1st District Joins 2nd District Court of Appeals and Holds that One-Year SOL Applies to Disgorgement Claims
June 14, 2021 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogWe’re beginning to see a trend.
This past year, the 2nd District Court of Appeals, in Eisenberg Village of the Los Angeles Jewish Home for the Aging v. Suffolk Construction Company, 53 Cal.App.5th 1201 (2020), held for the first time that a one (1) year statute of limitations period beginning upon substantial completion of a project applies to disgorgement claims under Business and Professions Code section 7031. In San Francisco CDC LLC v. Webcor Construction L.P., the 1st District Court of Appeals became the second Court of Appeals in the state to hold that a one (1) year statute of limitations beginning upon completion or cessation of work on a project applies to disgorgement claims under Business and Professions Code section 7031.
The San Francisco CDC LLC Case
The Defect Action
In September 2005, San Francisco CDC LLC entered into a $144 million construction contract with Webcor Construction, Inc. doing business as Webcor Builders to build the InterContinental Hotel in San Francisco, California.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Climate Disasters Are an Affordable Housing Problem
October 01, 2024 —
Juan Pablo Garnham & Arjuna Heim - BloombergWhen Maui was devastated by wildfires in August 2023, some residents were initially fortunate. The neighborhood of Makawao, for example, was spared the worst effects of the fire that engulfed Lahaina, 35 miles to the west.
Recently, though, we met a woman in that neighborhood who faces a different kind of threat: Her landlord has now demanded that she pay double her rent or face eviction. As housing advocates in the region, we’ve heard stories like this repeatedly, as residents report an acute fear of displacement and homelessness.
A year after the fires killed more than 100 people, displaced 12,000 and disrupted the economy of the island, the disaster lingers for many in Maui and Hawai'i. Rents across the island have increased sharply, offering a cautionary tale for the rest of the US about how climate change, a housing crisis and the lack of adequate public policies can multiply the suffering of a community already in pain.
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Bloomberg
Vermont Supreme Court Finds COVID-19 May Damage Property
November 07, 2022 —
Michael S. Levine & Lorelie S. Masters - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogAs reported on this
blog, policyholders have long been of the view that the presence of substances like COVID-19 and its causative virus SARS-CoV-2, which render property dangerous or unfit for normal business operations, should be sufficient to trigger coverage under commercial all-risk insurance, as has been the case for more than 60 years.
However, many courts, federal courts in particular, despite decades of pro-policyholder precedent, have embraced the view that “viruses harm people, not [property].” Thirty-one months after the start of the pandemic, the first state high court has gone in a different direction, according greater weight to pro-policyholder precedent.
Reprinted courtesy of
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Lorelie S. Masters, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Ms. Masters may be contacted at lmasters@HuntonAK.com
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Avoiding Project Planning Disasters: How to Spot Problem Projects
December 13, 2021 —
James T. Dixon - Construction ExecutiveThe burden of project planning falls first and foremost upon a project owner. Owners have varying levels of sophistication, and the smart ones fill weak spots on their staff by engaging project managers, construction managers and owner’s representatives.
Typically, the owner then delegates the largest part of the project’s plan to the contractor in terms of creation and execution of a critical path method schedule during the construction phase. Before accepting that burden, a wise contractor will evaluate the project to determine if it is on a path to success or disaster. It is guaranteed that an owner’s problems will become the contractor’s problems in one way or another.
There are legendary projects that were also legendary planning failures. The iconic Sydney Opera House is one. The design competition began in 1955. After selecting the architect, the owner implemented a team that involved that architect, a structural engineer and an executive committee of inexperienced politicians. The original plan included a budget of $7 million (Australian) and a completion schedule spread over four years. That executive committee forced the project to start before designs were complete, doubled the number of theaters and then put a strangle-hold on the payment process, eventually causing the architect to quit and return to Europe with the construction drawings. The Opera House opened for its first performance in 1973—14 years late and $98 million over budget.
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James T. Dixon, Construction Executive, a publication of Associated Builders and Contractors. All rights reserved.
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Brown Act Modifications in Response to Coronavirus Outbreak
March 30, 2020 —
Gregory J. Rolen - Haight Brown & BonesteelGov. Gavin Newsom waived certain provisions of the Bagley-Keene Act and Ralph M. Brown Act to make state and local legislative bodies safer while allowing California public entities to conduct business.
In an effort to promote social distancing and slow the spread of the coronavirus pandemic Gov. Newsom issued Executive Order N-25-20. The Executive Order authorizes state and local legislative bodies, such as school district and county office of education governing boards, to more easily hold public meetings by way of teleconference. The order took further steps to make public meetings accessible to the public via electronic means, including telephone.
The Brown Act generally requires legislative body members, a clerk, or other personnel to be physically present in a meeting in order to participate or establish a quorum. Executive Order N-25-20 temporarily eliminates this requirement. Furthermore, standard Brown Act requirements such as publicly noticing the teleconference location for each meeting participant is also suspended. Clearly, this is an attempt to protect the public, as well as Board members and staff, by temporarily discouraging large group settings in the conduct of the public’s business.
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Gregory J. Rolen, Haight Brown & BonesteelMr. Rolen may be contacted at
grolen@hbblaw.com
The Preservation Maze
June 12, 2023 —
Sofya Uvaydov - Kahana & Feld LLPTo appropriately preserve an issue for appeal is frankly confusing to many attorneys due to differing rules depending on the issue or procedural posture (presumably why appellate attorneys are more commonly used during trial). On May 25th, the US Supreme Court handed down Dupree v. Younger, 598 U.S. __ (2023) clarifying preservation requirements from denied summary judgment orders. When a federal court denies summary judgment on sufficiency of evidence grounds, a party must raise the argument again post-trial to preserve it for appeal as per the Court’s prior ruling in Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011). When a court denies summary judgment on a purely legal issue, the Court unanimously held that the issue is preserved in an appeal from a final judgment without having to raise it again post-trial. The Supreme Court distinguished this from their prior rule in Ortiz by explaining that sufficiency or factual issues which were previously denied at summary judgment must be evaluated based on the totality of the evidence adduced at trial. A purely legal issue decided on summary judgment is not changed by factual evidence at trial.
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Sofya Uvaydov, Kahana & Feld LLPMs. Uvaydov may be contacted at
suvaydov@kahanafeld.com
Defective Stairways can be considered a Patent Construction Defect in California
September 24, 2014 —
William M. Kaufman – Construction Lawyers BlogStairs are not safe! At least the Court of Appeal in the Second Appellate District of California doesn’t think so.
A rail station in Los Angeles was completed by the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”) in 1993. The rail station was part of the development of the Southern California Rapid Transit District Metro Rail Project. In 2011, the plaintiff fell on a stairway at the station. In August 2012, Plaintiff sued the MTA for dangerous condition of public property, statutory liability, and negligence. Among other defects, plaintiff alleged the banister of the stairwell was “too low” and the stairwell “too small” given the number, age, and volume of people habitually entering and exiting the rail station. In addition, plaintiff alleged that MTA “failed to provide adequate safeguards against the known dangerous condition by, among other acts and omissions, failing to properly design, construct, supervise, inspect and repair the Premises causing the same to be unsafe and defective for its intended purposes.” MTA, in turn, cross-complained against Hampton- the entity that provided design and construction services at the station.
Hampton demurred to the first amended cross-complaint, asserting a four year statute of limitations defense pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 337.1, claiming the alleged deficiencies were patent defects. On September 11, 2013, the trial court overruled the demurrer finding that the defect was not patent. Hampton appealed.
The appellate court overruled the trial court’s ruling and in fact, granted Hampton’s writ of mandate and even directed the trial court to sustain the demurrer without leave to amend! (Delon Hampton & Associates v. Sup. Ct. (Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority) (Cal. App. Second Dist., Div. 3; June 23, 2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 250, [173 Cal.Rptr.3d 407].)
The appellate court found that the purpose of section 337.1 is to “provide a final point of termination, to proctect some groups from extended liability.” A “patent deficiency” has been defined as a deficiency which is apparent by reasonable inspection. See Tomko Woll Group Architects, Inc. v. Superior Court (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1336. The court found a patent defect can be discovery by the kind of inspection made in the exercise of ordinary care and prudence, whereas a latent defect is hidden and would not be discovered by a reasonably careful inspection. See Preston v. Goldman (1986) 42 Cal.3d 108, 123. The test to determine whether a construction defect is patent is an objective test that asks “whether the average consumer, during the course of a reasonable inspection, would discover the defect…” See Creekbridge Townhome Owners Assn., Inc. v. C. Scott Whitten, Inc. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 251, 256.
Mr. Kaufman may be contacted at wkaufman@lockhartpark.com, and you may visit the firm's website at www.lockhartpark.com
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William M. Kaufman, Lockhart Park LP
