Protecting Expert Opinions: Lessons Regarding Attorney-Client Privilege and Expert Retention in Construction Litigation
August 19, 2024 —
David McLain - Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCThe Hill Hotel Owner LLC v. Hanover Insurance Company case has garnered attention due to its implications on the scope of attorney-client privilege in construction litigation. This blog post delves into the project’s background, the ensuing litigation, and the intricate work undertaken by attorneys and experts, highlighting the potential pitfalls associated with assumptions about privilege protections.
Background of the Project
Hill Hotel Owner LLC initiated a construction project in Boulder, Colorado, which included building a basement-level parking garage with an 18” thick concrete slab floor. The project utilized “void form,” a cardboard underlayment intended to create a gap between the foundation and the underlying soil. Unfortunately, the void form became wet and collapsed under the weight of the fresh concrete, causing considerable damage, and necessitating millions of dollars in remediation costs.
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David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLCMr. McLain may be contacted at
mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Delaware “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6)
June 10, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Baldo, No. 09-338 (D. Del. June 2, 2011), claimants condominium association and unit owners sued project developer Rehoboth and general contractor Capano seeking damages because of moisture penetration property damage to common elements and individual units resulting from construction defects. Rehoboth and Capano filed a third party complaint against insured property manager Baldo alleging that, if Rehoboth and Capano were liable to claimants, Baldo was also liable because of Baldo’s failure to properly manage, maintain, and repair the property
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Consider Manner In Which Loan Agreement (Promissory Note) Is Drafted
March 02, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesConsider who you loan money too and, perhaps more importantly, the manner in which your loan agreements (promissory notes) are drafted. By way of example, in what appears to be a failed construction project in Conrad FLB Management, LLC v. Diamond Blue International, Inc., 44 Fla. L. Weekly D2897a (Fla. 3d DCA 2019), a group of lenders lent money to a limited liability company (“Company”) in connection with the development of a project. Promissory notes were executed by Company and executed by its managing member as a representative of Company, and not in a personal capacity. Company, however, did not own the project. Rather, an affiliated entity owned the project (“Affiliated Entity”). Affiliated Entity had the same managing member as Company. Once the Company received the loan proceeds, it transferred the money to Affiliated Entity, presumably for purposes of the project.
The loans were not repaid and the lenders sued Company, Affiliated Entity, and its managing member, in a personal capacity. The lenders claimed they were all jointly liable under the promissory notes. Although the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the lenders, this was reversed on appeal as to the Affiliated Entity and the managing member because there was a factual issue as to whether they should be bound by the note executed on behalf of Company.
First, Florida Statute s. 673.4011(1) provides that “a person is not liable on a promissory note unless either (a) the person signed the note, or (b) the person is represented by an agent who signed the note.” Conrad FLB Management, LLC, supra. Affiliated Entity is a separate entity and did not execute the note.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Construction Contract Terms Matter. Be Careful When You Draft Them.
February 01, 2022 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law MusingsIn a prior post, I discussed the case of Fluor Fed. Sols., LLC v. Bae Sys. Ordinance Sys in the context of the interplay between fraud, contract, and statutes of limitation. Some cases just keep on giving. This time the case illustrates the need for careful drafting of those
pesky, and highly important, clauses in your construction documents.
In the
current iteration of this ongoing saga, the Court considered the contractual aspects of the matter. As a reminder, the facts are as follows: In May 2011, the United States Army (“Army) awarded BAE Systems Ordnance Systems, Inc. (“BAE”) a contract to design and construct a natural gas-fired combined heating and power plant for the Radford Army Ammunition Plant (“RAAP”). On October 7, 2015, BAE issued a request for a proposal from Fluor Federal Solutions, LLC (“Fluor”) to design and build a temporary boiler facility at a specific location on the RAAP property. On October 13, 2015, the Army modified the prime contract to change the location of the boiler facility. On December 10, 2015, the Army modified the prime contract to require BAE to design and construct a permanent boiler facility. On December 30, 2015, Fluor and BAE executed a fixed-price subcontract for Fluor to design and construct the temporary boiler. Throughout 2016, BAE issued several modifications to Fluor’s subcontract to reflect the modifications BAE received from the Army on the prime contract. On March 23, 2016, BAE directed Fluor to build a permanent – rather than temporary – boiler facility. On March 28, 2016, Fluor began construction of the permanent facility and began negotiations with BAE about the cost of the permanent facility. On September 1, 2016, the parties reached an agreement on the cost for the design of the permanent facility, but not on the cost to construct the permanent facility. On November 29, 2016, the parties executed a modification to the subcontract, officially replacing the requirement to construct a temporary facility with a requirement to construct a permanent facility and agreeing to “negotiate and definitize the price to construct by December 15, 2016.” The parties were unable to reach an agreement on the construction price.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Court Adopts Magistrate's Recommendation to Deny Insurer's Summary Judgment Motion in Collapse Case
June 06, 2018 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiThe district court accepted the magistrate's recommended ruling denying the insurer's motion for summary judgment on breach of contract and bad faith claims in a case involving collapse. Jang v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51880 (D. Conn. March 27, 2018).
After purchase of their home, the insureds' inspector found large cracks in the foundation. Liberty denied coverage, contending that the basement wall was collapsing due to settling earth or movement. The insureds' expert later found the foundation had cracks from the oxidation of iron sulfide minerals in the foundation's concrete. The insureds sued for breach of contract, bad faith, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Insurance Practice Act and the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Las Vegas’ McCarran Tower Construction Issues Delays Opening
August 13, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFThe Las Vegas Review-Journal reported that an improperly applied chemical coating might delay the opening of McCarran International Airport’s Federal Aviation Administration tower by a year and cost millions of dollars to repair.
The chemical coating was intended “to prevent the spread of toxic fungus,” but was “improperly applied and is ineffective,” workers on the site told the Las Vegas Review-Journal.
“Officials said the” $99 million, 352-foot “tower was expected to be operational by 2015, but the FAA now says it won’t be able to use the facility until late 2016 or early 2017.”
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CGL Insurer’s Duty to Defend Insured During Pre-Suit 558 Process: Maybe?
December 20, 2017 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn earlier postings, I discussed the issue of whether Florida Statutes Chapter 558′s pre-suit construction defects process triggers a CGL insurer’s duty to defend. The issue was whether Florida’s 558 pre-suit notice of a construction defect and repair process met the definition of “suit” within a standard CGL policy.
A standard CGL policy defines the term “suit” as:
“Suit” means a civil proceeding in which damages because of “bodily injury,” “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance applies are alleged. “Suit” includes:
a. An arbitration proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured must submit or does submit with our consent; or
b. Any other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in which such damages are claimed and to which the insured submits with our consent.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
Construction Litigation Roundup: “You May Want an Intervention …”
June 10, 2024 —
Daniel Lund III - LexologyYou may want an intervention … but you are not getting one!
So said a federal court in New Orleans to a masonry supplier seeking to intervene in in an upstream subcontractor’s lawsuit against a payment bond surety for allegedly unpaid subcontract sums.
It all seems so obvious: the masonry supplier indicates it is unpaid, and the subcontractor to which it supplied materials is saying the same thing and pursuing monies from the general contractor’s surety. Eventually, if the subcontractor prevails against the surety, monies ought to flow to the supplier – a set of facts lending itself to an intervention.
The federal district court disagreed, however. Referring to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) and prior United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case law the topic, the court opined that the masonry supplier lacked an interest in the subcontractor’s potential recovery that was “related to the property or transaction that forms the basis of the controversy…an interest that is ‘direct, substantial, [and] legally protectable.’"
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Daniel Lund III, PhelpsMr. Lund may be contacted at
daniel.lund@phelps.com