New Proposed Regulations Expand CFIUS Jurisdiction Regarding Real Estate
January 20, 2020 —
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogOn September 17, 2019, the U.S. Department of Treasury issued two new proposed rules for the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) implementing the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA). Of particular interest to readers of this blog was the second of the proposed rules, which addressed FIRRMA’s real estate-related expansion of CFIUS jurisdiction.
Pillsbury's Construction & Real Estate Law Team
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New York Court Holds Radioactive Materials Exclusion Precludes E&O Coverage for Negligent Phase I Report
October 30, 2018 —
Brian Margolies - TLSS Insurance Law BlogIn its recent decision in Merritt Environmental Consulting Corp. v. Great Divide Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175527 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2018), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York had occasion to consider the application of a radioactive materials exclusion in a professional liability policy.
Great Divide’s insured, Merritt Environmental, was hired as an environmental consultant by a bank in connection with a mortgage refinance of a property located in Westchester County, New York. Merritt’s responsibility was to prepare a Phase I environmental report concerning the property, which the bank ultimately relied on in agreeing to the refinance. It was later claimed, however, that Merritt’s report failed to document the full extent of the property’s radium and uranium contamination resulting from its use in the Manhattan Project. Merritt was named in two separate lawsuits as a result of its allegedly faulty report, including one by the bank alleging that Merritt negligently prepared its report.
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Brian Margolies, Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry LLPMr. Margolies may be contacted at
bmargolies@tlsslaw.com
Eastern District of Pennsylvania Clarifies Standard for Imposing Spoliation Sanctions
October 19, 2020 —
Kean Maynard - The Subrogation StrategistCourts are faced with the difficult task of drawing a line to determine when the failure to preserve evidence becomes culpable enough to permit a judicial remedy. In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Cohen, No. 19-1947, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163681, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (District Court) made clear that a party is not entitled to a spoliation sanction without proof that the alleged spoliation was beyond accident or mere negligence. The District Court emphasized that when evidence goes missing or is destroyed, the party seeking a spoliation sanction must show that the alleged spoliation was intentional and that the alleged spoliator acted in “bad faith” before adverse inferences will be provided.
In Cohen, Joshua Cohen (Cohen) rented a residential property to Lugretta Bryant (Bryant). Bryant’s property suffered damages as a result of a kitchen fire. Bryant’s insurer, proceeding as subrogee, hired a fire investigator to determine the cause and origin of the fire. Based on eyewitness testimony and examination of the burn patterns, the fire investigator concluded that the fire started at the General Electric (GE) microwave located in the kitchen. The investigator advised all parties to preserve the microwave so that a joint examination could take place with the property owner and GE present. In the following weeks, the tenant returned to the property to collect belongings and perform some cleaning in anticipation of repairs beginning. Importantly, the tenant claimed the microwave was preserved during these cleaning efforts and remained at the site as instructed. However, in the fall of 2017, one of Cohen’s workers discovered that the microwave was missing and its whereabouts remain unknown.
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Kean Maynard, White and WilliamsMr. Maynard may be contacted at
maynardk@whiteandwilliams.com
End of an Era: Los Angeles County Superior Court Closes the Personal Injury Hub
October 24, 2022 —
Elizabeth A. Evans & Angela S. Haskins - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPOn September 21, 2022, the Los Angeles County Superior Court announced that it would start a gradual shutdown of the Personal Injury Hub, currently located at the Spring Street Courthouse. This closure will see the return of personal injury cases being venued in the district where they occurred.
The Personal Injury Hub was established in 2012 as a means of consolidating personal injury cases after several civil courtrooms around the County were closed due to significant budget cuts. It first began as two courtrooms in Stanley Mosk Superior Court, then moved to the Spring Street Courthouse and ballooned to six courtrooms, each handling a case load of reportedly over 9,000 cases at times. Case Management Conferences were abolished and the parties were largely left to their own devices to move cases along. At times, slow chaos ensued. With a new and increased budget, Los Angeles Superior Court has now decided that enough is enough.
Effective October 10, 2022, new personal injury cases will be filed and handled from start to finish in independent calendar courtrooms in the districts where the events giving rise to the claims occurred. Any cases properly filed in the Central District will continue to be heard in the Personal Injury Hub for now. A new Civil Case Cover Sheet Addendum that reflects this change will be available on the Los Angeles County Superior Court website for use as of October 10th.
Reprinted courtesy of
Elizabeth A. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Angela S. Haskins, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Ms. Evans may be contacted at eevans@hbblaw.com
Ms. Haskins may be contacted at ahaskins@hbblaw.com
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BofA Said to Near Mortgage Deal for Up to $17 Billion
August 06, 2014 —
Tom Schoenberg – BloombergBank of America Corp. is nearing a $16 billion to $17 billion settlement with the U.S. Justice Department to resolve probes into sales of mortgage-backed bonds in the run-up to the financial crisis, a person familiar with the matter said.
Under the proposed terms, the bank would pay about $9 billion in cash and the rest in consumer relief to settle federal and state claims, according to the person, who asked not to be named because the negotiations are private. Details of the proposed accord, such as the relief and a statement of facts, are still being negotiated, the person said.
The outlines of the deal were reached last week after a phone call between Attorney General Eric Holder and Bank of America Chief Executive Officer Brian T. Moynihan, the person said. During the July 30 call, Holder said that the government was ready to file a lawsuit in New Jersey if the bank didn’t offer an amount closer to the department’s demand of about $17 billion, according to the person.
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Tom Schoenberg, BloombergMr. Schoenberg may be contacted at
tschoenberg@bloomberg.net
Exact Dates Not Needed for Construction Defect Insurance Claim
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in Vines-Herrin Custom Homes v Great American Lloyds Insurance Company on December 21, 2011. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes built a single-family home in Plano, Texas in 1999. They obtained a commercial general liability policy from Great American, later purchasing coverage from Mid-Continent, which the decision describes as “a sister company of Great American.”
While the home was under construction, Emil G. Cerullo sought to purchase it. At the time, it was under contract to another buyer. Two months later, Vines-Herrin told Cerullo that the deal had “fell through.” Cerullo bought the house with modifications from the original plan. Upon moving in, Cerullo began having water intrusion and other problems. “Cerullo noticed water gathering on window sills and damage to the sheetrock and baseboard.” Additional problems followed, including cracks, leaks, “and in early 2002, the ceiling and roof began to sag.”
Cerullo sued Vines-Herrin, claiming negligent construction. Vines-Herrin filed a claim seeking defense and indemnification under the insurance policies. Coverage was denied and Vines-Herrin filed suit to require coverage and also bringing claims for “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code violations.”
In May, 2006 Vines-Herrin stated that it had no more defense funds and went into arbitration with Cerullo. The underlying construction defect action was settled for about $2.5 million. As part of the settlement, “Cerullo became the rightful owner of all remaining claims, rights, and causes of action against” Vines-Herrin’s insurers. He then joined the coverage lawsuit.
The non-jury trial was held under the controlling law of the time which “imposed a duty to defend only if the property damage manifested or became apparent during the policy period.” The court concluded in Cerullo’s favor. During the post-judgment motions, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the manifestation rule. Under this ruling, the trial court set aside its judgment and found in favor of the insurance companies. The trial court noted that although “the Residence was covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance (which began before the Residence was constructed) and that the damages to the Residence manifested during the uninterrupted period of insurance coverage,” “Mr. Cerullo failed to allege the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred.”
The first claim by Cerullo and Vines-Herrin was that the “Final Judgment” occurred in October 2004, and that all proceedings thereafter were void. The court rejected this as the “final judgment” is not “final for the purposes of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Despite the use of the word “final,” the trial court’s decision did not do this.
The second issue was the application of the Texas Supreme Court case Don’s Building Supply Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance. In this case, framing rot due to defective stucco was not discovered until after the end of the policy period. The Supreme Court noted that “the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens on it.”
The appeals court found that the trial court misapplied the Don’s Building Supply decision. Rather than an exact date, “so long as that damage occurred within the policy period, coverage was provided.” The appeals court noted that “Cerullo alleged the house was constructed in 1999 and he purchased it in May 2000.” “By April of 2001, Cerullo noticed that the windowsills in the study were showing signs of leakage and water damage.” As the court put it, “the petitions then alleged a litany of defects.”
The court noted that coverage by Great American was in effect from November 9, 1999 to November 9, 2000. In May of 2000, the house suffered “substantial flooding from a rainstorm that caused damage.” This was during the policy period. “As a matter of law, actual damages must occur no later than when they manifest.”
The court concluded that as damage manifested during the period of coverage, so must have the damage. The court ruled that “contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the evidence showed Great American’s duty to indemnify was triggered, and expert testimony establishing the exact date of injury was not required to trigger the duty.”
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Up in Smoke - 5th Circuit Finds No Coverage for Hydrochloric Acid Spill Based on Pollution Exclusion
October 19, 2020 —
Kerianne E. Kane & David G. Jordan - Saxe Doernberger & VitaThe Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that an insurer was not obligated to pay damages associated with a hydrochloric acid spill based on a pollution exclusion in the policy.
In Burroughs Diesel, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. of America,1 a trucking company sued its property insurer, Travelers Indemnity Company of America (“Travelers”) when it refused to pay a claim for a storage tank leak which resulted in over 5,000 gallons of hydrochloric acid entering the property and causing significant damage to buildings, vehicles, tools, and equipment. The acid was initially dispensed in liquid form, but quickly became a cloud that engulfed the property. Travelers denied coverage for the claim based on the pollution exclusion because “acids” fell within the policy’s definition of “pollutants.”
The trucking company sued Travelers in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, alleging breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing for refusing to pay the claim. The trucking company argued that coverage was warranted because there is an exception to the pollution exclusion if “the discharge, dispersal, seepage, migration, release or escape is itself caused by any of the ‘specified causes of loss,’” and the hydrochloric acid cloud was a form of “smoke,” which is a specified cause of loss covered by the policy. The District Court entered summary judgment in favor of Travelers, finding that the trucking company failed to demonstrate that an exception to the pollution exclusion applied. The trucking company appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
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Kerianne E. Kane, Saxe Doernberger & Vita and
David G. Jordan, Saxe Doernberger & Vita
Ms. Kane may be contacted at kek@sdvlaw.com
Mr. Jordan may be contacted at dgj@sdvlaw.com
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Erasing Any Doubt: Arizona FED Actions Do Not Accrue Until Formal Demand for Possession is Tendered
July 13, 2017 —
Bob Henry - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogClearing up any lingering confusion, in Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC v. Woods, 767 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4 (June 22, 2017), the Arizona Court of Appeals confirmed that residential forcible entry and detainer actions in Arizona accrue for statute of limitations purposes when a party entitled to possession makes a formal demand for return of possession not when the party could have made a demand for return of possession.
In Carrington, the borrowers (the Woodses) remained in property that they had acquired in 2008 but then lost to foreclosure several years later. The original lender obtained title to the property at a trustee’s sale on February 16, 2010, but did not take any action to remove the Woodses at that time. Title to the property was then transferred through a series of transactions over the next six years. Ultimately, Carrington acquired the title and, in 2016, sent a formal “Notice to Vacate” the premises to the Woodses. After the Woodses failed to timely vacate pursuant to the demand, Carrington initiated an FED action to evict them from the property.
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Bob Henry, Snell & WilmerMr. Henry may be contacted at
bhenry@swlaw.com
