Fifth Circuit Finds Duty to Defend Construction Defect Case
March 14, 2022 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiReversing the judgment of the district court, the Fifth Circuit found the insurer owed a defense in a construction defect case. Siplast, Inc. v. Emplrs Mut. Cas. Co., 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 795 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2022).
The Archdiocese of New York sued various parties for a roofing project at a high school in the Bronx. Siplast, the roofing manufacturer, was included as a defendant. The underlying lawsuit arose from the Archdiocese purchase of a roof membrane system from Siplast. Siplast guaranteed that the roof membrane system would remain "in a watertight condition for a period of 20 years . . . or Siplast will repair the Roof Membrane System at its own expense."
After installation of the roof, school officials noticed water damage in the ceiling tiles throughout the school after a rain storm. Siplast attempted to repair the damage, but was unsuccessful. Siplast later informed the Archdiocese that the guarantee would not be honored regarding any permanent improvements of the roof. The Archdiocese filed suit against Siplast and the installing contractor. The cause of action against Siplast was for breach of the guarantee.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Colorado Supreme Court Weighs in on Timeliness of Claims Against Subcontractors in Construction Defect Actions
March 16, 2017 —
Jean Meyer - Colorado Construction LitigationOn February 27, 2017, the Colorado Supreme Court announced its decision in the Goodman v. Heritage Builders, No. 16SA193, 2017 CO 13 (Colo. February 27, 2017) case. In ten short pages, the Colorado Supreme Court completely reshuffled Colorado construction law with respect to application of the statutes of limitation and repose on third-party claims in construction defect cases. Specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court overruled a series of earlier Court of Appeals' decisions that found C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(b)(II) (“104(1)(b)(II)”) had no effect on the six-year statute of repose. For context, 104(1)(b)(II) permitted third-party actions for indemnity and contribution to toll until ninety days after the claims in the underlying action were resolved by settlement or judgment. In the construction context, 104(1)(b)(II) was intended to allow a general contractor’s claims against liable subcontractors to toll for the statutorily defined period. This allowed the general contractor to first focus its attention on defending the claims against and thereafter to pursue its claims against the subcontractors.
However, beginning in 2008, in the Thermo Dev., Inc. v. Cent. Masonry Corp., 195 P.3d 1166 (Colo. App. 2008) case, the Colorado Court of Appeals began chipping away at the force of 104(1)(b)(II). This trend continued in the Shaw Constr., LLC v. United Builder Servs., Inc., 2012 COA 24, 296 P.3d 145 decision, the Sierra Pac. Indus., v. Bradbury, 2016 COA 132, _ P.3d_ decision, and culminating in the Sopris Lodging, LLC v. Schofield Excavation, Inc., 2016 COA 158, reh'g denied (Nov. 23, 2016) decision. Effectively, in these decisions, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that third-party claims could not be brought beyond Colorado’s six-year statute of repose, regardless if they were brought within the ninety day tolling provision set forth in 104(1)(b)(II).
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Jean Meyer, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. Meyer may be contacted at
meyer@hhmrlaw.com
Picketing Threats
July 09, 2019 —
Jerry Morales - Snell & Wilmer Under ConstructionLetters from unions to owners, general contractors and other contractors informing them of the union’s dispute with one or more of the subcontractors, working at a common construction project site (or common situs), and of the union’s plans to engage in “public informational campaigns” at the site, in furtherance of the dispute, may constitute unlawful threats of secondary boycott.
Unions often send letters to various employers that share a common construction project site, informing them that the union has a dispute with one or more of the subcontractors working or scheduled to work at the same site. In labor law, the employers that do not have a dispute with the union are referred to as “neutral employers,” in contrast with the employers with which the union has the dispute, referred to as “primary employers.”
In the letters, the unions typically describe the reason for the labor dispute (e.g., alleged failure to pay “area standards”), request that the neutrals use their “managerial discretion” not to allow the primary employers to perform work at the project site until the dispute is resolved, and inform that the union will engage in public information campaigns against the primary employer at the common situs. The “public information campaign” is described in the union’s letter as including banner displays, distribution of handbills, picketing and other demonstration activity.
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Jerry Morales, Snell & WilmerMr. Morales may be contacted at
jmorales@swlaw.com
Unpaid Subcontractor Walks Off the Job and Wins
September 01, 2016 —
John P. Ahlers – Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMake the following inquiry of your constructional lawyer, watch him/her sit up in his/her chair and give your question immediate attention: “I haven’t been paid, can I walk off the job?” The answer to this question is a strong “maybe, but it’s risky.” Walking off the project has a significant downside. The risk is that the judge who reviews your decision, sometimes years after the event, may not agree that the non-payment was a material breach and, thus, suspension of performance (walking off) is not justified.
A breach of contract occurs where, without legal justification, a party fails to perform any promise that forms a whole or part of the contract. Not all breaches are equal. Some failures to perform a promise are “nominal,” “trifling” or “technical.” These breaches do not excuse performance under the contract by the non-breaching party. If the breach is “material,” that is, goes to the essential purpose of the agreement, is a question that only a judge decides, and only after the decision was made as to whether to walk off the job or not. Therefore, before deciding whether to walk off the job, you have to second guess what a judge may decide under the circumstances. Since not all judges see things the same way, the decision is fraught with uncertainty and risk.
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John P. Ahlers, Ahlers & Cressman PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
jahlers@ac-lawyers.com
Roadway Contractor Owed Duty of Care to Driver Injured Outside of Construction Zone
January 04, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogFor the roadway contractor it appeared to be an open and shut case:
Plaintiff car driver was stopped at a standard one-way “reversing lane closure” traffic control in which traffic going in one direction would be stopped while traffic going in the other direction was allowed to proceed, and then the procedure would be reversed.
Plaintiff, while stopped at the traffic control, was rear-ended by another vehicle driven by George Smithson. Smithson testified that he “must have looked off to the side” at some point prior to the collision because he did not see plaintiff’s vehicle before hitting it. He also testified that the primary reason the accident happened was that he was not paying attention and that he knew of no other cause of the accident.
For the roadway contractor you couldn’t ask for a better admission. And it ended in the trial court just the way you thought it would, with a win for the roadway contractor. That is, until it was appealed.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Housing Starts in U.S. Surge to Seven-Year High as Weather Warms
May 20, 2015 —
Sho Chandra – BloombergNew residential construction in the U.S. surged in April to the highest level in more than seven years, indicating the industry has moved beyond a weather-related soft patch to regain strength.
Housing starts jumped 20.2 percent to a 1.14 million annualized rate, the most since November 2007, from a 944,000 pace in March, a Commerce Department report showed Tuesday in Washington. The median forecast of 83 economists surveyed by Bloomberg was 1.02 million. More permits, a proxy for future construction, were issued than at any time since June 2008.
An improving labor market and mortgage costs close to multiyear lows are reviving residential construction, a sign that the weakness in early 2015 was probably due to harsh winter weather. Builders including PulteGroup Inc. have said the spring selling season is off to a good start, and sentiment data for May showed developers are optimistic about the next six months.
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Shobhana Chandra, Bloomberg
A Court-Side Seat: Guam’s CERCLA Claim Allowed, a “Roundup” Verdict Upheld, and Judicial Process Privilege Lost
June 14, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThis is a brief account of some of the important environmental and administrative law cases recently decided.
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
BP PLC, et al. v Mayor and City of Baltimore
The issue the court confronted was a procedural matter: Can the defendant energy companies use the federal removal statutes (see 28 USC Section 1442) to remove a state law climate change lawsuit to federal court? Here, a group of energy companies were sued by the mayor and city council of Baltimore in state court, where they alleged that the defendants had concealed the adverse environmental effects of the fossil fuel products they promoted and sold in Baltimore City. Several similar lawsuits have been filed in many state courts, where typically it is alleged that the defendants can be sued on various common law theories. Rather than defend these cases in state court, the defendants have sought to remove these cases to federal court because climate change liability appears to be an issue that should be settled at the federal level. These efforts have been unsuccessful, with most federal trial and appellate courts holding that the reasons cited for removal (oftentimes the federal officer removal statute) have not been persuasive. In this case, both the Maryland federal district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals held they had no jurisdiction to authorize removal, and thus returned the case to the state court. Noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ruled that a removal action could be countenanced under Section 1442, thus creating a circuit split, the Supreme Court held that a straightforward reading of the removal statute empowers the reviewing court to examine all theories for removal that a district court has rejected. Consequently, the Court remanded the case to the Fourth Circuit where it can decide, “in the first instance,” whether there actually exist grounds to remove this case to federal court.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
California Supreme Court Clarifies Deadline to File Anti-SLAPP Motions in Light of Amended Pleadings
July 02, 2018 —
Tony Carucci - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogCalifornia’s “anti-SLAPP” (“SLAPP” is an acronym for strategic lawsuit against public participation) statute—codified at California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 et seq.—is the primary vehicle for defending against any action involving petitioning or free speech. The statute was designed to provide an early and fast summary judgment-like procedure to allow defendants and cross-defendants to file a motion to dismiss either an entire complaint, specific causes of action, or even just portions of a cause of action, and to require the plaintiff to respond before conducting discovery. By facilitating an early challenge to a plaintiff or cross-complainant’s claims, the anti-SLAPP statute allows the responding party to avoid the costs and delay that chill the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16(f), an anti-SLAPP motion must be filed “within 60 days of the service of the complaint . . . .” But what if the plaintiff files an ameded complaint? In Newport Harbor Ventures, LLC v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism (2018) 4 Cal.5th 637, the California Supreme Court held that the 60-day timeline runs from the date a complaint is filed with the cause(s) of action challenged in the anti-SLAPP motion.
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Tony Carucci, Snell & WilmerMr. Carucci may be contacted at
acarucci@swlaw.com
