Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Ninth Circuit Rules Supreme Court’s Two-Part Test of Implied Certification under the False Claims Act Mandatory

May 13, 2019 — Meredith Thielbahr - Gordon & Rees Construction Law Blog
For those contractors in the government arena, read on. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) was enacted to deter knowingly fraudulent actions by contractors which resulted in a loss of property to the Government. Intent to defraud with resulting financial hardship was required. Contrary to popular misconception, the statute was not designed to punish all false submissions to the Government simply because those submissions, or claims, are later found to be false. The statute’s inclusion of the requisite element of knowledge is consistent with this notion:

A defendant must submit a claim for payment to the Government;
the claim must be false or fraudulent;
the defendant must have known the claim was fraudulent when it was submitted (also known as scienter); and
the claim must have caused the Government to pay out money.

See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). Despite these explicit elements (in addition to common law elements of fraud), over the last two decades, contractors have seen ever-expanding theories of FCA recovery presented by qui tam plaintiffs and the Government. For example, under the FCA, the false “claim” evolved over time: the claim no longer needs to be an express false claim (i.e. the truthfulness of the claim is a direct condition of payment); the claim can be “implied” misrepresentation or “half-truth”. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Meredith Thielbahr, Gordon & Rees Scully Mansukhani
Ms. Thielbahr may be contacted at mthielbahr@grsm.com

Nevada Assembly Bill Proposes Changes to Construction Defect Litigation

April 14, 2011 — Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFF

Assemblyman John Oceguera has written a bill that would redefine the term Construction Defect, set statutory limitations, and force the prevailing party to pay for attorney’s fees. Assembly Bill 401 has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary.

Currently, the law in Nevada states that “a defect in the design, construction, manufacture, repair or landscaping of a new residence, of an alteration of or addition to an existing residence, or of an appurtenance, which is done in violation of law, including in violation of local codes or ordinances, is a constructional defect.” However, AB401 “provides that there is a rebuttable presumption that workmanship which exceeds the standards set forth in the applicable law, including any applicable local codes or ordinances, is not a constructional defect.”

The Nevada courts may award attorney fees to the prevailing party today. However, AB401 mandates that attorney fees must be awarded, and the exact award is to be determined by the Court. “(1) The court shall award to the prevailing party reasonable attorneyâ€™s fees, which must be an element of costs and awarded as costs; and (2) the amount of any attorney’s fees awarded must be determined by and approved by the court.”

AB401 also sets a three year statutory limit “for an action for damages for certain deficiencies, injury or wrongful death caused by a defect in construction if the defect is a result of willful misconduct or was fraudulently concealed.”

This Nevada bill is in the early stages of development.

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The California Legislature Return the Power Back to the People by Passing the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018

January 02, 2019 — Richard H. Glucksman, Esq., David A. Napper, Esq., & Lana Halavi – Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Introduction Data breaches and social media hacks are becoming increasingly common stories on the news cycle. Meanwhile, companies have made fortunes on unsuspecting individuals by selling information gathered on the user. Every internet user has wondered why a pop-up ad or banner on an unrelated website relates to something you purchased or searched for "that one time. The California legislature has decided to return some power back to the people with the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018. California is the first state to introduce privacy protection for individuals personal data and could pave the way for other states to follow suit in the near future. The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 On June 28, 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed into law the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 ("the Act"). The California Legislature eagerly passed the Act, which comes into effect on January 1, 2020, granting broad new privacy rights to "consumers" and enforcing requirements on the protection of their personal data allowing consumers the right to take back control of their personal information. A "consumer" is defined as a "resident of California as defined by California's personal income tax regulations. "Personal information" pursuant to the Act is defined as "information that identifies, relates to, describes, is capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household." Personal information is generally recognized in California as information that can identify a specific individual. The Act also includes information that can be used to identify a household. Provisions of the Act Pursuant to the Act, consumers are given the right to know upon request if their personal information is disclosed, and to whom it is disclosed, the right to know what personal information has been collected about them by a business, the right to object to the sale of their personal information, the right to obtain data collected about them, the right to require businesses to obliterate their personal information, and the right to be given equal service and pricing from businesses, including equal prices and quality of goods or services. The Act forbids discrimination by businesses against consumers for exercising their privacy rights pursuant to the Act. Businesses are, however, permitted to charge different prices or provide different quality of service to consumers if the difference is "reasonably related to the value provided to the consumer by the consumer’s data." Additionally, businesses must allow consumers to exercise their rights by providing to consumers toll-free telephone numbers and/or websites to request such information or privacy. If a consumer sends a verified request for information to a business, the business subsequently has 45 days to give the consumer the requested information from the preceding 12 months with no charge to the consumer. Who Must Comply with the Act The Act will apply to for-profit businesses that do business in the State of California, deal with personal information of California residents, and either·(1) have more than $25 million in annual gross revenues, or (2) receive or disclose more than 50,000 California residents' personal information, or(3) derive 50% or greater of California residents' annual revenues from selling their personal information. Who is Exempted from Compliance with the Act A for-profit company, a small company, and/or a company that does not derive large amounts of personal information and does not share a brand with an affiliate covered by the Act is exempted from complying with the Act. Additionally, a company is exempted from compliance with the Act "if every aspect of . . . commercial conduct takes place wholly outside of California," meaning: (1) the personal information was collected from the consumer while they were outside California, (2) no sale of their personal information took place in California, and (3) there was no sale of personal information that was collected while the consumer was in California. Impact According to 2017 estimates, California's population totaled approximately 39 million people. Clearly the Act will affect an incredibly large amount of people considering it concerns the most populous state in America. The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, which is being compared to the EU General Data Protection Regulation for its all-encompassing method and resilient privacy protections is also speculated to have an impact on businesses throughout the nation and around the world. While the costs will likely go up for companies to do business in California, the transparency and trust earned by business and gained by consumers in this new landscape could potential overcome the initial costs to provide these required services. Perhaps most importantly however, is if California consumers decide to take advantage of the new protections, they will no longer have to wonder what for-profit businesses are doing with their data. Reprinted courtesy of Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger attorneys Richard H. Glucksman, David A. Napper and Lana Halavi Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com Mr. Napper may be contacted at dnapper@cgdrblaw.com Read the court decision
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Best Lawyers Recognizes Hundreds of Lewis Brisbois Attorneys, Honors Four Partners as ‘Lawyers of the Year’

October 16, 2023 — Lewis Brisbois
(August 17, 2023) – Best Lawyers has selected 172 Lewis Brisbois attorneys across 46 offices for its 30th edition of The Best Lawyers in America. It has also recognized four Lewis Brisbois partners on its "Lawyers of the Year" list: Akron Managing Partner David Kern (Mergers and Acquisitions Law); Newark Partner Meredith Kaplan Stoma (Professional Malpractice Law - Defendants); Philadelphia Partner Steven D. Urgo (Litigation – Insurance); and Roanoke Managing Partner John T. Jessee (Medical Malpractice Law – Defendants). Please join us in congratulating the following attorneys on their Best Lawyers recognition! You can see the full list of attorneys named to Best Lawyers' Ones to Watch in America here. Akron, OH

Partner John F. Hill - Bet-the-Company Litigation, Commercial Litigation, Legal Malpractice Law – Defendants, and Personal Injury Litigation - Plaintiffs
Partner Kerri Keller - Commercial Litigation
Managing Partner David Kern - Corporate Law, Mergers and Acquisitions Law, Tax Law, and Trusts and Estates

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Collapse of Breezeway Attached to Building Covered

February 24, 2020 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court found that a breezeway that collapsed during a party was covered by the commercial property policy. DENC, LLC v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179083 (M.D. N.C. Oct. 15, 2019). DENC owned an apartment complex that was insured by Philadelphia under an all-risk policy. During an early morning party, a large number of students gathered on the second-floor breezeway for a party. The students started jumping in the breezeway when a certain song started playing. The floor abruptly collapsed underneath the students. Philadelphia sent an adjuster to inspect the breezeway a couple days later. He wrote to Philadelphia that "the sole and proximate cause of the loss is water damage occurring over an extended period of time causing the second floor breezeway to sage and the light weight concrete to crack." Shortly thereafter, the building was condemned. A structural engineer found multiple ways in which water had seeped into the breezeway's wood framing and photographed the resulting biological growth and wood decay. He concluded that the building had sustained significant long-term water intrusion which resulted in the wood framing inability to support the loads. The water intrusion was caused by the failure to properly install a water management system on the walls, a properly integrated waterproof system for the walkway slab and framing configuration, and improper venting of dryers. DENC retained an engineer who testified that the breezeway was sagging because the concrete had broken. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

January 06, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 800¹ in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 2782² has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)³ Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.⁴

This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.⁵

2005 AMENDMENT

The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”⁶ In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

2007 AMENDMENT

The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

2008 AMENDMENT

The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

2011 AMENDMENT

Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.⁷

The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

CONCLUSION

The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.

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New World to Demolish Luxury Hong Kong Towers in Major Setback

August 04, 2021 — Shawna Kwan - Bloomberg
New World Development Co. will demolish two towers at Hong Kong’s most popular housing development in decades and compensate buyers after finding unexpected defects, in a major setback for the real estate company. The developer will pull down and rebuild the existing floors of Towers 1 and 8 at its Pavilia Farm III project near Tai Wai station after it found the concrete strength in some areas did not meet design requirements, the Hong Kong-based company said in a statement. Shares of New World fell as much as 4.8% Thursday in Hong Kong, the most in more than seven months, before recovering to close 3.9% lower. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Shawna Kwan, Bloomberg

Surplus Lines Carriers Cannot Compel Arbitration in Louisiana

May 29, 2023 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The court denied the surplus lines insurer's motion to compel arbitration based on Lousiana's law prohibiting arbitrations of coverage disputes. Fairway Village Condominiums v. Independent Spec. Ins. Co., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62135 (E.D. La. April 20, 2023). The plaintiff's condominium complex was damaged by Hurricane Ida. A claim was filed with the insurer. The insurer made an initial advance payment of $200,000. Three additional payments were made bringing the total to $951,462.49, which was less than half of the proof of loss amounts submitted by plaintiff. Plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract and bad faith. The insurer filed a motion to compel arbitration based upon an arbitration provision in the policy. Recognizing that Louisiana law prohibited enforcement of a policy's arbitration clause, the insurer argued it did not apply because it was a surplus lines carrier. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES