Condo Owners Allege Construction Defects at Trump Towers
April 28, 2016 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Daily Business Review reported that three lawsuits have been filed against the developers of Trump Towers in Sunny Isles Beach, Florida alleging cracked pool decks, sloping roofs, water intrusion, among other construction defects.
While Gary Mars, the attorney for the associations, did not have an estimate of repair costs, an engineer hired by the unit owners listed over 300 defects in two of the towers, according to the Daily Business Review.
Attorney Peri Rose Huston-Miller of Derrevere Hawkes Black & Cozad, counsel for Steven Feller (a defendant), stated their client is "aware of the complaints that have been filed and is confident the parties will work together toward a resolution of the issues alleged.”
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
Governor Murphy Approves Legislation Implementing Public-Private Partnerships in New Jersey
August 28, 2018 —
Steven M. Charney & Charles F. Kenny - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.On Tuesday, August 14, 2018, New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy signed Senate Bill S-865, creating the state’s new Public-Private Partnership (PPP) law, making New Jersey the latest state to embrace this burgeoning delivery system for the construction of public infrastructure projects. The new law goes into effect 180 days from today.
Peckar & Abramson (P&A) has teamed with both The Associated Construction Contractors of New Jersey (ACCNJ) and the Association for the Improvement of American Infrastructure (AIAI) who have been at the forefront in promoting this landmark legislation. P&A anticipates that the new law will create multiple opportunities for much needed public building and infrastructure projects in the state. In our recent Client Alert (June 29, 2018), we highlighted the numerous opportunities that will be available as a result of the PPP legislation, notably for the delivery of projects that may not have otherwise come to fruition.
Reprinted courtesy of
Steven M. Charney, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
Charles F. Kenny, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Mr. Charney may be contacted at scharney@pecklaw.com
Mr. Kenny may be contacted at ckenny@pecklaw.com
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New Law Impacting Florida’s Statute of Repose
June 29, 2017 —
Meredith N. Reynolds & K. Stefan Chin – Peckar & Abramson, P.C.On June 14, 2017, Governor Scott signed House Bill 377 into law, clarifying that Florida’s ten-year
Statute of Repose commences either when the work is completed or when final payment becomes
due, whichever is latest. The new law resolves a problem for contractors created by a recent Florida
court ruling that held the Statute of Repose to commence as late as when the owner made final
payment. The applicable amendments to Florida Statute Section 95.11 take effect on July 1, 2017
and apply to all causes of action that accrue on or after that date.
Perhaps the most critical component of a construction professional’s risk management program is
the length of time that it is liable for the work performed on a project. While contractual warranty
periods typically run one or two years from substantial completion, the true length of a contractor’s
post-completion obligation is measured by the “Statute of Repose,” which establishes the period of
time following the completion of construction that a lawsuit can be filed for construction defects.
Reprinted courtesy of
Meredith N. Reynolds, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and
K. Stefan Chin, Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
Ms. Reynolds may be contacted at mreynolds@pecklaw.com
Mr. Chin may be contacted at kschin@pecklaw.com
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Used French Fry Oil Fuels London Offices as Buildings Go Green
December 10, 2015 —
Siobhan Wagner – BloombergPricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s office above Charing Cross railway station in London is cooled, heated and fueled by an unlikely source: used cooking oil.
The system, which helped the property become the greenest building in the U.K. capital, uses oil refined less than two miles away at London Bridge. It also helps prevent an invisible problem: “fatbergs” formed when oils dumped in drains and pipes congeal with baby wipes and diapers and block the city’s sewers.
“We’re using London’s waste to fuel a London office building,” said Jon Barnes, head of building at PwC. The system contributed toward a one-third reduction in electricity costs after a two-year refurbishment of the One Embankment Place office building that finished last year.
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Siobhan Wagner, Bloomberg
Claims for Bad Faith and Punitive Damages Survive Insurer's Motion for Summary Judgment
August 02, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe court denied the insurer's motion for partial summary judgment seeking to dismiss claims for bad faith and for punitive damages. Van Der Weide v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101735 (N.D. Iowa June 30, 2017).
The homeowner sued the insured general contractor after water was found leaking into the home, causing significant water damage. Cincinnati rejected the general contractor's tender and denied any duty to defend, contending that the alleged defects were discovered after Cincinnati's policy period had ended. Cincinnati was advised that two experts for the insured would testify that the property damage occurred due to construction defects and that the damage began shortly after completion of the home. Cincinnati still refused to defend.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Engineer TRC Fends Off Lawsuits After Merger
August 17, 2017 —
Scott Van Voorhis - Engineering News-RecordIn the wake of its merger with an investment fund, TRC Cos. has been busy swatting away pesky shareholder lawsuits driven by law firms who specialize in such litigation.
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Scott Van Voorhis, ENRENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Assessing Defective Design Liability on Federal Design-Build Projects
March 22, 2021 —
Dirk Haire, Adam Hamilton & Dana Molinari - ConsensusDocsA common misconception by many government officials is that a design-builder is always responsible for every design error or omission on a design-build project. This article examines the actual liability standard applied by the courts and boards of contract appeals when a design defect arises on a federal design-build project.
Background: Design-Build Contracts and the Spearin Doctrine
Design-build contracts combine the design and construction elements of a construction project into one contract. Design-build contracts often include two types of specifications: design and performance. Design specifications may set forth various parameters, such as precise measurements, tolerances, and materials. In doing so, the specifications create a fixed “roadmap” governing a contractor’s performance of the project. Performance specifications, on the other hand, set forth “operational characteristics” to achieve a particular objective or standard, but generally leave the details to the contractor.
Reprinted courtesy of
Dirk Haire, Fox Rothschild LLP,
Adam Hamilton, Fox Rothschild LLP and
Dana Molinari, Fox Rothschild LLP
Mr. Haire may be contacted at dhaire@foxrothschild.com
Mr. Hamilton may be contacted at ahamilton@foxrothschild.com
Ms. Molinari may be contacted at dmolinari@foxrothschild.com
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