Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFThe California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”
The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.
As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.
Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.
The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”
The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.
Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”
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"My Bad, I Thought It Was in Good Faith" is Not Good Enough - Contractor Ordered to Pay Prompt Payment Penalties
February 23, 2016 —
David A. Harris & Jesse M. Sullivan – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPRetention clauses are almost always included in California construction contracts and permit an Owner to withhold a portion of what is owed to the General Contractor as security to ensure the proper completion of the work. General Contractors pass the withholding of retention down to the subcontractors. Thus, if the subcontractor fails to complete its work, or fails to correct deficiencies, the Owner/General Contractor can use the retention to pay the costs of completing or correcting the subcontractor’s work.
The contractor must release any retention it receives from the owner within ten days unless a “good faith dispute exists between the direct contractor and the subcontractor.” (Civil Code section 8814.) Where there is a good faith dispute, the contractor “may withhold from the retention to the subcontractor an amount not in excess of 150 percent of the estimated value of the disputed amount.” (Civil Code section 8814(c).) If the contractor wrongfully withholds retention, it must not only pay the retention but must also pay the subcontractor “a penalty of 2 percent per month on the amount wrongfully withheld.” The contractor must also pay the subcontractor’s costs and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in collecting the retention. (Civil Code section 8818.)
Reprinted courtesy of
David A. Harris, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Jesse M. Sullivan, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Harris may be contacted at dharris@hbblaw.com
Mr. Sullivan may be contacted at jsullivan@hbblaw.com
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Terminating Contracts for Convenience — “Just Because”
June 28, 2021 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesTermination for convenience provisions are important provisions to include in construction contracts. These are provisions that allow a party to terminate the contract for ANY REASON. No cause is needed to exercise the termination for convenience provision. In other words, the terminating party does not have to demonstrate the other party breached the contract. A termination for convenience can be exercised “just because.”
Typically, the party providing the service should not get to terminate for convenience. However, the party receiving the service will want to be afforded this contractual right.
For example, an owner (receiving a service) will want to include a termination for convenience provision with its prime contractor (providing a service). And, a general contractor (receiving a service) will want to include a termination for convenience provision in its subcontract with its subcontractor (providing a service). However, a general contractor providing a service for an owner, or a subcontractor providing a service to a general contractor, should not be able to terminate the contract for their convenience “just because” a better opportunity comes along.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
A Homeowner’s Subsequent Action is Barred as a Matter of Law by way of a Prior “Right to Repair Act” Claim Resolved by Cash Settlement for Waiver of all Known or Unknown Claims
February 26, 2015 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq., Jon A. Turigliatto, Esq., and David A. Napper, Esq. – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinDavid Belasco v. Gary Loren Wells et al. (2015) B254525
OVERVIEW
In a decision published on February 17, 2015, the Second District Court of Appeal made clear that settlement agreements containing waivers of unknown claims in connection with a construction of a property, absent fraud or misrepresentation, will be upheld. In brief, the homeowner plaintiff had made a claim against the builder pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure Section 896 (“Right to Repair”) and settled for a cash payment and obtained a Release of all Claims including for all known and unknown claims. The court held that homeowner’s subsequent construction defect claim was barred pursuant to the terms and conditions of the earlier release.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff and Appellant, David Belasco ("Belasco"), purchased a newly construction home in Manhattan Beach from builder Gary Loren Wells ("Wells"). Two years after purchasing the property, Belasco filed a Complaint for construction defects, which eventually resulted in settlement between the parties. The settlement agreement included a California Civil Code Section 1524 waiver of all known or unknown claims with the word "claims" defined in part as “any and all known and unknown construction defects." Six years later in 2012, Belasco filed a Complaint alleging a claim, amongst others, that the defective and leaky roof breached the statutory warranty on new construction under California Civil Code section 896 ("Right to Repair Act").
Relying on San Diego Hospice v. County of San Diego (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1048, Wells and Wells' surety, American Contractors Indemnity Company (collectively "Wells"), filed a motion for summary judgment contending that the 2012 action was barred by the settlement of Belasco’s prior Complaint against Wells for construction defects to his home. When the trial court ruled in favor of Wells, Belasco appealed. Belasco, a patent attorney, made the following contentions:(1) the general release and section 1542 wavier in the settlement agreement for patent construction defects is not a "reasonable release" of a subsequent claim for latent construction defects within the meaning of section 929 and the “Right to Repair” Act; (2) a reasonable release can only apply to a "particular violation" and not to a latest defect under the language of section945.5, subdivision (f), and the settlement was too vague to be valid because it does not reference a "particular violation;" (3) section 932 of the California Civil Code specifically authorizes an action on "[s]subsequently discovered claims of unmet standards;" (4) public policy prohibits use of a general release and section 1542 waiver to bar a subsequent claim for latent residential construction defects; and (5) a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning Belasco's fraud and negligence claims that would have voided the settlement pursuant to section 1668.
Pursuant to the "Right to Repair Act" Section 929 subsection (a), a builder can make a cash offer in lieu of a repair and the homeowner is free to accept or reject such offer. Section 929subsection (b) goes on to state that
"[t]he builder may obtain a reasonable release in exchange for the cash payment. The builder may negotiate the terms and conditions of any reasonable release in terms of scope and consideration in conjunction with a cash payment under this chapter."
The Second District Court of Appeal ruled that the prior cash settlement, with a release and section 1524 wavier, was a "reasonable release" under the language of California Civil Code Section 929.
On multiple occasions, the Court noted that Belasco is an attorney and was represented by an attorney during the negotiation of the settlement agreement. By executing the agreement with express language regarding what claims were to be release, Belasco released Wells of "any and all claims" due to "any and all known and unknown construction defects." The Court reasoned that because Belasco is an attorney in his own right, he should have understood the import of the Section 1542 waiver and had the opportunity to reject or revise the settlement agreement prior to binding himself to it. The Court further found that the agreement "could not have been more clear" regarding the waiver of all unknown and known construction defect claims and therefore was not vague. Belasco's additional contentions were found to be without merit because Belasco availed himself of the statutory remedy of a cash settlement in lieu of repairs and voluntarily entered into a negotiated settlement agreement. Lastly, Belasco failed to present any evidence regarding his misrepresentation claim.
When a homeowner files a "Right to Repair Act" claim, often it seems that only two options exist: either repair the alleged defects or go to court. However, Belasco is a reminder to builders that the "Right to Repair Act" does offer an avenue for settlement. The Second District Court of Appeal presented a clear, unqualified opinion regarding the validity and enforceability of settlement agreements releasing all known or unknown construction defects in a single family home case. The Court will hold parties to the settlements they agree to. This is especially so when one of the parties is an attorney and provides deposition testimony expressly acknowledging that he understood the scope of the agreement. Attorneys for builders should always include a waiver of all known and unknown claims, which pursuant to Belasco and San Diego Hospice, will ensure that any future claims at the property will be effectively barred by the terms of the settlement agreement.
Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys
Richard H. Glucksman,
Jon A. Turigliatto and
David A. Napper
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Turigliatto may be contacted at jturigliatto@cgdrblaw.com
Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com
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Where Mechanic’s Liens and Contracts Collide
July 02, 2018 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsToday at Construction Law Musings, we’re back to a discussion of mechanic’s liens.
This past week, the Loudoun County Circuit Court here in Virginia had an opportunity to discuss the interaction between mechanic’s liens, contracts and the law of fixtures. In TWP Enters. v Dressel, the Court considered a provision of a contract between the TWP Enterprises, a supplier of materials to the construction project, and the builder for the defendant. The provision between the supplier and builder essentially stated that until such time as TWP’s materials were paid for in full, TWP kept title to them (check out the case link above for the full text of the provision).
Needless to say, the builder did not pay and TWP filed a mechanic’s lien then sued to enforce that lien. The owners demurred to the complaint and asked the Court to dismiss the claim on several grounds, among them that the contractual provision described above precluded the enforcement of the lien because TWP retained title to the materials despite the fact that they had been incorporated into the structure of the building and were therefore part of the realty.
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Christopher G. Hill, The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Homebuilders Opposed to Potential Change to Interest on Construction Defect Expenses
January 22, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFIn 2008, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that in calculating interest on the expense of repairing construction defects would start at the time that the defect was repaired. In 2009, the Colorado State Legislature introduced a bill that would have made homeowners eligible for interest back to the purchase date of their homes. The Colorado Springs Business Journal notes that the Colorado Springs Housing and Building Association is concerned that the legislature might take up the issue again, in which case, the HBA would oppose it.
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Real Property Alert: Recording Notice of Default as Trustee Before Being Formally Made the Trustee Does Not Make Foreclosure Sale Void
February 18, 2015 —
Krsto Mijanovic and Annette F. Mijanovic – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Ram, et al. v. OneWest Bank, FSB, et al. (filed 2/6/15, No. A139055), the California Court of Appeal held that a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is not void merely because the notice of default was recorded by an entity who had not yet been substituted as trustee. The court also held that because the sale was voidable, rather than void, the plaintiffs were required to allege an ability and willingness to tender their debt in addition to alleging that they were prejudiced by the irregularity in the foreclosure process.
Plaintiffs were borrowers who purchased a home subject to a deed of trust. After they defaulted on their loan, nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings were initiated, and the beneficiary of the deed of trust, OneWest Bank, FSB ("OneWest"), purchased the property at the foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs sued OneWest and other entities for wrongful foreclosure, alleging that the sale was void because the entity identified as the trustee on the notice of default, Aztec Foreclosure Corporation ("Aztec"), had not been formally substituted as trustee until after the notice of default was recorded. The trial court sustained OneWest's demurrer and plaintiff appealed.
Reprinted courtesy of
Krsto Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Annette F. Mijanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Mijanovic may be contacted at kmijanovic@hbblaw.com
Ms. Mijanovic may be contacted at amijanovic@hbblaw.com
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The Importance of a Notice of Completion to Contractors, Subcontractors and Suppliers
August 12, 2024 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe recording of a valid “Notice of Completion” with the County Recorder is an event of significance to owners, contractors, subcontractors and suppliers alike. The recording of a Notice of Completion is one of several methods used to trigger the time period for the recording of mechanics liens and service of stop payment notices. Although the recording of a Notice of Completion is not absolutely required on any given project, all those working in the construction industry should understand its significance.
When a valid Notice of Completion has not been recorded in relation to a construction project, a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier might from ninety to one hundred fifty days after completion of the project to record a mechanics lien or serve a stop payment notice to secure payment for their services on the project, depending on the facts. However, if a valid Notice of Completion is recorded, then the deadline under most circumstances accelerates and subcontractors and suppliers must record a mechanics lien or serve a stop payment notice within only thirty days thereafter. Under the same circumstances, a prime contractor has only sixty days after the recording of a valid Notice of Completion to record a mechanics’ lien. Failure to meet these deadlines often results in loss of the right to a mechanics lien or stop payment notice. There are limited exceptions to these general deadlines, depending on the facts. If you believe you may have missed an important deadline to seek collection of a construction debt, you should consult with a construction attorney immediately to secure your avenues of collection, including the mechanics lien and stop payment notice remedies, if still available.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
