Ruling Closes the Loop on Restrictive Additional Insured Endorsement – Reasonable Expectations of Insured Builder Prevails Over Intent of Insurer
July 31, 2019 —
Theodore L. Senet, Esq., Jason M. Adams, Esq. and Clayton Calvin - Gibbs GiddenOn June 5, 2019, the Court of Appeal in
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, 35 Cal. App. 5th 1042 (Cal. Ct. App. 2019) issued an important opinion on the scope of additional insured insurance coverage for developers and general contractors in California. Specifically, the “care, custody and control” (“CCC”) exclusion will be read to only exclude coverage for additional insureds who exercised exclusive control over the damaged property. Thus, general contractors who share control of the property with their subcontractors, as is typical on most projects, will not be denied coverage under this exclusion.
I. Facts & Procedural History
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. was a Southern California developer and general contractor. In 2014, homeowners sued McMillin for roofing defects in a case called
Galvan v. McMillin Auburn Lane II, LLC. Pursuant to a subcontract, the roofer, Martin Roofing Company, Inc., provided McMillin with additional insured coverage under Martin’s general liability insurance policy. The insurer, National Fire and Marine Insurance Company, covered McMillin under an ISO Form CG 20 09 03 97 Additional Insured (“AI”) endorsement. After McMillin tendered its defense of the Galvan lawsuit under the AI endorsement, National Fire declined to provide McMillin with a defense to the homeowners’ lawsuit, relying on a CCC exclusion contained in the AI endorsement for property in the care, custody or control of the additional insured. McMillin then sued National Fire for breach of the policy, bad faith and declaratory relief in
McMillin Homes Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company.
In
McMillin Homes, the trial court found the CCC exclusion in the AI endorsement applied and held in favor of the insurer, National Fire. The trial court found the exclusion for damage to property in McMillin’s “care, custody, or control” precluded coverage for the roofing defect claims, as well as any duty on the part of the insurer to defend the home builder, McMillin. McMillin filed an appeal from the trial court’s ruling.
II. Case Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed to hold in favor of McMillin, interpreting the CCC exclusion narrowly and finding a duty on the part of the insurer to defend the general contractor pursuant to the AI endorsement on the roofer’s insurance policy. It held that for the CCC exclusion to attach, it would require the general contractor’s exclusive control over the damaged property, but here, the general contractor shared control with the roofer. The Court of Appeal noted that where there is ambiguity as to whether a duty to defend exists, the court favors the reasonable belief of the insured over the intent of the insurer. Here, that reasonable belief was that the coverage applied and the exclusion was narrow.
The Court of Appeal relied upon
Home Indemnity Co. v. Leo L. Davis, Inc., 79 Cal. App. 3d 863 (Ct. App. 1978) (“Davis”), as a judicial interpretation of the CCC exclusion. That case synthesized a string of case law into a single conclusion: that courts may hold the exclusion inapplicable where the insured’s control is not exclusive. In the opinion in McMillin Homes, coverage turned upon whether control was exclusive: “[t]he exclusion is inapplicable where the facts at best suggest shared control.” The Court of Appeal stated the “need for painstaking evaluation of the specific facts of each case. Here, McMillin coordinated the project’s scheduling, but Martin furnished the materials and labor and oversaw the work; they therefore shared control.
Even if the rule in Davis did not apply and the exclusion was found to be ambiguous, the court stated that “control” requires a higher threshold than merely acting as a general contractor. Liability policies are presumed to include defense duties and exclusions must be “conspicuous, plain, and clear.” Furthermore, because “construction defect litigation is typically complex and expensive, a key motivation [for the endorsement] is to offset the cost of defending lawsuits where the general contractor’s liability is claimed to be derivative.” This is especially true because the duty to defend is triggered by a mere potential of coverage. Under the insurer’s construction of the exclusion, coverage would be so restrictive under the AI endorsement that it was nearly worthless to the additional insured.
III. Reasonable Expectation of the Insured Prevails over the Intent of the Insurer
Like most commercial general liability policies, National Fire’s policy excluded coverage for property damage Martin was contractually obliged to pay, with an exception for “insured contracts.” Typically, “insured contracts” include prospective indemnification agreements for third party claims. The National Fire policy contained a form CG 21 39 Contractual Liability Limitation endorsement, which deleted indemnity agreements from the definition of “insured contracts” to effectively preclude coverage for the indemnity provision between McMillin and Martin. National Fire argued that this endorsement demonstrated its intent to exclude coverage to McMillin for the homeowners’ defect lawsuit. The Court of Appeal stated that the insurer’s intent is not controlling and that the insureds reasonable expectation under the AI endorsement would control. As a result of its ruling, the Court also dealt a significant blow to the argument that the CG 21 39 endorsement is effective as a total bar to additional insured coverage for all construction defect claims.
IV. Conclusion
The decision is good news for developers and general contractors who rely on subcontractors to provide additional insured coverage. Unless the general contractor exercises exclusive control over a given project, the CCC exclusion in the CG 20 09 03 97 additional insured endorsement may not preclude the duty to defend. Demonstrating that a general contractor exercised exclusive control over the project would be extremely difficult to show under normal project circumstances because the any subcontractor participation appears to eliminate the general contractor’s exclusive control.
The case also highlights the need for construction professionals to regularly review their insurance programs with their risk management team (lawyers, brokers, and risk managers). As is often the case, a basic insurance policy review at the outset of the McMillin project could likely have avoided the entire dispute. For owners and general contractors, CG 20 10 (ongoing operations) and CG 20 37 (completed operations) additional insured forms are preferable to the CG 20 09 form at issue in the McMillin case because they do not contain the CCC exclusion. The CG 20 10 and 20 37 forms are readily available in the marketplace and are commonly added to most policies upon request. Had those forms been added, AI coverage likely would have been extended to McMillin without the need for litigation. Similarly, carriers will routinely delete the CG 21 39 Contractual Liability Limitation endorsement upon request. Deletion of the CG 21 39 would have circumvented National Fire’s second argument in its entirety.
Additionally, insurance policies, endorsements, and exclusions are subject to revision and are not always issued on standard forms. As a result, it is incumbent upon developers, contractors, and subcontractors to specify the precise overage requirements for construction projects and to review all endorsements, certificates, and policies carefully. Due to the difficulty in monitoring compliance with insurance requirements, project owners and general contractors are finding that it is better to insure projects under project specific wrap-up insurance programs which eliminate many of the issues pertaining to additional insured coverage. Wrap-up programs vary greatly as to their terms and conditions, so however a project is insured, insurance requirements and evidence of coverage should be carefully reviewed by experienced and qualified risk managers, brokers, and legal counsel to assure that projects and parties are sufficiently covered.
Gibbs Giden is nationally and locally recognized by U. S. News and Best Lawyers as among the “Best Law Firms” in both Construction Law and Construction Litigation. Chambers USA Directory of Leading Lawyers has consistently recognized Gibbs Giden as among California’s elite construction law firms. The authors can be reached at tsenet@gibbsgiden.com (Theodore Senet); jadams@gibbsgiden.com (Jason Adams) and ccalvin@gibbsgiden.com (Clayton Calvin). Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Shifting the Risk of Delay by Having Float Go Your Way
July 05, 2021 —
Christopher J. Brasco & Matthew D. Baker - ConsensusDocsCritical path delay plays a central role in allocating responsibility for project delay. The interrelated concept of concurrency is also frequently determinative of entitlement on a range of claims including by owners for liquidated damages and by contractors for delay damages. What constitutes critical/concurrent delay, however, is hotly debated by scheduling experts. The lack of real consensus regarding how critical/concurrent delay should be determined and analyzed has created significant uncertainty in scheduling disputes. Indeed, courts have adopted differing and at times conflicting theories of concurrency that can produce divergent outcomes for the parties. In an effort to reduce uncertainty, stakeholders have increasingly adopted specialized contractual provisions and scheduling techniques which have significant implications for the evaluation of the companion concepts of criticality and concurrency. One such mechanism is float sequestration. Regardless of whether float sequestration is ultimately in the construction industry’s broader interest, stakeholders must be able to recognize its use and appreciate the implications for delay disputes on their projects.
Simply defined, float is the number of days an activity can be delayed before affecting the project’s critical path (i.e., the longest chain of activities which determines the project’s minimal duration). Typically, only delays affecting the critical path can produce concurrent delay. Consequently, the concept of float is integral to understanding and resolving issues of both criticality and concurrency.
Reprinted courtesy of
Christopher J. Brasco, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP and
Matthew D. Baker, Watt, Tieder, Hoffar & Fitzgerald, LLP
Mr. Brasco may be contacted at cbrasco@watttieder.com
Mr. Baker may be contacted at mbaker@watttieder.com
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Bad Faith and a Partial Summary Judgment in Seattle Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe US District Court of Washington has issued a ruling in the case of Ledcor Industries v. Virginia Surety Company, Inc. Ledcor was the builder of a mixed-use real estate project in Seattle called the Adelaide Project. Ledcor purchased an insurance policy from Virginia Surety covering the project. After the completion of the project, Ledcor received complaints of construction defects from the homeowners, which they forwarded to Virginia Surety.
Virginia Surety denied coverage on several grounds. Absent any lawsuit, Virginia claimed that there was “not yet any duty to defend or indemnify.” Further, as the policy commenced ten days after work on the project was substantially completed, Virginia cited a provision in the policy that excluded coverage for damage that occurred before the policy began. As problems included water intrusion, Virginia noted an exclusion for fungal damage. Finally, Virginia noted that it was not clear whether damage was due to Ledcor’s own actions.
The homeowners sued over the construction defects. Ledcor settled these suits before trial. In this, they were defended by, and settlements were paid by American Home, another of Ledcor’s insurers. Ledcor claims that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith by denying coverage and by its failure to investigate the ongoing nature of the work at the project.
The judge determined that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith when it invoked the fungus exclusion. Virginia noted that fungal damage “‘would have been’ referenced in the list of construction defects,” however, the HOAs claimed only “water stains” and “water damage,” and made no mention of mold or fungus. The court found that Virginia Surety “was not entitled to deny coverage simply because it may have suspected that mold or fungus damage existed.” The court noted that further proceedings would be needed to determine what portion of the settlement Virginia is obligated to pay.
The court found that there were matters of fact to be determined on the further issues in the case. The judge wrote that although Virginia acted in bad faith in invoking the fungus exclusion, it still had to be determined if they were in breach of contract by failing to defend Ledcor. Ledcor still needs to show that the damages claimed by the HOA were due to work actually covered by Virginia Surety.
Ledcor made an additional claim that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s laws concerning the insurance industry. Here, the court noted that the improper exclusion for fungus issues “constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.” Six other claims were made under this law. The court found that Virginia Surety did not misrepresent “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” It also issued its denial letter promptly, satisfying the fifth provision. However, Virginia Surety did violate the second provision, in that it failed “to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims.” Two other issues could not be determined.
Judge Martinez’s decision granted a summary judgment to Ledcor on the issue of bad faith. An additional summary judgment was granted that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act. Judge Martinez did not grant summary judgment on any of the other issues Ledcor raised.
Read the court’s decision…
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court Will Not Address Trigger for DEP Environmental Cleanup Action at This Time
August 14, 2018 —
Gregory Capps - White and Williams LLPOn July 18, 2018, in Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association Insurance Company v. Johnson Matthey, Inc., et al., No. 24 MAP 2017 (Pa. July 18, 2018), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court quashed the Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Association’s (PMA) appeal seeking review of a ruling denying its motion for summary judgment for an order that coverage for the cleanup of a toxic waste site is limited to the policy in effect when property damage was first discovered. In short, the court found the lower court’s ruling only narrowed the dispute between the parties and is, therefore, interlocutory and not appealable at this time.
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Gregory Capps, White & Williams LLPMr. Capps may be contacted at
cappsg@whiteandwilliams.com
GRSM Named Among 2025 “Best Law Firms” by Best Lawyers
December 23, 2024 —
Gordon Rees Scully MansukhaniGordon Rees Scully Mansukhani has been recognized in the 2025 "Best Law Firms" survey published by Best Lawyers.
To be eligible for a 2025 ranking, a law firm must have at least one lawyer recognized in the 2025 edition of the Best Lawyers in America in a "Best Law Firms" practice area and geographic jurisdiction. GRSM announced earlier this year that 166 lawyers were recognized in the 2025 edition of Best Lawyers in America®, while 74 lawyers were named to the 2025 edition of Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch. Explore the full list of GRSM recognized attorneys.
No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Prior results do not guarantee a similar outcome. For details about Best Law Firms' methodology, please click here.
The firm received National "Tier 1" rankings in the following areas:
- Admiralty and Maritime Law
- Commercial Litigation
- Construction Law
- Insurance Law
- Litigation – Construction
- Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions – Defendants
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Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani
Separation of Insureds Provision in CGL Policies
August 31, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesCGL policies contain a “Separation of Insureds” provision. This provision oftentimes states:
Except with respect to the Limits of Insurance, and any rights or duties specifically assigned this Coverage Part to the first Named Insured, this insurance applies:
- As if each named insured were the only Named Insured; and
- Separately to each insured against whom claim is made or “suit” is brought.
This provision is designed to “create separate insurable interests in each individual insured under a policy, such that the conduct of one insured will not necessarily exclude coverage for all other insured.” Evanson Ins. Co. v. Design Build Interamerican, Inc., 569 Fed.Appx. 739 (11th Cir. 2014). This provision also allows one insured under the policy (e.g., additional insured) to sue another (e.g., named insured) without violating potential coverage because there are separate insurable interests. This is a valuable provision in CGL policies.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
Expired Contract Not Revived Due to Sovereign Immunity and the Ex Contractu Clause
September 15, 2016 —
David R. Cook Jr. – AHHC Construction Law BlogA few months ago, a decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc. provided a strict rule for contractors who work with state agencies to determine whether a state agency has waived its sovereign immunity. The issue as framed by the Court was “whether an agency’s waiver of immunity from a breach of contract claim as a result of entering into a written contract remains intact in the event the contract is extended without a written document signed by both parties expressly amending the contract, as required by its terms.”
The case involved a contract executed on March 1, 2012, by a contractor, RTT Associates, Inc. (RTT), and the Georgia Department of Labor (DOL), whereby RTT was to develop certain computer software for the DOL by the completion date, June 30, 2012. The contract required that amendments be in writing and fully executed by both parties. Time was of the essence and RTT’s obligation under the contract survived the expiration or termination of the contract.
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David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Buyer's Demolishing of Insured's Home Not Barred by Faulty Construction Exclusion
June 21, 2017 —
Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiLoss of the insured's home caused by a renter who demolished the home was covered under the homeowner's policy. Fisher v. Garrison Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2017 Idaho LEXIS 143 (Idaho May 26, 2017).
The insured, Shammie L. Fisher, entered a Purchase Agreement to sell her home to Ron Reynoso. The purchase of the property was contingent upon Reynoso obtaining financing. Before completing the purchase, he would lease the property. The Agreement stated, "Buyer intends to make certain improvements to the property upon possession, with the intent to sell the property for a profit."
Within two months of renting the property to Reynoso, Fisher learned that he had demolished the entire house down to the foundation. He then ceased work and left. Fisher made a claim under her policy, but Garrison Property and Casualty Insurance Company denied coverage based upon the exclusion for faulty, inadequate or defective work. When Fisher sued, the trial court granted summary judgment to Garrison.
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Tred R. Eyerly - Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
