Seattle Independent Contractor Ordinance – Pitfalls for Unwary Construction Professionals
October 09, 2023 —
Travis Colburn - Ahlers Cressman & SleightChapter 14.34 of the Seattle Municipal Code is a relatively new ordinance that can affect the parties to a construction contract for work performed within the City of Seattle’s city limits. The Independent Contractor Protection Ordinance (“ICPO”) was enacted to provide self-employed persons, or entities composed of not more than one person, regardless of corporate form, recourse for timely payment for work performed. The ICPO applies to contracts of $600[i] or more between an independent contractor and a hiring entity where the work, in whole or in part, is known to be performed within the City of Seattle’s city limits.[ii] The ICPO cannot be waived by parties to a contract.[iii]
Historically, the primary legal recourse for non-payment or late payment for work performed under a contract involves an expensive breach of contract action, and one reason the ICPO was enacted was to give greater protection to a growing number of Washington independent contractors who report problems with timely and accurate payment.
The ICPO affects “hiring entities” or any individual, partnership, association, corporation, business trust, or any entity, person or group of persons, or a successor thereof, that hires independent contractors to provide services within the scope of a hiring entity’s business or commercial activities. In the construction context, most general contractors, subcontractors, design professionals, and design consultants should be aware of this ordinance, as well as certain owners[iv] and development-side entities.
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Travis Colburn, Ahlers Cressman & SleightMr. Colburn may be contacted at
travis.colburn@acslawyers.com
Construction Litigation Roundup: “Too Soon?”
July 02, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyNot at all, said the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a case dealing with the timing of filing of a claim for indemnity.
In the case, a Louisiana intermediate appellate court had earlier ruled in very short order on a supervisory writ application (reversing the trial court) that a claim for indemnity (based upon an indemnity clause in a construction contract) was “premature” until a “determination that damages are actually owed and the indemnitee sustains a loss. … At this time, the lawsuit is still pending against [the putative indemnitee], and no determination of liability had been made; thus, there is no obligation for indemnity and defense costs. … Stated differently, indemnity (or reimbursement) is not available at this time because [the indemnitee] has not discharged a liability which [the indemnitor] should have assumed or otherwise suffered any loss or damages. … Accordingly, [the] cause of action for indemnity and defense is not ripe for adjudication.” Bennett v. Demco Energy Servs., LLC, 2023-0581 (La. App. 1 Cir. 09/11/23); 2023 La. App. LEXIS 1449.
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com
The Year 2010 In Review: Design And Construction Defects Litigation
February 25, 2011 —
Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen LauderdaleThis article is the first in a series summarizing construction law developments for 2010
1. Centex Homes v. Financial Pacific Life Insurance Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
After settling numerous homeowners’ construction defect claims — and more than ten years after the homes were substantially completed — a home developer brought suit against one of the concrete fabrication subcontractors for the development seeking indemnity for amounts paid to the homeowners, as well as for damages for breach of the subcontractor’s duties to procure specific insurance and to defend the developer against the homeowners’ claims. The subcontractor brought a motion for summary adjudication on the ground the developer’s claims were barred by the ten year statute of repose contained in Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.15.
The District Court agreed the developer’s claim for indemnity was barred by Section 337.15. And it held that because the damages recoverable for breach of the subcontractor’s duty to purchase insurance are identical to the damages recoverable through the developer’s indemnity claim, the breach of duty to procure insurance claim also was time-barred. The District Court, however, allowed the claim for breach of the duty to defend to proceed. The categories of losses associated with such a claim (attorneys’ fees and other defense costs) are distinct from the damages recoverable through claims governed by Section 337.15 (latent deficiency in the design and construction of the homes and injury to property arising out of the latent deficiencies).
2. UDC — Universal Development v. CH2M Hill, 181 Cal. App. 4th 10 (6th Dist. Jan. 2010)
Indemnification clauses in construction agreements often state that one party to the agreement — the “indemnitor” — will defend and indemnify the other party from particular types of claims. Of course, having a contract right to a defense is not the same as actually receiving a defense. Any indemnitor attempting to avoid paying for defense costs can simply deny the tender of defense with the hope that when the underlying claim is resolved the defense obligations will be forgotten. In the past, when parties entitled to a defense — the “indemnitees” — had long memories and pressed to recover defense costs, indemnitors attempted to justify denying the tender by claiming their defense obligations coincided with their indemnity obligations and neither arose until a final determination was made that the underlying claim was one for which indemnity was owed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. Ms. Matson can be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com, Mr. Hamersmith can be contacted at hhamersmith@sheppardmullin.com, and Ms. Lauderdale can be contacted at hlauderdale@sheppardmullin.com.
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Fifth Circuit Confirms: Insurer Must Defend Despite Your Work/Your Product Exclusion
February 14, 2022 —
Nathan A. Cazier & Scott S. Thomas - Payne & FearsThe United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently confirmed that liability insurers have a duty to defend their insureds in construction defect cases when the underlying complaint alleges damage to property beyond the product and work of the insured – even if the complaint merely implies that the insured seeks such damage, without explicitly alleging so. Siplast, Incorporated v. Employers Mutual Casualty Company, No. 20-11076, 2022 WL 99303 (5th Cir. Jan. 11, 2022).
The Archdiocese of New York replaced the roof over Cardinal Spellman High School in the Bronx, using a roofing membrane manufactured by Siplast, Inc. (“Siplast”). After a rainstorm a few years later, school officials reported water damage to the ceiling tiles throughout the school, and repair attempts only made the leaking worse. Siplast disputed that the leaks were its fault and refused to replace the roof, so the Archdiocese sued.
Reprinted courtesy of
Nathan A. Cazier, Payne & Fears and
Scott S. Thomas, Payne & Fears
Mr. Cazier may be contacted at nac@paynefears.com
Mr. Thomas may be contacted at sst@paynefears.com
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Potential Pitfalls Under the Contract Disputes Act for Federal Government Contractors
February 28, 2018 —
Sarah K. Carpenter – Smith Currie PublicationsThe Contract Disputes Act (CDA) governs monetary and non-monetary disputes arising out of contracts or implied-in-fact contracts between the federal government and contractors. Because the CDA is an exclusive remedy, it is important that contractors be wary of the many pitfalls that may be encountered by a contractor seeking to assert a claim against the government under the CDA.
The pitfalls faced by a contractor under the CDA can arise before a contractor becomes aware of a potential claim. Pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) § 43.204(c), a contracting officer should include in any supplemental agreement, including any change order, a Contractor’s Statement of Release which requires a contractor to execute a broad release of the government from any and all liability under the contract. As a result of this FAR provision, in executing a routine change order, a contractor may inadvertently release its right to pursue a potential claim under the CDA. A contractor should always review any release language prior to executing a supplemental agreement or change order with the government.
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Sarah K. Carpenter, Smith CurrieMs. Carpenter may be contacted at
skcarpenter@smithcurrie.com
Arkansas: Avoiding the "Made Whole" Doctrine Through Dépeçage
April 09, 2014 —
Robert M. Caplan – White and Williams LLPIn Arkansas, a workers’ compensation carrier’s subrogated recovery is subject to a determination of whether the injured worker—or, as the case may be, the worker’s surviving beneficiaries—has been “made whole” by the worker’s recovery against the third party tortfeasor. See, e.g., Yancey v. B & B Supply, 213 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Ark. App. 2005) (“An insured’s right to be made whole takes precedence over an insurer’s right to subrogation, and an insured must be fully compensated before the insurer's right to subrogation arises.”) [1] More often than not, a “made whole” determination will completely eradicate the carrier’s lien.
But under the right circumstances, a workers’ compensation carrier may be able to avoid the harsh outcome of “made whole” by intervening in a pending third party action and subsequently filing a motion for dépeçage—i.e., the conflict of laws principle requiring the court to conduct a separate choice of law analysis for discrete issues in a given case. A motion for dépeçage, in this sense, would demand that the court conduct a choice of law analysis to determine what state’s workers’ compensation subrogation law will apply on reimbursing a carrier’s lien.
We recently exploited this often underutilized tactic—to avoid Arkansas’ made whole doctrine—in a case involving a fatal plane crash in Louisiana. In that case, the deceased worker and his beneficiaries were residents of Louisiana; the accident took place in Louisiana; the worker was officially employed in Louisiana; and the workers’ compensation insurance policy was governed by, and benefits were paid under, Louisiana law. The only “contact” with Arkansas [2], meanwhile, was that Arkansas was the defendant’s domicile.
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Robert M. Caplan, White and Williams LLPMr. Caplan may be contacted at
caplanr@whiteandwilliams.com
Unions Win Prevailing Wage Challenge Brought By Charter Cities: Next Stop The Supreme Court?
April 06, 2016 —
Steven M. Cvitanovic & Sarah A. Marsey – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn City Of El Centro v. David Lanier (State Building And Construction Trades Council Of California, AFL-CIO), the 4th appellate district upheld by a 2-1 majority the constitutionality of Labor Code section 1782, which prohibits a charter city from receiving or using state funding or financial assistance for a public construction project if the city has a charter provision or ordinance that authorizes a contractor to not comply with the state prevailing wage laws.
As we wrote on this topic back in 2012 (See alert here), charter cities are governed by a municipal constitution and may make and enforce its own ordinances and regulations with respect to municipal affairs (i.e., the ‘home rule’ doctrine), as opposed to general law cities, which must comply with the state laws such as the Public Wage Rate Act (requiring municipalities to pay prevailing wages).
The California Supreme Court previously held in State Building and Construction Trade Council of California, AFL-CIO v. City of Vista that the ‘home rule’ rule permits charter cities not to pay prevailing wages to its contract workers on locally funded public works because such determination is a municipal affair and not a statewide concern.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven M. Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Sarah A. Marsey, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com
Ms. Marsey may be contacted at smarsey@hbblaw.com
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Client Alert: Michigan Insurance Company Not Subject to Personal Jurisdiction in California for Losses Suffered in Arkansas
February 05, 2015 —
R. Bryan Martin, Lawrence S. Zucker II, and Kristian B. Moriarty – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Greenwell v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (No. C074546, Filed 1/27/2015) (“Greenwell”), the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, held a California resident could not establish specific personal jurisdiction over an insurance company, located in Michigan, which issued a policy of insurance to the California resident where the claimed loss occurred in Arkansas.
Plaintiff purchased a policy of insurance from defendant, Auto-Owners Ins. Co. (“Auto”), a Michigan corporation. The policy provided commercial property coverage for an apartment building owned by Plaintiff, located in Arkansas. The policy also provided commercial general liability coverage for plaintiff’s property ownership business, which plaintiff operated from California.
Both coverage provisions insured certain risks, losses, or damages that could have arisen in California. The dispute which arose between Plaintiff and Defendant, however, involved two fires that damaged the apartment building in Arkansas. As a result of coverage decisions that Auto made in the handling of the claim, plaintiff filed suit for breach of contract and bad faith.
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys
R. Bryan Martin,
Lawrence S. Zucker II and
Kristian B. Moriarty
Mr. Martin may be contacted at bmartin@hbblaw.com;
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com;
and Mr. Moriarty may be contacted at kmoriarty@hbblaw.com
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