Fairfield Connecticut Building Expert Directory

Traub Lieberman Attorneys Jessica Burtnett and Jessica Kull Obtain Dismissal of Claim Against Insurance Producer Based Upon Statute of Limitations

August 20, 2019 — Jessica Burtnett & Jessica N. Kull - Traub Lieberman
Traub Lieberman Straus & Shrewsberry attorneys Jessica Burtnett and Jessica Kull successfully obtained a dismissal with prejudice on behalf of their client after oral argument for a lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County. Mrs. Burtnett and Ms. Kull represented an insurance broker who was sued by one of its customers, a property management company, for failure to procure a correct policy of insurance that would have provided coverage for an underlying class action lawsuit asserting statutory violations. In their motion, Mrs. Burtnett and Ms. Kull argued that the Plaintiff failed to file the lawsuit within the applicable two year statute of limitations outlined in the Illinois Insurance Producers Act 735 ILCS 5/13-214.4. Based on a recent ruling by the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Krop, 2018 IL 122556, ¶ 13, reh’g denied (Nov. 26, 2018), Mrs. Burtnett and Ms. Kull argued that the statute of limitations began to accrue at the moment the allegedly non-conforming policy was delivered to the customer Plaintiff. In this case, Mrs. Burtnett and Ms. Kull argued that the subject policy was purchased and received before it became effective on November 25, 2015. Thus, at the absolute latest, the statute of limitations expired two years later on November 25, 2017. Since the lawsuit was not filed until October 4, 2018, the Plaintiff was approximately 10 months too late to assert a valid claim. In response, the Plaintiff tried to factually distinguish the Krop case by arguing it involved a claim against a captive agent rather than a broker. Plaintiff further argued that a broker maintains a fiduciary duty to its clients and, therefore, the two year statute of limitations applied in Krop did not apply to a broker. Plaintiff also argued the Illinois Insurance Placement Liability Act was unconstitutional. Reprinted courtesy of Jessica Burtnett, Traub Lieberman and Jessica N. Kull, Traub Lieberman Ms. Burtnett may be contacted at jburtnett@tlsslaw.com Ms. Kull may be contacted at jkull@tlsslaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Arizona Rooftop Safety: Is it Adequate or Substandard?

October 01, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
The Wall Street Journal reported that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recently “took the unprecedented step of formally proposing to take over construction workplace safety in Arizona because it said the state doesn't require proper fall protection.” OSHA’s deputy director, Jordan Barab, told the Wall Street Journal, “We told them we did not think their standard…was at least as effective as ours.” However, “[a] spokeswoman for Arizona's state workplace enforcement agency countered that the state's requirements are adequate, adding that it will respond to the federal notice ‘as appropriate.’” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Dispute between City and Construction Company Over Unsightly Arches

April 01, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
The city of Swartz Creek, Michigan alleged that Slagter Construction’s work on “Texas-style arches along a new bridge” was “terrible” and doesn’t “match up to what the company promised when it took the job to build the $20,000 walkways that include the arches,” reported M Live. However, Slagter Construction “maintains its repairs were adequate and claims in a letter to the state that the issue shouldn't resolved by local officials who have ‘no formal training or education on these matters.’” According to M Live, “[t]he two sides are set to meet on May 5 with MDOT officials on May 5 in Bay City for arbitration.” Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Court of Appeals Upholds Default Judgment: Serves as Reminder to Respond to Lawsuits in a Timely Manner

October 02, 2023 — Anna Basnaw - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
In Cyrus Way Partners, LLC. (“Cyrus”) v. Cadman, Inc. (“Cadman”), the primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in denying Cadman’s motion to vacate the default judgment under Civil Rules 55 and 60. A default judgment is a legal ruling that can be entered in favor of the plaintiff when the defendant fails to respond to a lawsuit. If that happens, the court may resolve the lawsuit without hearing from the other side. In Washington, a party typically has 20 days to appear in a suit before being at risk for default judgment. If a default judgment is entered for the plaintiff, the defendant can move to vacate the default judgment, meaning the defendant hopes the court will set aside the default judgment as if it never happened. In this case, Cadman, the defendant, presents several ultimately unsuccessful arguments for why the default judgment in favor of Cyrus, the plaintiff, should be vacated. Cyrus and Orca Beverage Inc. (“Orca”) are under common ownership. In 2018, Cyrus began a project to build a warehouse for Orca, which included the construction of a large concrete slab. Cadman was hired to supply the concrete. Cyrus hired Olympic Concrete Finishing Inc. (“Olympic”) to finish the concrete. On April 1, 2018, Cadman poured the concrete, and Olympic finished the slab. The next day, Cyrus noticed several problems with the slab, which experts hired by both Cyrus and Cadman opined were caused by an abnormally high air content in the concrete. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC

The Road to Hell is Paved with Good Intentions: A.B. 1701’s Requirement that General Contractors Pay Subcontractor Employee Wages Will Do More Harm Than Good

November 02, 2017 — Steven M. Cvitanovic & Omar Parra - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Tales of subcontractors who close up shop before paying their employees are not all that uncommon, but they are certainly not common enough to require General Contractors to pay for that same labor twice. Last month, the California Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 1701, which requires the General Contractor of a private construction project to pay all unpaid wages and fringe benefits owed to an employee of a subcontractor, irrespective of the tier, and even if the General Contractor made the payment. With the Governor’s recent signature, Assembly Bill No. 1701 is now the law of the land. Here is what you need to know:

It applies to all private (but not public) construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2018;
It gives a subcontractor’s employee a direct cause of action against the General Contractor for any unpaid wages and fringe benefits, even if the General Contractor has fully paid the subcontractor;
It gives a third party owed fringe or other benefits a cause of action against the General Contractor;
All actions by the employee or third party must be filed within one year of the earliest of the recordation of the notice of completion, the recordation of the notice of cessation of work, or the actual completion of the work;
The General Contractor cannot contract to avoid the liability imposed by Assembly Bill No. 1701, but it can seek indemnity from the subcontractor; and
At the General Contractor’s request, the subcontractor shall provide the General Contractor with its payroll records.

Reprinted courtesy of Steven Cvitanovic, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Cvitanovic may be contacted at scvitanovic@hbblaw.com Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

New Illinois Supreme Court Trigger Rule for CGL Personal Injury “Offenses” Could Have Costly Consequences for Policyholders

March 09, 2020 — Michael S. Levine & Kevin V. Small - Hunton Insurance Recovery Blog
The Illinois Supreme Court’s recent decision in Sanders v. Illinois Union Insurance Co., 2019 IL 124565 (2019), announced the standard for triggering general liability coverage for malicious prosecution claims under Illinois law. In its decision, the court construed what appears to be a policy ambiguity against the policyholder in spite of the longstanding rule of contra proferentem, limiting coverage to policies in place at the time of the wrongful prosecution, and not the policies in effect when the final element of the tort of malicious prosecution occurred (i.e. the exoneration of the plaintiff). The net result of the court’s ruling for policyholders susceptible to such claims is that coverage for jury verdicts for malicious prosecution – awarded in today’s dollars – is limited to the coverage procured at the time of the wrongful prosecution, which may (as in this case) be decades old. Such a scenario can have costly consequences for policyholders given that the limits procured decades ago are often inadequate due to the ever-increasing awards by juries as well as inflation. Moreover, it may be difficult to locate the legacy policies and the insurers that issued such policies may no longer be solvent or even exist. A copy of the decision can be found here. The Sanders case arose out of the wrongful conviction of Rodell Sanders in 1994 by the City of Chicago Heights (the “City”). Mr. Sanders sought recompense for, among other things, malicious prosecution through a federal civil rights action against the City. In September 2016, Mr. Sanders obtained a consent judgment for $15 Million; however, at the time of the wrongful conviction, seventeen years earlier, the City’s only applicable insurance policy provided just $3 million in coverage. The City contributed another $2 million towards the judgment and, in exchange for Mr. Sanders’s agreement not to seek the $10 million balance from the City, assigned its rights under the policies for the 2012 to 2014 period. Reprinted courtesy of Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and Kevin V. Small, Hunton Andrews Kurth Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com Mr. Small may be contacted at ksmall@HuntonAK.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

What are Section 8(f) Agreements?

July 02, 2018 — Wally Zimolong – Supplemental Conditions
Like many areas of federal labor law, there are different rules for construction industry employers. One major difference is in how employers become unionized. Typically, under Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, a union becomes a collective bargaining agent of employees only after a majority of employees show support for union representation. In other words, the employees chose whether to be represented by a particular union. However, under Section 8(f) of the NLRA, construction industry employers can choose to become union without any showing of majority support by employees. In fact, construction industry employers don’t need to have any employees at all to sign a “8(f) agreement.” Thus, these agreements have become known as pre-hire agreements. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Wally Zimolong, Zimolong LLC
Mr. Zimolong may be contacted at wally@zimolonglaw.com

California Supreme Court Endorses City Authority to Adopt Inclusionary Housing Ordinance

August 04, 2015 — Garret Murai – California Construction Law Blog
The following post was written by my partner Neal Parish on the California Supreme Court’s recent (and surprising) new decision which eases the way for local governments to adopt inclusionary housing ordinances, to the chagrin of residential housing developers. On June 15, 2015, in a decision that came as a surprise to many observers, the California Supreme Court unanimously rejected a challenge to San Jose’s inclusionary housing ordinance which had been filed by the California Building Industry Association (CBIA) and supported by the Pacific Legal Foundation. The Court disagreed with CBIA’s position, which claimed that jurisdictions must first show a nexus between new market-rate residential development and the need for affordable housing before adopting any inclusionary housing requirement. The Court instead held that in adopting an inclusionary housing ordinance the City needs to simply demonstrate a real and substantial relationship between the ordinance and the public interest, and further held that the ordinance did not represent a taking of developers’ property interests. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLP
Mr. Murai may be contacted at gmurai@wendel.com

FAIRFIELD CONNECTICUT BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES