Roof's "Cosmetic" Damage From Hail Storm Covered
August 19, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's determination that cosmetic damage to the insured's roof was covered. Advance Cable Co., LLC v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 9805 (7th Cir. June 11, 2015).
The insured submitted a claim to its insurer, Cincinnati, for damage to the metal roof of its building caused by a hail storm. The insured inspected the roof with a claims representative for Cincinnati. Dents were spotted, but there was little other evidence of damage. The loss was estimated at $1,894.74. A check for this amount was sent to the insured.
Six months later, the insured considered selling the building. A potential buyer inspected the roof and found hail damage. At the request of the insured, Cincinnati conducted another inspection of the roof. Again, dents of approximately 1 inch in diameter were found. The inspector noted that the denting would not affect the performance of the roof panels or detract from their life expectancy.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
SB 939 Proposes Moratorium On Unlawful Detainer Actions For Commercial Tenants And Allows Tenants Who Can't Renegotiate Their Lease In Good Faith To Terminate Their Lease Without Liability
June 01, 2020 —
Rhonda Kreger – Newmeyer DillionSB 939 is currently working its way through the Senate Judiciary Committee. The legislation would impose new obligations on landlords, and provide protections for commercial tenants who meet specified criteria. SB 939 would impose a moratorium on eviction of those qualified commercial tenants while emergency COVID-19 orders are in effect. Any eviction actions commenced after the date of the emergency COVID-19 order, but before the adoption of SB 939, would be void and unenforceable. The Senate Judiciary Committee has scheduled a hearing for SB 939 on May 22, 2020, at 9:00 a.m.
Who qualifies as a commercial tenant under SB 939?
To qualify under this legislation, a commercial tenant must be a business that operates primarily in California. The commercial tenant must be a small business, nonprofit, an eating or drinking establishment, place of entertainment, or performance venue. Publicly traded companies or any company owned by, or affiliated with a publicly traded company, do not qualify. The commercial tenant must have experienced a decline of at least 40 percent monthly revenue, either as compared to two months before the emergency COVID-19 order, or other local government shelter-in-place orders took effect, or as compared to the same month in 2019. If the commercial tenant is an eating or drinking establishment, place of entertainment, or performance venue, the commercial tenant must also show a decline of 25 percent or more in capacity due to social or physical distancing orders or safety concerns, and show that it is subject to regulations to prevent the spread of COVID-19 that will financially impair the business when compared to the period before the emergency COVID-19 order or other local shelter-in-place orders took effect.
What eviction actions are prohibited while emergency COVID-19 orders are in effect?
If adopted, SB 939 would add Section 1951.9 to the Civil Code. This section would make it unlawful to terminate a tenancy, serve notice to terminate a tenancy, use lockout or utility shutoff actions to terminate a tenancy or otherwise evict a tenant of commercial real property, including a business or nonprofit, during the pendency of the COVID-19 emergency order proclaimed by Governor Newsome on March 4, 2020. Exceptions apply if a tenant poses a threat to the property, other tenants or a person, business or other entity. Any violations of this eviction prohibition would be against public policy and unenforceable.
Any eviction started after proclamation of the state of emergency but before the effective date is deemed void, against public policy and is unenforceable.
Does SB 939 impose new penalties or remedies?
Any landlord who harasses, mistreats or retaliates against a commercial tenant to force the tenant to abrogate the lease would be subject to a fine of $2,000 for each violation. Further, any such violation would be an unlawful business practice and an act of unfair competition under Section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code and would be subject to all available remedies or penalties for those actions under state law.
When is a commercial tenant required to pay unpaid rent due to COVID-19?
If a commercial tenant fails to pay rent during the emergency COVID-19 order, the sum total of the past due rent must be paid within 12 months following the date of the end of the emergency proclamation, unless the commercial tenant has successfully negotiated an agreement with its landlord to pay the outstanding rent at a later date. Nonpayment of rent during the state of emergency cannot be used as grounds for eviction. Notwithstanding lease terms to the contrary, landlords may not impose late charges for rent that became due during the state of emergency.
Are landlords required to provide notice of protections adopted under SB 939?
Landlords would be required to provide notice to commercial tenants of the protections offered under SB 939 within 30 days of the effective date. SB 939 does not preempt local legislation or ordinances restricting the same or similar conduct which impose a more severe penalty for the same conduct. Local legislation or ordinances may impose additional notice requirements.
Does SB 939 impose new protections for commercial tenants when negotiating lease modifications?
If enacted, SB 939 would permit commercial tenants to open negotiations for new lease terms, and provide commercial tenants the ability to terminate the lease if those negotiations fail. A commercial tenant who wishes to modify its commercial lease, may engage in good faith negotiations with its landlord to modify any rent or economic requirement regardless of the term remaining on the lease. The commercial tenant must serve a notice on the landlord certifying that it meets the required criteria, along with the desired modifications.
If the commercial tenant and landlord do not reach a mutually satisfactory agreement within 30 days, then within 10 days, the commercial tenant may terminate the lease without any liability for future rent, fees, or costs that otherwise may have been due under the lease by providing a written termination notice to the landlord. The commercial tenant would be required to pay previously due rent, in an amount no greater than the sum of the following: (1) the actual rent due during the emergency COVID-19 order, or a maximum of three months of the past due rent during that period, and (2) all rent incurred and unpaid during a time unrelated to the emergency COVID-19 order through the date of the termination notice. The payment is due within 12 months from date of the termination notice. The commercial tenant would be required to vacate the premises within 14 days of the landlord's receipt of the termination notice. Upon service of the notice, any lease, and any third party guaranties of the lease would terminate. If the landlord and commercial tenant reach an agreement to modify the lease, the commercial tenant would not have the option to later terminate the lease under this provision.
When is the next Senate Judiciary Committee Meeting for SB 939?
The Senate Judiciary Committee set a hearing for SB 939 on May 22, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. The Senate will livestream the hearing on its website at www.sen.ca.gov. Public comments or testimony may be submitted in writing to the Judiciary Committee by emailing Erica.porter@sen.ca.gov. Alternatively, the public may participate via telephone during the public comment period. Any changes to the Judicial Committee schedule may be found at: https://www.senate.ca.gov/calendar.
Newmeyer Dillion continues to follow COVID-19 and its impact on your business and our communities. Feel free to reach out to us at NDcovid19response@ndlf.com or visit us at www.newmeyerdillion.com/covid-19-multidisciplinary-task-force/.
Rhonda Kreger is Senior Counsel on Newmeyer Dillion's transactional team at our Newport Beach office. Her practice focuses on all aspects of commercial real estate law, with a particular emphasis on the representation of residential developers, merchant builders and institutional investors. You can reach Rhonda at rhonda.kreger@ndlf.com.
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The Problem With Building a New City From Scratch
May 10, 2022 —
Nolan Gray - BloombergFrom California to Miami and points in between, housing costs in the U.S. are skyrocketing, bringing bidding wars in hot markets and fears of a fresh surge in homelessness as renters scramble for an affordable place to live.
The deepening housing crunch — and the intractable resistance that residents often put up when the prospect of new housing emerges nearby — has led some observers to ask: Why don’t we just make new cities?
“When China needs new places for people to live, they just build a new city,” Nathan J. Robinson recently wrote in Current Affairs, contemplating all the undeveloped land in between California’s costly major urban areas. “They’ve built 600 of them since 1949.”
At first blush, it might seem obvious. But history is full of failed, unfinished or underperforming scratch-built city projects, in California and elsewhere, and more are in the pipeline.
To learn more about how we might best approach building new cities, CityLab talked to a person who’s had a hand in planning a few of them: Alain Bertaud, a fellow at the Marron Institute for Urban Management and a globetrotting former city planner at the World Bank. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.
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Nolan Gray, Bloomberg
Sierra Pacific v. Bradbury Goes Unchallenged: Colorado’s Six-Year Statute of Repose Begins When a Subcontractor’s Scope of Work Ends
November 03, 2016 —
Luke Mecklenburg – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIt’s official: the October 20, 2016 deadline to petition for certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals on its decision in Sierra Pacific Industries, Inc. v. Bradbury has passed, so it appears that decision will stand.
In Sierra Pacific, the Court of Appeals held as a matter of first impression that the statute of repose for a general contractor to sue a subcontractor begins to run when a subcontractor’s scope of work is substantially complete, regardless of the status of the overall project. Sierra Pac. Indus., Inc. v. Bradbury, 2016 COA 132, ¶ 28, ___ P.3d ___. The Court of Appeals interpreted the statute of repose in C.R.S. section 13-80-104, which requires that “all actions against any architect, contractor, builder or builder vendor, engineer, or inspector performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, inspection, construction, or observation of any improvement to real property” must be brought within six years of substantial completion of that improvement. C.R.S. § 13-80-104(1)(a). Recognizing that “an improvement may be [to] a discrete component of an entire project” under Shaw Construction, LLC v. United Builder Services, Inc., 296 P.3d 145 (Colo. App. 2012), the Court of Appeals determined that “a subcontractor has substantially completed its role in the improvement at issue when it finishes working on the improvement.” Sierra Pac., 2016 COA at ¶¶ 20, 28. In doing so, it rejected Sierra Pacific’s argument that the statute could be tolled under the repair doctrine “while others worked to repair [the subcontractor’s] ‘improper installation work and flawed repair work.’” Id. at ¶ 29. Because six years had undisputedly passed since the subcontractor completed its scope of work when Sierra Pacific filed suit against it, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order granting the subcontractor’s motion for summary judgment under Section 13-80-104(1)(a).
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Luke Mecklenburg, Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogMr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at
lmecklenburg@swlaw.com
Dispute Among Joint Venture Partners and Joint Venture Agreement
January 28, 2025 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a dispute involving joint venture partners and a joint venture agreement, one of the partners sued a third party (which purchased the assets of the other partner). Claims against the third party included tortious interference of the joint venture agreement between the partners, conspiracy to tortiously interfere with the joint venture agreement between the partners, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty by the other partner, and conspiracy with the other partner to breach a fiduciary duty.
The dispute was tried in a non-jury trial. The other partner and the third party prevailed. A few key points on the above claims asserted against the third party that failed:
- Tortious interference of the contract -- Since the trial court found that the other partner did NOT breach the joint venture agreement, the cause of action for tortious interference failed. “No cause of action for tortious interference with a contract can exist in the absence of a breach.”
- Conspiracy to tortiously interfere with a contract -- “If an underlying tort [e.g., tortious interference] has not been established, a count for conspiracy to commit that tort will not lie.”
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Back to Basics – Differing Site Conditions
December 19, 2018 —
Tracey W. Pruiett - Smith CurrieEncountering an unexpected site condition is one of the more common risks on a construction project. A “differing site condition”, or it is sometimes called a “changed condition”, is generally understood to be a physical condition that is discovered while performing work and that was not visible or otherwise expected at the time of bidding. Often, the condition could not have been discovered by a reasonable site investigation. Examples of common differing site conditions include: soil with inadequate bearing capacity to support the building being constructed, soil that cannot be reused as structural fill, unanticipated groundwater, quicksand, mud, rock formations, or other artificial subsurface obstructions. Differing site conditions may also occur within the walls or ceilings of a renovation project such as the renovation of a hospital or historic building.
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Tracey W. Pruiett, Smith CurrieMs. Pruiett may be contacted at
twpruiett@smithcurrie.com
Broker Not Liable for Failure to Reveal Insurer's Insolvency After Policy Issued
March 28, 2012 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiFaced with an issue of first impression in California, the Court of Appeals held that a broker was not liable for failing to reveal the insurer's insolvency occurring after issuance of the policy. Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Serv. West, Inc., 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 232 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2012).
The developer for a construction project in downtown San Diego retained Aon as its broker to secure coverage. Aon procured a general liability policy for the project with Legion Indemnity Company. Legion was solvent when it issued the policy.
The developer hired Pacific Rim (“PacRim”) as one of several subcontractors on the project. The parties entered into a contract in which the developer agreed to provide PacRim with liability insurance through an Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“OCIP”). Aon was not a party to the contract and PacRim was never its client. PacRim, however, enrolled in the OCIP by contacting Aon and providing all necessary paperwork.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Supreme Court Opens Door for Challenges to Older Federal Regulations
August 05, 2024 —
Jane C. Luxton - Lewis BrisboisWashington, D.C. (July 1, 2024) – On July 1, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court issued another end-of-term major decision limiting the scope of federal agency actions in Corner Post, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Adding to the tectonic shift in the regulatory landscape created by the Court’s June 27 and 28 rulings constraining the role of administrative law judges and overturning longstanding “Chevron deference” by courts to federal agency expertise, the decision in Corner Post establishes a newly expanded time frame for affected entities to challenge final agency action. Instead of confirming that final agency action is subject to a default six-year statute of limitations, the Court held that under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the time limit for appeal begins to run when a plaintiff is injured by the agency's action, not when the action becomes final. This decision has important implications for businesses and others affected by federal regulations.
The case arose when Corner Post, a truck stop and convenience store in North Dakota that opened in 2018, challenged a 2011 Federal Reserve Board regulation (Regulation II) that set maximum interchange fees for debit card transactions. Corner Post filed suit in 2021, arguing that Regulation II allowed higher fees than permitted by statute. The lower courts dismissed the suit as time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a), which effectively requires APA claims to be filed "within six years after the right of action first accrues."
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Jane C. Luxton, Lewis BrisboisMs. Luxton may be contacted at
Jane.Luxton@lewisbrisbois.com
