Use It or Lose It: California Court of Appeal Addresses Statutes of Limitations for Latent Construction Defects and Damage to Real Property
August 02, 2017 —
Omar Parra & Jesse M. Sullivan - Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPThe First Appellate District of the California Court of Appeal recently confirmed California’s latent defect statute of limitations, codified in California Code of Civil Procedure section 337.15, bars only claims based on construction defects. Estuary Owners Association v. Shell Oil Company, No. A145516, (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 2017). The Court also reemphasized that under California’s three-year statute of limitations for damage to real property, delineated in California Code of Civil Procedure section 338(b), the actual and constructive knowledge of the prior landowner is imputed to the current landowner.
Estuary Owners Association concerned the development and construction of a 100-unit condominium by Signature at the Estuary, LLC (“Signature”) on land Shell Oil Company (“Shell”) previously used as a fuel distribution terminal. Construction of the condominiums was completed in 2006. In 2008, it was discovered that residual concentrations of petroleum related chemicals remained in the soil, soil gas, and groundwater beneath the development. Later that year, Signature revealed that the condominiums had been constructed with moisture barriers beneath the building slabs instead of the vapor/gas barriers called for in the corrective action plan.
Reprinted courtesy of
Omar Parra, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and
Jesse M. Sullivan, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP
Mr. Parra may be contacted at oparra@hbblaw.com
Mr. Sullivan may be contacted at jsullivan@hbblaw.com
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2021 California Construction Law Update
December 29, 2020 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogThis Christmas looks to be a Blue Christmas as the nation grapples with rising infection, hospitalization and death rates due to COVID. But there’s always 2021 to look forward to, which, of course, also means new laws impacting the construction industry.
Due to COVID there were two unscheduled breaks during the second half of the 2019-2020 legislative session as legislators sheltered-in-place. As a result, there were fewer bills introduced and enacted than in previous legislative session. A total of 2,223 bills were introduced in 2020 compared to 2,625 bills in 2019, of which 428 bills made it to the Governor’s desk, and 372 were signed into law.
Among the bills signed into law were bills, unsurprisingly, related to COVID. In addition, the 2020 legislative session saw the passage of legislation creating a new licensing classification for residential renovation contractors, new laws expanding and clarifying when prevailing wages are required to be paid, and legislation extending the period during which seniors can cancel certain contracts.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
North Carolina Soil & Groundwater Case to be Heard by U.S. Supreme Court
April 09, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFIn Ashville, North Carolina, property owners have sued CTS Corp for alleged toxic chemicals in the soil and groundwater discovered decades after the company closed its manufacturing plant, according to the Citizen-Times. The contamination wasn’t discovered by the owners until 1999: “That lapse in time will be a primary point of consideration by the U.S. Supreme Court later this month when it hears arguments in a lawsuit brought by 25 Buncombe County property owners against the company.”
Citizen-Times declared that the “issue is a North Carolina law establishing a 10-year ‘statute of repose’ that sets a deadline for filing claims related to environmental pollution in cases involving real property, even if the victims weren't aware of the contamination until long after.” However, the law might be “pre-empted by the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act passed by Congress in 1980.”
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Quick Note: Notice of Contest of Claim Against Payment Bond
January 31, 2018 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesOn private jobs where the general contractor has an unconditional payment bond, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors and suppliers need to serve a
notice of nonpayment to preserve payment bond rights.
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David Adelstein, Florida Construction Legal UpdatesMr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dadelstein@gmail.com
South Carolina “occurrence” and allocation
September 01, 2011 —
CDCoverage.comIn Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., No. 26909 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2011), insured Crossman was the developer and general contractor of several condominium projects constructed by Crossman’s subcontractors over multiple years. After completion, Crossman was sued by homeowners alleging negligent construction of exterior components resulting in moisture penetration property damage to non-defective components occurring during multiple years. Crossman settled the underlying lawsuit and then filed suit against its CGL insurers to recover the settlement amount. Crossman settled with all of the insurers except for Harleysville. Crossman and Harleysville stipulated that the only coverage issue was whether there was an “occurrence.” The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Crossman, determining that there was an “occurrence.” The trial court also ruled that Harleysville was liable for the entire settlement amount without offset for the amounts paid by the other insurers.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
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Subcontractors Have Remedies, Even if “Pay-if-Paid” Provisions are Enforced
February 19, 2019 —
John P. Ahlers - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCIn a recent case in Kentucky[1], a sub-tier subcontractor sued the general contractor and owner for failure to pay for extra work. At the trial, the court held the subcontractor was entitled to recover under the theories of implied contracts and unjust enrichment, even though the subcontract contained a “pay-if-paid” clause. All parties appealed. In particular, the general contractor asserted that the pay-if-paid provision in the subcontract precluded recovery by the subcontractor. The issue was petitioned to the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
The question to be resolved by the Supreme Court of Kentucky was whether a pay-if-paid provision was enforceable as between a general contractor and subcontractor, and if so, whether the subcontractor could nevertheless pursue the owner directly for payment notwithstanding a lack of privity between the owner and subcontractor.
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John P. Ahlers, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCMr. Ahlers may be contacted at
john.ahlers@acslawyers.com
Home Building Mergers and Acquisitions 2014 Predictions
March 19, 2014 —
Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFFJohn McManus, writing for Big Builder, discusses the various predictions for mergers and acquisitions in the home building field for 2014. While predictions vary between individuals, it seems to hover between 15 and 30.
McManus lists several home building seller motivations, such as a “[n]eed for cash infusion to buy and develop new lot pipeline” and “[s]uccession planning.”
Finally, McManus points out that not every merger and acquisition discussion will lead to a deal: “We've recently seen a combination or three flounder on the issue of price. This occurs partly as the home builder buyer community becomes more discriminating as to what truly fits their program, and partly as smaller builders attain options as regional and national lenders awaken and look to reenter project financing in a bigger way.”
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Life After McMillin: Do Negligence and Strict Liability Causes of Action for Construction Defects Still Exist?
January 24, 2018 —
Thomas Balestreri and Amanda Crawley - Balestreri, Potocki, & HolmesThe ruling is in but the battle will likely continue over the practical application of SB 800. On January 18, 2018 the California Supreme Court issued its decision in
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __, holding that the statutory prelitigation scheme in The Right to Repair Act (“the Act”) that provides for notice and an opportunity for the Builder to repair defects applies to all claims for construction defects in residential construction sold on or after January 1, 2003, regardless whether the claim is founded on a violation of the Act’s performance standards or a common law claim for negligence or strict liability. (
McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (Van Tassel) (January 18, 2018, S229762) __ Cal.4th __.) With this holding, has the Court ruled that common law causes of action for construction defect still survive? If so, what will they look like and what standards will be applied?
The short answer is that it appears that common law causes of action still survive, at least for now, but it is not clear from this decision what they will look like and what standards will apply.
Portions of the decision seem to suggest that the Act is the sole and exclusive remedy for construction defect claims: “…even in some areas where the common law had supplied a remedy for construction defects resulting in property damage but not personal injury, the text and legislative history [of the statute] reflect a
clear and unequivocal intent to supplant common law negligence and strict product liability actions under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 6].) (Italics added for emphasis) However, at the end of the decision, the Court seems to be saying that there may still be a place for common law claims for negligence and strict liability alongside the Act but that these causes of action may be subject to the performance standards in the Act.
The
McMillin case went up to the Supreme Court on a procedural issue: whether a common law action alleging construction defects resulting in both economic loss and property damage is subject to the Act’s prelitigation notice and cure procedures. The Van Tassels had dismissed their claims under the Act opting to proceed solely on their common law claims including negligence and strict liability. McMillin sought a stay to force the Van Tassels to comply with the Act’s prelitigation procedures. The Supreme Court held that the Van Tassels must comply with the statutory procedures and affirmed the stay issued by the trial court. But the question remained: now that the Van Tassels were left only with common law claims, how would they proceed under the Act?
To understand how the Court dealt with this question, one must first understand how the Court dealt with the narrow procedural question presented by the case. The Court provides a very detailed, clear explanation of the reasons why it felt the Legislature intended for all construction defect claims involving residential construction must comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Act. In summing up its conclusions the Court makes three definitive holdings.
First, for claims involving economic loss only—the kind of claims involved in
Aas—the Court holds that the Legislature intended to supersede
Aas and provide a statutory basis for recovery. (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 10].) In other words, the Court clearly agrees that the Act was meant to allow recovery of damages based solely on economic damages. No surprise there. Second, the Court held for personal injuries, the Legislature made no changes to existing law that provides common law remedies for the injured party. (Id.) Nobody has ever contested that. Finally, the Court held that for construction defect claims involving property damage and not just economic loss “the Legislature replaced the common law
methods of recovery with the new statutory scheme.” (
Id.,) (Italics added for emphasis.)
In other words, the Court is not saying that negligence and strict liability are not permitted causes of action. The Court is merely stating that these causes of action must comply with the Act’s statutory scheme just as the same as a claim for economic loss. Here the Court is focusing on the procedure that must be followed. “The Act, in effect, provides that construction defect claims not involving personal injury will be treated the same procedurally going forward whether or not the underlying claims gave rise to any property damage.” (
Id.)
Having laid out its fundamental premise, the Court then deals with Plaintiff’s arguments regarding the intent of the Legislature and makes light work of them all. In the process, the Court disapproves
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal. App. 4th 98, and
Burch v. Superior Court (2014) 223 Cal. App. 4th 1411, to the extent they are inconsistent with the views expressed in the
McMillin opinion.
This is where the decision gets interesting. The Court reminds us that the Van Tassels had dismissed their statutory causes of action for violation of the performance standards under Section 896. One would think at that point that Plaintiffs had to be wondering if they had any claims left given that the Court had ruled that the Act was the sole means of recovery for construction defects. Not so fast. The Court points out that the complaint still rests on allegations of defective construction and that the suit remains an “ ‘action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction’ of the plaintiffs’ homes (§896)
and McMillin’s liability under the Van Tassels’ negligence and strict liability claims depends on the extent to which it [McMillin] violated the standards of sections 896 and 897.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Emphasis added.) WHAT DID THE COURT JUST SAY? Did the Court just say that a plaintiff could bring a common law cause of action for negligence or strict liability based on a violation of the performance standards under Section 896? What exactly would that claim look like? What would be the elements of such a cause of action?
To answer these questions, the Court states in the very next paragraph, which also happens to be the last paragraph in the decision: “In holding that claims seeking recovery for construction defect damages are subject to the Act’s prelitigation procedures regardless of how they are pleaded,
we have no occasion to address the extent to which a party might rely upon common law principles in pursuing liability under the Act.” (
McMillin (January 18, 2018, S229762) __Cal.4th.__ [p. 19].) (Italics added for emphasis) Is the Court answering “No” to the questions posed above? Probably not. It is simply following the age old rule that an appellate court will
not rule on an issue that is not specifically presented by an appeal, leaving that question for another day.
All we know for sure from
McMillin is that every claim for construction defects falling within the scope of the Act must follow the prelitigation procedure. There are no hall passes for negligence and strict liability. The larger question posed by the last two paragraphs in the decision, is whether the law recognizes a cause of action for negligence and strict liability for construction defects based on the standards in Section 896. The answer will have to be worked out by judges and trial attorneys in courtrooms across the State! The parameters of this hybrid cause of action that the Court seems to have posited will need more careful consideration than can be offered on first reading of
McMillin v. Superior Court.
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Balestreri, Potocki, & Holmes
