CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Supreme Court Overrules Longstanding Decision Supporting Collection of Union Agency Fees

July 02, 2018 — Amy R. Patton, Blake A. Dillion, & Eric C. Sohlgren - Payne & Fears
In a 5 to 4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court overruled a longstanding decision which required government employees who are represented by but do not belong to a union, to pay a fair share or agency fee to cover the union's costs for collective bargaining activities. In Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 585 U.S. ___ (2018), the Supreme Court found that requiring such fees from nonconsenting public sector employees violates the First Amendment: "[n]either an agency fee nor any other form of payment to a public-sector union may be deducted from an employee, nor may any other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively consents to pay." Reprinted courtesy of Payne & Fears attorneys Amy R. Patton, Blake A. Dillion and Eric C. Sohlgren Ms. Patton may be contacted at arp@paynefears.com Mr. Dillion may be contacted at bad@paynefears.com Mr. Sohlgren may be contacted at ecs@paynefears.com Read the court decision
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Additional Insured Coverage Confirmed

February 23, 2016 — Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law Hawaii
The Texas Court of Appeals found that Exxon Mobil Corporation was an additional insured under the CGL policy for Exxon's service provider. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corporation, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 12757 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 17, 2015). Exxon contracted with Wyatt Field Service Company to perform "services" as set forth in various work orders from Exxon's affiliates. The contract also required Wyatt to maintain $5 million of commercial general liability insurance. The contract provided that the policies must cover Exxon and its affiliates "as additional insureds in connection with the performance of Services." In 2008, Wyatt was assigned to work on a flexicoker unit at Exxon's refinery. Wyatt was to reinstall dummy nozzles and chains. It completed this service in October 2008. Three years later, one of the dummy nozzles pulled free, and the escaping steam and coke burned three individuals who were working on the unit. After the accident, it was discovered that the safety chain had been installed in the wrong location so that it did not properly secure the dummy nozzle. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Taylor Morrison Home Corp’ New San Jose Development

October 15, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
The Silicon Valley Business Journal reported that Taylor Morrison Home Corp has made the “biggest land acquisition so far in San Jose” after acquiring “an 8-acre chunk of dirt in the developing Montecito Vista area where it has plans to build out 184 townhomes.” The developer “paid about $32.5 million, or roughly $176,600 per buildable unit, for the land, according to public tax records,” according to the Silicon Valley Business Journal. Construction is scheduled to begin November of 2015 and models should be ready by April of 2016. Read the court decision
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Three-Year Delay Not “Prompt Notice,” But Insurer Not “Appreciably Prejudiced” Either, New Jersey Court Holds

November 04, 2019 — Anthony L. Miscioscia and Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLP
In Harleysville Preferred Insurance Company v. East Coast Painting & Maintenance, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135295 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2019) (East Coast Painting), the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey held that an insurer, which received notice of a bodily injury accident three years after it happened, was not “appreciably prejudiced” by such late notice, even as the court acknowledged notice three years later did not satisfy the policy’s “prompt notice” condition. The court also held that the policy’s “Operational Exclusion,” which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of the operation of “cherry pickers and similar devices,” did not apply because the accident arose out of the use of a “scissor lift,” which is not a device similar to a cherry picker. East Coast Painting arose out of a Queens, New York bridge-painting project, during which an employee of the insured, East Coast Painting and Maintenance LLC was injured while “standing on a scissor lift mounted to the back of a truck,” owned and operated by East Coast. The employee sued various project-related entities which, in turn, joined East Coast as a defendant. East Coast sought coverage under its business auto policy, and the insurer agreed to defend the insured under a reservation of rights. The insurer subsequently sought a declaration that it did not owe coverage based on, among other things, the policy’s “Operational Exclusion,” and the insured’s failure to satisfy the policy’s “prompt notice” condition. The insurer moved for summary judgment on both of those bases, but the court in East Coast Painting denied the motion. As for the insurer’s “prompt notice” defense, the court in East Coast Painting concluded that, the insured’s notice to the insurer was not prompt because it did not receive notice until three years after the accident. But, the court added, the inquiry does not end there. “[T]his Court must determine whether [the insurer] was appreciably prejudiced by that delay.” Reviewing the facts, the court held that the insurer was not “appreciably prejudiced,” even though during the three-year delay the lift truck was “not properly maintained” or “in the same condition it was at the time of the Accident.” The court observed that the insurer had “ample other evidence with which it can defend itself,” such as experts who inspected the lift truck and opined about the cause of the accident.” [Emphasis added.] Further, “there are multiple contemporaneous accident reports,” “a list of the East Coast employees on site at the time,” “photographs of the lift truck and its location when [the employee] was injured,” and “depositions of [the employee] and others regarding the events at issue.” Thus, the court held, the insurer was not prejudiced and summary judgment was inappropriate. Reprinted courtesy of Anthony L. Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and Timothy A. Carroll, White and Williams LLP Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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General Contractors Have Expansive Common Law and Statutory Duties To Provide a Safe Workplace

February 18, 2020 — Paul R. Cressman Jr. - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
On November 21, 2019, the Washington Supreme Court handed down its decision in Vargas v. Inland Washington, LLC.[1] At the time of the incident in May 2013, Mr. Vargas, the plaintiff, was helping pour the concrete walls for what would become a parking garage for an apartment building. He was employed by Hilltop Concrete Construction. Inland Washington was the general contractor, and subcontracted with Hilltop to pour concrete. Hilltop, in turn, entered into agreements with Ralph’s Concrete Pumping and Miles Sand & Gravel to provide a pump truck, certified pump operator, and supply concrete. A rubber hose carrying concrete whipped Mr. Vargas in the head. It knocked him unconscious and caused a traumatic brain injury. Vargas, through his guardian ad litem, along with his wife and children, sued Inland Washington, Ralph’s, and Miles. The trial court initially dismissed on summary judgment Vargas’ claims that Inland Washington was vicariously liable for the acts of Hilltop, Ralph’s, and Miles. Later, the trial court also granted Inland Washington’s motion for summary judgment that it was not directly liable as a matter of law. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Paul R. Cressman Jr., Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Mr. Cressman may be contacted at paul.cressman@acslawyers.com

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Unit Owners Have No Standing to Sue under Condominium Association’s Policy

February 10, 2012 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii

If a condominium owner suffers damage caused by a leak from another unit, may it sue the insurer for the Association of Apartment Owner (AOAO) for coverage? The federal district court for Hawaii said "no" in a decision by Judge Mollway. See Peters v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148734 (D. Haw. December 27, 2011).



Two cases were consolidated. In each case, Plaintiffs owned condominium units at the Watercrest Resort on Molokai. Water leaking from another unit damaged Plaintiffs’ units.



Watercrest Resort was insured by Lexington pursuant to a policy maintained by the AOAO. Plaintiffs filed claims with Lexington. Lexington hired an adjustor.



Unhappy with the adjustment of their claims, Plaintiffs sued Lexington and the adjustor.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Court Voids Settlement Agreement in Construction Defect Case

September 01, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

A U.S. District Court Judge in Florida has ruled in favor of a company that sought to void a settlement agreement. The case, Water v. HDR Engineering, involved claims of construction defects at Florida’s C.W. Bill Young Regional Reservoir. The Tampa Bay Water Authority attributed these to both HDR Engineering’s design and Bernard Construction Company which had built the embankment. Bernard Construction filed a complaint against their subcontractor, McDonald.

Tampa Bay Water settled with Bernard Construction and McDonald, in an agreement that set a minimum and maximum settlement, but also would “prohibit Barnard and McDonald from presenting any evidence on several claims and positions of TBW, to require Barnard to call certain witnesses at trial, to preclude Barnard and McDonald from calling other witnesses, and to restrict the filing of trial and post-trial motions.” HDR Engineering moved to void the agreement as collusive.

The judge that the agreement¬? contained “133 paragraphs of ‘Agreed Facts’ that the parties stipulated would survive any order declaring the Settlement Agreement void or unenforceable.” He characterized these as stipulating “that Barnard neither caused nor contributed to TBW’s damages.” HDR motioned that a summary judgment be given to Barnard Engineering.

The court found that “the evidence identified by TBW is patently insufficient to survive summary judgment.” Further, TBW’s expert initially held Barnard responsible for “lenses, pockets, streaks and layers within the embankment,” but then later withdrew this assigning the responsibility to HDR. Further, the court notes that, “TBW’s arguments that lenses, pockets, streaks, and layers in the soil wedge caused or contributed to its damages and that Barnard is liable for those damages have been foreclosed by the Agreed Facts.”

As TBW failed to provide sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment, the court granted summary judgment, mooted the claim against McDonald, and terminated the agreement between TBW and the other parties.

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Point Taken: The UK Supreme Court Finally Confirms the General Law of Liquidated Damages (LDs)

April 04, 2022 — Vincent C. Zabielski & Julia Kalinina Belcher - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law Blog
In a long-awaited decision which overturned the Court of Appeal’s ruling in the Triple Point Technology vs PTT Public Company case, the UK Supreme Court confirmed the general law of LDs, which is that—absent clear words to the contrary—they accrue up to the date of termination of a contract regardless of whether the contractor completes the work; after that, general damages are recoverable. This approach was held to reflect “commercial reality and the accepted function of liquidated damages.” Although the contract in question was not a construction contract, the decision is equally relevant in the construction sphere. By way of reminder, Triple Point failed to complete the works under Phase 1 of a contract for the design, installation, maintenance and licencing of software. Despite agreeing a revised project plan, PTT gave notice to terminate. Reprinted courtesy of Vincent C. Zabielski, Pillsbury and Julia Kalinina Belcher, Pillsbury Mr. Zabielski may be contacted at vincent.zabielski@pillsburylaw.com Ms. Belcher may be contacted at julia.belcher@pillsburylaw.com Read the court decision
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