Cambridge Massachusetts Building Expert Directory

United States Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in EEOC Subpoena Case

March 29, 2017 — Jeffrey M. Daitz & Rashmee Sinha - Peckar & Abramson, P.C.
On September 29, 2016, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in McLane Co. Inc. v. EEOC, case number 15-1248, a case that asks the Court to resolve a split in the Circuit Courts of Appeals on the proper standard of review applied to a district court decision to quash or enforce a subpoena issued by the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The decision by our highest court on the correct standard of review will have important implications for businesses, because if a litigant is displeased with a lower court's decision, it may get two bites at the apple. Such an outcome will likely encourage more appeals, drawn-out investigations and increase legal fees. On the other hand, if the Supreme Court decides that the Ninth Circuit was wrong and that a deferential standard of review (as opposed to a de nova standard) is appropriate, the losing side in future cases is more likely to accept the decision of the lower district court, knowing its chances of winning on appeal are slim. Reprinted courtesy of Jeffrey M. Daitz, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. and Rashmee Sinha, Peckar & Abramson, P.C. Mr. Daitz may be contacted at jdaitz@pecklaw.com Ms. Sinha may be contacted at rsinha@pecklaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Court Affirms Duty to Defend Additional Insured Contractor

December 05, 2022 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling that the insurer must defend. Main St. Am. Assurance Co. v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 2022 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5507 (N.Y. App. Div., Oct. 7, 2022). XL Construction Services, LLC was the contractor on a construction project. Timothy J. O'Connor was insured when performing drywall finishing as a self-employee subcontractor on the project. As part of a written indemnification and insurance agreement between the parties, O'Connor was obligated to obtain insurance for the benefit of XL Construction. O'Connor was insured by Merchants Mutual Insurance Company under a policy containing an additional insureds endorsement that provided coverage to a party where required by a written agreement, but "only with respect to liability for 'bodily injury' . . . caused in whole or in part, by . . . [O'Connor's] acts or omissions." The trial court found there was a duty to defend and entered judgment that Merchants Mutual was obligated to provided a defense to XL Construction. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

No Coverage for Foundation Collapse

November 08, 2017 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Coverage for the collapse of a foundation was not covered under the contractor's builder's risk policy. Taja Investments LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19855 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2017). Taja Construction LLC was renovating a row house owned by Taja Investments LLC when the east wall of the property collapsed. Taja submitted a claim for repair costs in the amount of $400,000. Peerless denied coverage because the collapse was caused by Taja's failure to support the building's foundation properly while excavating the basement. The policy excluded coverage for defects in construction or workmanship. The claim was also denied under the earth movement exclusion. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Attorney's Erroneous Conclusion that Limitations Period Had Not Expired Was Not Grounds For Relief Under C.C.P. § 473(b)

February 27, 2019 — David W. Evans & Stephen J. Squillario
In Jackson v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, Inc. (2/8/19 No. A150833), the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of a motion for relief from a voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, filed by the plaintiff based on the erroneous conclusion of an attorney who she had consulted (but who had not yet appeared as counsel in her case) that the applicable statute of limitations had not yet expired. In reality, the limitations period had expired on the same date plaintiff had filed her complaint in propria persona. The plaintiff later retained the attorney on a limited basis to present the motion for relief pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure § 473(b) based on the attorney’s affidavit of fault. Therein, the attorney testified that he had advised the plaintiff to dismiss her action voluntarily based on a misinterpretation of the applicable limitations period, which the attorney characterized as having been based on his “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” Section 473 provides two distinct provisions for relief from default or dismissal – one is discretionary, while the other is mandatory. Discretionary relief is available in the case of an attorney’s mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. In contrast, mandatory relief is available where the resulting dismissal was caused by an attorney’s mistake, whether or not excusable. In denying the plaintiff’s motion, the trial court reasoned that the plaintiff could not rely upon Section 473(b) because (1) the attorney did not represent the plaintiff at the time and (2) this provision did not apply to the voluntary dismissal of an action without prejudice. Reprinted courtesy of David W. Evans, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP and Stephen J. Squillario, Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP Mr. Evans may be contacted at devans@hbblaw.com Mr. Squillario may be contacted at ssquillario@hbblaw.com Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Insurer Cannot Abandon Defense Agreement on Underlying Asbestos Claims Against Insured

June 12, 2023 — Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law Hawaii
The court found that the insurer continued to be bound by a defense agreement entered with the insured who merged with another company. Continental Ins. Co. v. Neles-Jamesbury, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52521 (D. Mass. March 28, 2023). In 1990, Neles-Jamesbury became the sucessor by merger to the liabilities of Jamesbury Corp. and Neles, Inc. The companies were both in the business of manufacturing and selling valves. Continental issued two primary CGL policies to Neles, Inc. from 1986 to 1988. After the merger, Neles-Jamesbury was involved in numerous lawsuits that alleged bodily injury from asbestos exposure. Due to the continuing question of whether the policies created duties for Continental, the parties entered into a 2007 Cost Sharing Agreement, which served to clarify and define their respective obligations and coverage in the lawsuits. The agreement noted that Continental wanted to avoid the expense and uncertainties of litigation over defense obligations. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Damon Key Leong Kupchak Hastert
Mr. Eyerly may be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Home Construction Thriving in Lubbock

December 30, 2013 — CDJ STAFF
The 2013 numbers for home construction aren’t ready yet, but the January through November numbers for Lubbock, Texas show a 42% increase over the number of construction permits issued for single-family homes in the first 11 months of 2012. The number look even better compared to 2011’s totals, according to KFYO. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of

Fraudster Sells 24-Bedroom ‘King’s Speech’ London Mansion

May 20, 2015 — Neil Callanan – Bloomberg
Edward Davenport, jailed for fraud for his role in a fake lender, sold a 24-bedroom mansion in London’s Marylebone district that was featured in the film “The King’s Speech.” The money raised from the sale will be used to repay 13 million pounds ($20 million) from a confiscation order by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service, the Serious Fraud Office said in a statement Wednesday. Davenport was jailed for more than seven years in October 2011 for his role in Gresham Ltd., a company that said it offered to provide commercial funding in return for advance fees, the SFO said. After securing the payments, employees would make deceptive assertions to extract further fees, the SFO said in 2011. Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Neil Callanan, Bloomberg

Know your Obligations: Colorado’s Statutory Expansions of the Implied Warranty of Habitability Are Now in Effect

November 04, 2019 — Luke Mecklenburg - Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation Blog
The Colorado legislature had a busy session this year. Among the several significant bills it enacted, HB1170 strengthens tenant protections under the implied warranty of habitability. It became effective on August 2, 2019, so landlords and tenants alike are now subject to its requirements. The bill makes numerous changes to Colorado’s implied warranty of habitability, and interested parties should review the bill in detail. Landlords in particular may want to consider retaining legal counsel to make sure they have proper procedures in place to promptly deal with any habitability complaints within the new required timelines. This posting is not intended to provide a comprehensive guide to the changed law, but simply to highlight some of the most significant changes. With that caveat, landlords and tenants should be aware that as of August 2, 2019:

The following conditions are now deemed to make a residential residence uninhabitable for the purposes of the implied warranty of habitability:
- The presence of mold, which is defined as “microscopic organisms or fungi that can grow in damp conditions in the interior of a building.”
- A refrigerator, range stove, or oven (“Appliance”) included within a residential premises by a landlord for the use of the tenant that did not conform “to applicable law at the time of installation” or that is not “maintained in good working order.” Nothing in this statute requires a landlord to provide any appliances, but these requirements apply if the landlord either agreed to provide appliances in a written agreement or provided them at the inception of the tenant’s occupancy.
- Other conditions that “materially interfere with the tenant’s life, health or safety.”
Read the court decision
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Luke Mcklenburg, Snell & Wilmer
Mr. Mecklenburg may be contacted at lmecklenburg@swlaw.com

CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS BUILDING EXPERT DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES