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DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Construction Contract Terms Matter. Be Careful When You Draft Them.

February 01, 2022 — Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musings
In a prior post, I discussed the case of Fluor Fed. Sols., LLC v. Bae Sys. Ordinance Sys in the context of the interplay between fraud, contract, and statutes of limitation. Some cases just keep on giving. This time the case illustrates the need for careful drafting of those pesky, and highly important, clauses in your construction documents. In the current iteration of this ongoing saga, the Court considered the contractual aspects of the matter. As a reminder, the facts are as follows: In May 2011, the United States Army (“Army) awarded BAE Systems Ordnance Systems, Inc. (“BAE”) a contract to design and construct a natural gas-fired combined heating and power plant for the Radford Army Ammunition Plant (“RAAP”). On October 7, 2015, BAE issued a request for a proposal from Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC (“Fluor”) to design and build a temporary boiler facility at a specific location on the RAAP property. On October 13, 2015, the Army modified the prime contract to change the location of the boiler facility. On December 10, 2015, the Army modified the prime contract to require BAE to design and construct a permanent boiler facility. On December 30, 2015, Fluor and BAE executed a fixed-price subcontract for Fluor to design and construct the temporary boiler. Throughout 2016, BAE issued several modifications to Fluor’s subcontract to reflect the modifications BAE received from the Army on the prime contract. On March 23, 2016, BAE directed Fluor to build a permanent – rather than temporary – boiler facility. On March 28, 2016, Fluor began construction of the permanent facility and began negotiations with BAE about the cost of the permanent facility. On September 1, 2016, the parties reached an agreement on the cost for the design of the permanent facility, but not on the cost to construct the permanent facility. On November 29, 2016, the parties executed a modification to the subcontract, officially replacing the requirement to construct a temporary facility with a requirement to construct a permanent facility and agreeing to “negotiate and definitize the price to construct by December 15, 2016.” The parties were unable to reach an agreement on the construction price. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of The Law Office of Christopher G. Hill
Mr. Hill may be contacted at chrisghill@constructionlawva.com

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California Court of Appeal Clarifies Intent of Faulty Workmanship Exclusions

October 26, 2017 — Tiffany Casanova – Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Last month, in Global Modular, Inc. v. Kadena Pacific, Inc., 1 a California Court of Appeal clarified the meaning of the frequently asserted j.(5) and j.(6) exclusions of the standard commercial general liability policy; an issue the court deemed one of “first impression” for the state. The court took a close look at how courts nationwide handle the exclusions and relied on the policy language to come to a policyholder-friendly decision. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tiffany Casanova, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.
Ms. Casanova may be contacted at tlc@sdvlaw.com

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New York’s Highest Court Gives Insurers “an Incentive to Defend”

November 20, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
The New York Court of Appeals, that state’s highest court, has ruled that when an insurer disclaims duty to defend, “if the disclaimer is found bad, the insurance company must indemnify its insured for the resulting judgment, even if policy exclusions would have otherwise negated the duty to indemnify.” The insurer who makes a failed claim that there was no duty to defend cannot thereafter claim exclusions. This recent New York decision is discussed by Allen R. Wolff and Eric R. Reed of Anderson Kill in their Policyholder Advisor. They note that the decision “confirms that the estoppel rule applies in New York , as it does in at least four other states.” But this may not be the last word. American Guarantee made a motion for reargument, which the court granted. The case will return to the court in January 2014. They note that “if paying defense costs is the only consequence an insurance company faces for breaching its duty to defend the insured, an insurance company has a financial incentive to ‘kick the can down the road.’” Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of

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Additional Insured Not Entitled to Coverage for Post-Completion Defects

December 21, 2016 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The general contractor, an additional insured on the subcontractor's policy, was not entitled to coverage for construction defect claims that arose after completion of the project. Weitz Co. v. Acuity, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150433 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2016). Weitz was the general contractor hired by Twin Lakes for construction of a residential community. One of the subcontractors, Miter Masonry, was insured by Acuity under a CGL policy. Work on the project began in 2002 and was substantially completed in 2005. In 2011, Twin Lakes notified Weitz that there were moisture infiltration issues at the project that may be related to work during the project. Twin Lakes filed a Demand for Arbitration against Weitz on November 30, 2012. Twin Lakes alleged that the defects included the building wrap, windows, doors, wood trim, aluminum wrap, vinyl siding, flashing and brick veneer not being installed in accordance with contract documents and/or industry standards. The arbitration panel awarded damages to Twin Lakes in the amount of $2,775,771.86. The panel found that Weitz breached sections of the contract which caused moisture intrusion and damage to all the units. The panel ultimately held that Weitz could recover from the subcontractors 100% of the $2,775,771.86 awarded. Acuity's insured, Miter Masonry, was determined to be 4% at fault for the damages. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Specific Performance of an Option Contract to Purchase Real Property is Barred Absent Agreement on All Material Terms

December 20, 2017 — Richard H. Herold - Real Estate Litigation Blog
On November 14, 2017, the Court of Appeals (Division 1), in Offerman v. Granada, LLC, 2017 WL 5352664, reversed a trial court order directing specific performance of an alleged option to purchase real property, holding that the alleged option was too indefinite to be specifically performed because the parties did not agree to all of the material terms of the option. Tenant-Purchaser Offerman executed a two-year lease with Landlord-Seller Granada, which granted Offerman “the option to purchase [the] property…for a sales price to be determined at that time by an independent appraiser acceptable to both Tenant and Landlord. (Terms and Conditions to be stipulated by both parties at such time).” (emphasis added). Offerman timely advised Granada he intended to exercise the option, asked Granada to name an appraiser, and, when Granada did not respond, Offerman tendered a $240,000 appraisal to exercise the option. Granada did not retain an appraiser but instead simply demanded $350,000 to close the sale. After a bench trial, the Court determined that Offerman was entitled to specific performance, and, as the parties had not agreed to certain terms, held a second evidentiary hearing to resolve the form of judgment, therein naming a title agency to handle the escrow, setting a closing date, allocating the transaction fees between the parties, and ordering Granada to pay for the property inspection. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Richard H. Herold, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Herold may be contacted at rherold@swlaw.com

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Revisiting Statutory Offers to Compromise

August 28, 2023 — Kathryne Baldwin - Wilke Fleury
The fourth appellate district published an opinion earlier this year in Smalley v. Subaru of America, Inc. (2022) 87 Cal.App.5th 450 that serves as an excellent refresher on requirements of the “998 Offer,” or a statutory offer to compromise pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) §998. In Smalley, set in the context of a Lemon Law action, Defendant Subaru made a 998 Offer for $35,001.00, together with attorneys’ fees and costs totaling either $10,000.00 or costs and reasonably incurred attorneys’ fees, in an amount to be determined by the Court. (Smalley, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at 454.) Plaintiff objected that the offer was not reasonable and the case proceeded to trial. At trial, a jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded him a total judgment award of $27,555.74 – far short of the $35,001.00 offer. The trial court found Plaintiff had failed to beat the 998 at trial and that Subaru’s earlier 998 offer was reasonable. Plaintiff appealed the post-judgment order awarding Plaintiff pre-offer costs and Defendant post-offer costs on the grounds that the 998 was not reasonable in that it did not specify whether Plaintiff would be deemed the prevailing party for purposes of a motion for attorneys’ fees. The fourth district affirmed the trial court’s order and engaged in a helpful review of 998 requirements. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Kathryne Baldwin, Wilke Fleury
Ms. Baldwin may be contacted at kbaldwin@wilkefleury.com

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Depreciating Labor Costs May be Factor in Actual Cash Value

April 20, 2016 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Minnesota Supreme Court considered a certified question from the the U.S. District Court regarding consideration of depreciating labor costs in determining the actual cash value of a loss. Wilcox v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2016 Min. LEXIS 50 (Minn. Feb. 10, 2016). The insureds' home was damaged by hail. State Farm provided a written estimate that calculated the actual cash value of the loss. To estimate the actual cash value of the damaged property, State Farm first calculated the replacement costs of individual items, such as roof flashing, siding, fascia, gutters, and window screens. Next, State Farm subtracted the pre-loss depreciation of some, but not all, individual items. For example, State Farm depreciated the cost of removing and replacing certain materials, such as siding. State Farm did not depreciate the cost of the new siding separately from the cost of the labor required to install the new siding on the home. Instead, State Farm calculated the removal and replacement of the siding as a single cost, then depreciated the removal-and-replacement cost as a whole. The cost of labor to repair or replace the damaged property was referred to by the court as "embedded labor costs." Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Traub Lieberman Partner Ryan Jones Provides Testimony Before Florida Senate Committees

January 09, 2023 — C. Ryan Jones - Traub Lieberman
On December 12, Traub Lieberman Partner Ryan Jones provided testimony before two Florida Senate Committees during a Special Session to address the insurance crisis in Florida. Following the Special Session, the Florida Senate passed Senate Bill 2-A, which was designed to improve the property insurance marketplace for homeowners. Among other changes, the bill eliminates the one-way attorney’s fees provision in favor of insureds for lawsuits over disputed property claims and sets pre-requisites to filing bad faith lawsuits. The bill was recently signed into law by Florida Governor Ron DeSantis. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of C. Ryan Jones, Traub Lieberman
Mr. Jones may be contacted at rjones@tlsslaw.com

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