Statutes of Limitations May be the Colorado Contractors’ Friend
April 18, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFAlbert Wolf, a principal in Wolf Slatkin & Madison P. C., has written an interesting article on statutes of limitations in construction defect claims in Colorado. While Wolf states that in most cases, “construction defect claims against construction industry participants (contractors, subcontractors, architects, engineers, etc.) requires that suits be started within two years after construction defects have been or should have been—in the exercise of reasonable diligence (care)—discovered,” if a project used the AIA General Conditions (AIA Document A2010) before the 2007 edition, the “statutes of limitations begin to run (accrue) at either substantial completion or breach by the contractor (installation of defective work), depending on the circumstances.”
“That’s a huge difference,” Wolf writes in his article. “For example, if the structural defect caused by faulty foundation work is not discovered or discoverable until walls begin to exhibit cracking more than two years after the building is completed, the owner’s claim against the contractor may be barred if the AIA provision is applied.”
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Battle of “Other Insurance” Clauses
March 23, 2011 —
Tred R. EyerlyThe New York Court of Appeals considered the impact of competing “other insurance” provisions located in both a CGL policy and a D&O policy. See Fieldston Property Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Hermitage Ins. Co., Inv., 2011 N.Y. LEXIS 254 (N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011).
In the underlying case, Fieldston’s officers were charged with making false statements and fraudulent claims with respect to a customer's right to access its property from adjacent streets. Suit was eventually filed against Fieldston and its officers, alleging several causes of action including injurious falsehood. Damages were sought.
Fieldston’s CGL policy was issued by Hermitage. The “other insurance” provision stated, “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover . . . our obligations are limited,” but also stated it would share with all other insurance as a primary policy.
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Insurer's Motion to Dismiss Allegations of Collapse Rejected
August 08, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiIn yet another of the collapse cases being litigated in state and federal courts in Connecticut, the federal district court denied the insurer's motion to dismiss. Rosenberger v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95345 (D. Conn. June 6, 2018).
The insureds had policies with Amica since 1989. Policies before December 18, 2006, covered collapse caused by hidden decay or other specified causes. "Collapse" was not defined by the policy. These policies did not include any provisions explicitly excluding coverage for a chemical reaction.
The post-2006 policies held by the insureds covered collapse, but under a significantly modified definition. The newer policy language stated that "collapse applies only to an abrupt collapse." Further, collapse was defined as "an abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a building with the result that the building or part of the building cannot be occupied for its intended purpose."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Up in United States
November 27, 2013 —
CDJ STAFFAcross the country, construction was up 5% in October, smaller than September’s 13% increase over August, but continuing the trend of escalating construction. The increase in October was largely due to non-residential construction, which was the case in September as well.
The projects that drove the increase were described as “large and unusual,” and as such perhaps cannot be counted on to sustain the growth of the construction industry. The $1.7 billion fertilizer plant being built in Iowa cannot be viewed as typical.
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Force Majeure Under the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic
March 29, 2021 —
Lindsay T. Watkins - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCAs COVID-19 disrupts work and life as we know it, the question many contractors have is what protections are available against the inevitable project impacts and delays? Generally, construction contracts require a contractor to timely perform work until project completion or potentially face damages (liquidated or actual) and possible termination. When events occur, however, that are beyond our control (such as a national pandemic), it is important to review and understand what contract provisions or avenues are available for potential relief.
- Review Your Contract For A Force Majeure Provision.
A “force majeure” contract provision is commonly included in construction contracts, service agreements, purchase orders, etc. It typically covers events or conditions that can be neither anticipated nor controlled. These provisions, however, will vary greatly from contract to contract and may not include the language “force majeure” but rather may be included in general delay or impact clauses. For example, some common provisions include:
- Washington State Department of Transportation Clause (2018 Standard Specifications for Road, Bridge and Municipal Construction): The Contractor shall rebuild, repair, restore, and make good all damages to any portion of the permanent or temporary Work occurring before the Physical Completion Date and shall bear all the expense to do so, except damage to the permanent Work caused by: (a) acts of God, such as earthquake, floods, or other cataclysmic phenomenon of nature, or (b) acts of the public enemy or of governmental authorities; or (c) slides in cases where Section 2-03.3(11) is applicable; Provided, however, that these exceptions shall not apply should damages result from the Contractor’s failure to take reasonable precautions or to exercise sound engineering and construction practices in conducting the Work.
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Lindsay T. Watkins, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMs. Watkins may be contacted at
Lindsay.Watkins@acslawyers.com
Carrier Has Duty to Defend Claim for Active Malfunction of Product
October 19, 2020 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiRejecting that the underlying claim was based solely on faulty workmanship, the Third Circuit held the insurer had a duty to defend allegations of a malfunctioning product. Nautilus Ins. Co. v. 200 Christina Street Partners LLC, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 22118 (3d Cir. July 16, 2020).
The insureds were sued by homeowners in two separate suits alleging defects in the construction of their homes. Nautilus defended under a reservation of rights. Nautilus filed suit in District Court and moved for judgment on the pleadings. The District Court denied the motion, finding Nautilus had a duty to defend because the underlying claims sufficiently alleged product--related tort clams that could fall within the scope of coverage under the relevant policies.
The Third Circuit affirmed. There was a distinction between a claim of faulty workmanship, for which the insurer did not have a duty to defend, and a claim of "active malfunction" of a product, for which an insurer did have such a duty. An active malfunction was sufficiently fortuitous as to constitute an "occurrence."
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
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A Court-Side Seat: Flint Failures, Missed Deadlines, Toad Work and a Game of Chicken
October 05, 2020 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelThe last few weeks have yielded a number of interesting developments in the Federal courts.
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL
In re Flint Water Cases
Several local and State of Michigan officials, including the former governor, requested dismissal from the civil litigation seeking damages for the massive failure of Flint, Michigan’s public drinking water system. On August 5, 2020, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs, residents of Flint, have successfully pled a case that the conduct of the defendants so “shocked the conscience” that a claim for a violation of their substantive due process rights was appropriately alleged. The defendants, including the former governor, argued that they were entitled to a qualified immunity defense. The court rejected this argument on the basis of the earlier decisions made by the court in this matter. Judge Sutton concurred because he was bound by this precedent, but remarked that the evidence for the governor’s culpability was very thin; he was not intimately connected to the extraordinary error in judgment. The majority was very upset with this concurrence as indicted by their own opinion.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
