Arizona Purchaser Dwelling Actions Are Subject to a New Construction
September 04, 2019 —
William L. Doerler - The Subrogation StrategistArizona recently amended its Purchaser Dwelling Action statute to, among other things, involve all contractors in the process, establish the parties’ burdens of proof, add an attorney fees provision, establish procedural requirements and limit a subcontractor’s indemnity exposure. The governor signed the bill—2019 Ariz. SB 1271—on April 10, 2019, and the changes go into effect and apply, retroactively “to from and after June 30, 2019.” The following discussion details some of the changes to the law.
Notice to Contractors and Proportional Liability
Under the revised law, a “Seller” who receives notice of a Purchaser Dwelling Action (PDA) from a residential dwelling purchaser pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-1363* has to promptly forward the notice to all construction professionals—i.e. architects, contractors, subcontractors, etc., as defined in A.R.S. § 12-1361(5)—that the Seller reasonably believes are responsible for an alleged construction defect. A.R.S. § 12-1363(A). Sellers can deliver the notice by electronic means. Once construction professionals are placed on notice, they have the same right to inspect, test and repair the property as the Seller originally placed on notice. A.R.S. § 12-1362(B), (C).
To the extent that the matter ultimately goes to suit, A.R.S. § 12-1632(D) dictates that, subject to Arizona Rules of Court, construction professionals “shall be joined as third-party defendants.” To establish liability, the purchaser has the burden of proving the existence of a construction defect and the amount of damages. Thereafter, the trier of fact determines each defendant’s or third-party defendant’s relative degree of fault and allocates the pro rata share of liability to each based on their relative degree of fault. However, the seller, not the purchaser, has the burden of proving the pro rata share of liability for any third-party defendant. A.R.S. § 12-1632(D).
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William L. Doerler, White and Williams LLPMr. Doerler may be contacted at
doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com
Condo Owners Suing Bank for Failing to Disclose Defects
January 17, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Option Owners Association Inc., Condo Owners in Lincoln, Nebraska, filed suit against Security First Bank, “alleging the bank failed to disclose ‘hidden defects,’” reported the Lincoln Journal Star. Alleged defects include defective siding, improperly installed siding, and defective flashing. The condo owners are seeking at least $644,000 which they claim is the “fair market value of the repairs needed to fix the alleged construction defects.”
When the Lincoln Journal Star asked Jim Wefso, general counsel for Security First Bank, to comment, he stated, “The bank doesn't feel it has any liability in the case.”
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Low Interest Rates Encourages Homeowners to become Landlords
June 18, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFCNN Money reported that more homeowners are deciding to keep their homes rather than sell, and become landlords instead. "Clients tell us all the time, 'We're never going to sell our home, even after we buy a new one,'" Glenn Kelman, CEO of the brokerage, Redfin, told CNN Money.
“The math works in most landlords' favor these days,” according to CNN Money. “Rents have risen by about 20% nationwide since mid-2006, the housing bubble peak, while home prices are still about 21% below what they were at that time.”
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PFAS and the Challenge of Cleaning Up “Forever”
July 31, 2023 —
PFAS Team - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogFrom a stream of legal challenges, to ever-expanding regulations on things like cosmetics and drinking water, PFAS are the “forever chemicals” keeping companies and consumers on high alert. While industries scramble to remove the synthetic compounds from products, scientists are researching new techniques for scrubbing PFAS from the environment. There is money to be had for those who can find a more streamlined method of purging the substances—the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has an $800 million contract on the table for the handling, destruction and replacement of PFAS-laden fire-fighting foam—leaving technology companies racing to create solutions. The three main PFAS cleaning techniques currently relied upon can be very effective but are also costly and may leave questionable byproducts in their wake.
The established approaches include:
- Granular Activated Carbon. As one of the most studied treatments for PFAS removal, granular activated carbon is often used in water treatment plants. Large beds of carbon essentially soak up the unwanted chemicals. After the Sweeney Water Plant in North Carolina, whose water source is downstream from a fluorochemical-producing Chemours plant, was found to be contaminated with PFAS, the plant invested around $46 million into upgraded activated carbon systems. Once installed, these systems cost roughly $2.9 million to operate yearly, as the carbon needs to be replaced each time it reaches capacity. Though pricey, the plant says that the process now clears close to 100% of PFAS.
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PFAS Team, Pillsbury
The Prompt Payment Rollercoaster
February 23, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogThis past year we
wrote about a case involving California’s prompt payment laws and the current state of confusion with the prompt payment statutes which are
scattered throughout the state Code and which are inconsistent in the use of their terminology and, thus importantly, application.
In
United Riggers & Erectors, Inc. v. Coast Iron & Steel Co., California Court of Appeals for the Second District, Case No. B258860 (December 18, 2015), the Court of Appeals for the Second District addressed whether under one of the prompt payment statutes, Civil Code section 8814, a general contractor may withhold retention without being subject to prompt payment penalties if there is a dispute of any kind between the general contractor and the subcontractor, or only when the dispute relates to the retention itself.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Commonwealth Court Holds That Award of Attorney's Fees and Penalties is Mandatory Under the Procurement Code Upon a Finding of Bad Faith
October 29, 2014 —
William J. Taylor and Michael Jervis – White and Willams LLPIn a decision regarding a payment claim by a highway contractor against the City of Allentown, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has held that an award of attorney's fees and penalties is mandatory under the terms of the Pennsylvania Procurement Code, 62 Pa.C.S. § 3901 et seq., upon a finding of bad faith by the non-paying government agency, even though the statute only states that a court “may” award such fees and penalties.
In A. Scott Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Allentown, Cmwlth. Ct. No. 2163 C.D. 2013, the plaintiff, A. Scott Enterprises, Inc. (Scott), won a contract with the City of Allentown (City) to construct a one mile roadway. Several weeks after commencing work, Scott learned that soil at the construction site was potentially contaminated with arsenic, and was instructed by the City to suspend its work. Because of the soil contamination, additional work would be required to complete the project and Scott submitted proposals for the additional work plus its suspension costs. However, the City never approved the additional work and the project was never completed. The City never paid Scott for costs incurred due to the suspension of the work and Scott filed suit to recover its losses. The jury found that the City had breached the contract with Scott and had acted in bad faith in violation of the Procurement Code, and awarded damages to Scott for its unreimbursed suspension costs. However, the trial court denied Scott’s request for an award of attorney's fees and penalty interest. Both Scott and the City appealed the final judgment to the Commonwealth Court, which reversed the trial court’s refusal to award attorney's fees and penalties.
Reprinted courtesy of
William J. Taylor, White and Williams LLP and
Michael Jervis, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Taylor may be contacted at taylorw@whiteandwilliams.com; Mr. Jervis may be contacted at jervism@whiteandwilliams.com
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Keeping Detailed Records: The Best Defense to Constructive Eviction
October 24, 2023 —
Ben T. Welch & Ken Brown - Snell & WilmerInevitably, commercial property owners and managers will be faced with a claim by a tenant of constructive eviction. This article is intended to describe what constructive eviction is and to suggest what owners and managers can do to prepare for, and ward off, such claims.
Constructive eviction occurs where a tenant’s “right of possession and enjoyment” of the leasehold is disrupted by the landlord in a manner that renders the premises “unsuitable for the purposes intended.”i Put another way, it is interference that is so “substantial nature and so injurious as to deprive the tenant of the beneficial enjoyment of a part or the whole of the demised premises.”ii Although easy to describe in theory, constructive eviction can be devilishly difficult to determine in the real world. In litigation, determining when interference crosses over the line to constructive eviction is intensely fact-sensitive and resists sweeping generalizations.iii
For instance, Utah courts have held that tenants have been constructively evicted when they have been subjected to continual harassment or insults by the landlord or the landlord’s agent,iv prevented or impaired in their access to the leased premises during operating hours,v or when a landlord fails to provide an operable elevator (or other essential commercial amenities) necessary for a tenant’s business operations.vi By contrast, claims of “discomfort” or “inconvenience” have been rejected as a basis for constructive eviction.vii The same goes for claims that a landlord wrongfully served a three-day notice to pay or quit.viii
Generally, constructive eviction is an affirmative defense made in response to a landlord’s lawsuit for nonpayment of rent.ix It is not, as is commonly supposed, a basis for a tenant’s premature abandonment of the premises. In other words, the defense is raised after the tenant has vacated as a result of being effectively “evicted.”x Further, the defense requires the tenant to actually abandon the premises and do so within a “reasonable time” after the alleged interference.xi A tenant cannot stay in possession and simply refuse to pay rent on the basis of constructive eviction.xii
The key consideration in preparing for, and responding to, a claim of constructive eviction is keeping good records. A tenant claiming constructive evicting likely must prove that the issue was raised in a timely manner and, despite multiple entreaties, was never resolved.xiii As such, it is critical that landlords acknowledge tenant complaints as well as document in writing their efforts to ameliorate those complaints. While a landlord does not carry the burden of proof for constructive eviction, detailed documentation can thwart a tenant’s claim that a landlord has been inattentive or unwilling to address the tenant’s concerns.
Detailed records are also useful in disputes where a tenant claims substantial interference. “The whole point of constructive eviction is that the landlord basically drove the tenant out through the landlord’s action or inaction.”xiv As such, a landlord that is unable to document the steps taken in response to complaints will be grossly disadvantaged whereas the tenant, which had control and knowledge of the premises, will have a much easier time describing how the alleged interference deprived them of enjoying the premises.
Even with meticulous records, however, owners and managers may still face claims of construction eviction. In such instances, counsel should be retained to properly advise on compiling, preserving, and employing the evidence necessary to refute the tenant’s claims.
i Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Grp., Inc., 139 P.3d 267, 269 (Utah Ct. App. 2006).
ii Gray, 139 P.3d at 270 (citing Neslen, 254 P.2d at 850) (internal formatting omitted).
iii See Gray, 139 P.3d at 269–70 (citing Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847, 850 (Utah 1953)); Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1982).
iv See Gray, 139 P.3d at 270–71.
v Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953).
vi See Richard Barton Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 375, 378 (Utah 1996) (citing Union City Union Suit Co. v. Miller, 162 A.D.2d 101, 556 N.Y.S.2d 864 (1990)).
vii See Myrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679, 682–84 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
viii Barton v. MTB Enterprises, 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); see also Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (stating that the tenant’s complaints revolved around standard problems commonly associated with building maintenance and did not rise to the level of substantial interference); viv Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 896, 898–900 (Utah 1989) (upholding trial court’s findings of fact concerning insufficiency of disruption so as to justify claim for constructive eviction).
ix See Kenyon v. Regan, 826 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
x See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142.
xi See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142; see also Barton v. MTB Enterprises, Inc., 889 P.2d 476, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648.
xii See Kenyon, 826 P.2d at 142 (citing Fernandez v. Purdue, 518 P.2d 684, 686 (Utah 1974)).
xiii See Brugger, 645 P.2d at 648 (noting that while the tenant had raised legitimate issues concerning state of the premises, the landorld had taken steps to remedy the problems within a reasonable time) (citing 49 Am.Jur.2d, Landlord and Tenant, § 617).
xiv Barton, 889 P.2d at 477.
Reprinted courtesy of
Ben T. Welch, Snell & Wilmer and
Ken Brown, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Welch may be contacted at bwelch@swlaw.com
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Insurer's Motion to Dismiss "Redundant Claims" Denied
June 21, 2024 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe insurer's motion to dismiss was more appropriate for an eventual summary judgment motion and was consequently denied. Sivan Lam v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81262 (M.D. Fla. April 12, 2024).
Lam suffered a loss to her home due to Hurricane Ian. When only a portion of the claim was paid, Lam sued his insurer, Scottsdale, for breach of contract (Count I) and declaratory relief (Count II).
Scottsdale argued that Lam's request for declaratory relief was redundant of her breach of contract claim. The court noted that Rule 12 (b)(6), Fed. R. Civil P., was a vehicle to challenge a claim's sufficiency. Redundancy was not insufficiency, and it was not a ground for dismissal under Rule 12 (b)(6).
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Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak HastertMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
