, if a subcontractor was required to provide lien waivers and releases as a condition precedent to payment, then this should be asserted with particularity as an affirmative defense. If the contractor’s receipt of payment from the owner was a condition precedent to payment to the subcontractor (pay-when-paid), then this should be asserted with particularity as an affirmative defense. Any noncompliance with a condition precedent should be identified as an affirmative defense.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
Dadelstein@gmail.com
Contractor Entitled to Continued Defense Against Allegations of Faulty Construction
November 01, 2021 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe U.S. District Court found that the contractor was entitled to a defense in the underlying state court action. Pa. Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Zonko Builders, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168855 (D. Del. Sept. 7, 2021).
Zonko was the general contractor for building the Salt Meadows Townhomes Condominium. This included supervising subcontractors in the installation of siding, house wrap, and flashing in five buildings between 2005 and 2007. In 2016, Salt Meadows and its individual members ("Association") found property damage in the condominiums.
The Association sued Zonko in state court, alleged that resulting damages included drywall damage in ceilings or walls, flooring and carpet, water damage around window trim, rot on window frames, incorrect flashing around roofs and windows, possible ridge vent leaks, and possible foundation issues.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Superior Court Of Pennsylvania Holds That CASPA Does Not Allow For Individual Claims Against A Property Owner’s Principals Or Shareholders
January 07, 2015 —
William J. Taylor and Michael Jervis – White and Williams LLPIn Scungio Borst Assocs. v. 410 Shurs Lane Developers, LLC, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held that an individual principal/shareholder of a property owner could not be held personally liable as an “agent of the owner” for unpaid invoices, penalties, and attorneys fees under the Pennsylvania Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (CASPA), 73 P.S. §§ 501-516, even though the property owner itself had failed to make payments allegedly due under a construction contract.
CASPA is a Pennsylvania statute which is designed to protect contractors and subcontractors from nonpayment and which, to that end, establishes rules and deadlines for payment under construction contracts between property owners, contractors, and subcontractors. An owner or contractor who does not adhere to the Act’s payment requirements is subject to the imposition of interest, penalties, and attorneys’ fees. In this recent case, the property owner, a limited liability company, had retained the plaintiff contractor to perform construction services on a condominium project. Upon completion of the work, the contractor was not paid approximately $1.5 million that it was owed under the contract. The contractor filed suit under CASPA to obtain the payment it was owed plus interest, penalties and fees, and named both the property owner and its individual principal as defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment to the individual principal on all claims asserted against him, and the contractor appealed, arguing that CASPA allows for claims against both a property owner and its principal when the principal is an “agent of the owner acting with the owner’s authority.”
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Michael Jervis, White and Williams LLP and
William J. Taylor, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Jervis may be contacted at jervism@whiteandwilliams.com; Mr. Taylor may be contacted at taylorw@whiteandwilliams.com
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