CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

In Florida, Exculpatory Clauses Do Not Need Express Language Referring to the Exculpated Party's Negligence

October 02, 2015 — Edward Jaeger & William Doerler – White and Williams LLP
In Sanislo v. Give Kids the World, Inc., 157 So.3d 256 (Fla. 2015), the Supreme Court of Florida considered whether a party to a contract, in order to be released from liability for its own negligence, needs to include an express reference to negligence in an exculpatory clause. The court held that, unlike an indemnification clause, so long as the language in an exculpatory clause is clear, the absence of the terms “negligence” or “negligent acts” in an exculpatory clause does not, for that reason alone, render the exculpatory clause ineffective. Background Give Kids the World, Inc. (“GKW”) is a non-profit organization that provides free vacations to seriously ill children and their families at GKW’s resort village. To use the resort, vacationers have to fill out an application. Stacy and Eric Sanislo filled out an application to bring their seriously ill child to the village for a vacation and GKW accepted their application. Upon arriving at the resort, the Sanislos filled out a liability release form. Reprinted courtesy of Edward Jaeger, White and Williams LLP and William Doerler, White and Williams LLP Mr. Jaeger may be contacted at jaegere@whiteandwilliams.com Mr. Doerler may be contacted at doerlerw@whiteandwilliams.com Read the court decision
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San Francisco Law Firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman Hired New Partner

May 21, 2014 — Beverley BevenFlorez-CDJ STAFF
The San Francisco law firm Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman has hired Clark Thiel as a new partner. Thiel has “significant experience in construction disputes” and “bolsters Pillsbury’s capabilities in litigation, mediation and domestic and international arbitration,” according to The Lawyer. Furthermore, Thiel is a licensed contractor and registered architect. Formerly, he was a partner at the firm Jones Day. Read the court decision
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Does the Miller Act Trump Subcontract Dispute Provisions?

May 16, 2018 — Christopher M. Horton - Smith Currie
All general contractors performing public building or public works contracts with the federal government must be familiar with the Miller Act. It is a requirement for doing business with the federal government. Pursuant to the Miller Act, a general contractor entering into a public building or public works contract with the federal government must furnish a payment bond in an amount equal to the contract price, unless the contracting officer determines that it is impractical to obtain a bond in that amount and specifies an alternative bond amount. Miller Act payment bonds guarantee payment to certain subcontractors and suppliers supplying labor and materials to contractors or subcontractors engaged in the construction. As a result, subcontractors have an avenue of relief should they not get paid for work done on the project. Specifically, subcontractors have a right to bring an action against the surety within 90-days after the date on which the person did or performed the last labor or furnished or supplied the last of material for which the claim is made. Any such action must be brought no later than one year after the date on which the person did or performed the last labor or furnished or supplied the last of material. 40 United States Code § 3133. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Christopher M. Horton, Smith Currie
Mr. Horton may be contacted at cmhorton@smithcurrie.com

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Shoring of Ceiling Does Not Constitute Collapse Under Policy's Definition

November 12, 2019 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Despite the need to shore up the ceiling, the building was not in a state of collapse under the language of the policy. Ravinia Vouge Cleaners v. Travelers Cas. Ins. Co. of Am., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123594 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2019). Ravinia Cleaners held a property policy issued by Travelers for the building from which it operated its dry-cleaning business. On February 2, 2015, there was heavy snowfall. On February 4, Ravinia reported to Travelers a leak coming from the ceiling. A temporary "shoring " was placed on the ceiling. Ravinia reported to Travelers that there was damage to the roof on February 25, 2015. Travelers hired an engineer who observed a buckling truss and roof displacing downward. The inspector recommended that the building be vacated and not occupied until adequate shoring was in place. Travelers denied coverage because the building was in a state of imminent collapse which was caused by the weight of ice and snow, and defective construction of the truss system. The policy excluded damage relating to a "collapse of a building." Collapse was defined by the policy as "an abrupt falling down or caving in of a building or any part of a building," such that the building could not be occupied for its intended purpose. There were exceptions to the exclusion, however, if the cause of the collapse was: (1) weight of snow; or (2) use of defective materials or methods in construction if the collapse occurred after construction. The policy also excluded damage from a building being in a state of imminent collapse unless the damage was caused by: (1) weight of snow; or (2) use of defective materials or methods in construction if the collapse occurred during construction. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

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Colorado Court of Appeals’ Ruling Highlights Dangers of Excessive Public Works Claims

August 26, 2024 — David M. McLain – Colorado Construction Litigation
In the case of Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company, LLC v. Regional Rail Partners (2024 COA 78), the Colorado Court of Appeals reviewed a complex contract dispute related to the design and construction of a transit rail line. The project, commissioned by the Regional Transportation District (“RTD”), involved a collaboration between Regional Rail Partners and Ralph L. Wadsworth Construction Company (“Wadsworth”) to build the North Metro Rail Line between Denver Union Station and Thornton. Key Facts:

1. Contracts and Payments: Regional Rail Partners contracted with Wadsworth to perform specific construction tasks with a total contract value of $60,210,783. By the time of the trial, Regional Rail had paid almost $58 million of this amount.
2. Disputes and Delays: The project faced numerous delays and disputes, leading to Wadsworth claiming significant financial damages attributed to these disruptions. In April 2018, Wadsworth’s expert estimated that Regional Rail owed them $12,408,496.60.

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Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Mr. McLain may be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com

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Tesla’s Solar Roof Pricing Is Cheap Enough to Catch Fire

May 10, 2017 — Tom Randall - Bloomberg
Tesla Inc. has begun taking orders for its remarkable solar roof tiles to be delivered by summer at a price point that could be transformative for the U.S. solar market. Tesla will begin with production of two of the four styles of solar tile unveiled in October: a smooth glass and a textured glass version. The Tuscan and French slate tiles will be available by the end of this year. Roofing a 2,000 square-foot home in New York state—with 40 percent coverage of active solar tiles and battery backup for night-time use—would cost about $50,000 after federal tax credits and generate $64,000 in energy over 30 years, according to Tesla. The warranty is for the lifetime of your house. Read the court decision
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Reprinted courtesy of Tom Randall, Bloomberg

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A Termination for Convenience Is Not a Termination for Default

April 22, 2024 — David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal Updates
A termination for convenience is NOT a termination for default. They are NOT the same. They should NOT be treated as the same. I am a huge proponent of termination for convenience provisions because sometimes a party needs to be able to exercise a termination for convenience, but the termination is not one that rises to a basis for default. However, exercising a termination for convenience does not mean you get to go back in time and convert the termination for convenience into a termination for default. It does not work like that. Nor should it. An opinion out of the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals – Williams Building Company, Inc. v. Department of State, CBCA 7147, 2024 WL 1099788 (CBCA 2024 – demonstrates a fundamental distinction between a termination for convenience and a termination for default, i.e., that you don’t get to conjure up defaults when you exercise a termination for convenience:

Because a termination for convenience essentially turns a fixed-price construction contract into a cost-reimbursement contract, allowing the contractor to recover its incurred performance costs, the resolution of this appeal will involve identifying the total costs that [Contractor] incurred in performing this contract before [Government] terminated it for convenience. Since [Government] terminated the contract for convenience rather than for default, it no longer matters whether, in the past,[Contractor] acted intentionally in overstating the amount of its incurred costs or committed a contract breach. Ultimately, as permitted in response to a termination for convenience, [Contractor] will recover those allowable costs that [Contractor]establishes it incurred in performing the contract.

Williams Building Company, supra.

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Reprinted courtesy of David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.
Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at dma@kirwinnorris.com

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HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case

October 28, 2011 — CDJ STAFF

The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.

Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.

The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.

In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.

In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.

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