2022 Construction Outlook: Continuing Growth But at Slower Pace
January 24, 2022 —
Garret Murai - California Construction Law BlogIn the midst of a pandemic that has lasted far longer than I think many of us thought it would, it’s been a study in contrasts:
- There has been over 305 million COVID-19 cases and 5.5 million deaths worldwide since the start of the pandemic.
- The U.S. stock market gained a whopping 26.9% in 2021.
- The annual rate of inflation in the U.S. hit 6.8% in November 2021 the highest it has been in nearly 40 years.
- The U.S. unemployment rate stood at 4.2% at the end of 2021, down from 14.7% in April 2020, the second highest unemployment rate since the Great Depression.
- The Doomsday Clock struck 100 seconds before midnight in 2021 as scientists warn that global leaders are doing too little too late to combat climate change that has seen global temperatures rise roughly 2 degrees Fahrenheit since the pre-industrial era.
- 2021 saw the launch of the first all-civilian spaceflight by Elon Musk’s Space X which was just one of 16 private spaceflights by tech billionaires Richard Branson’s Virgin Galactic and Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin.
For the construction industry, when we started out in 2021, economists were estimating that construction starts would be up just 4% in 2021 after taking a 14% free-fall in 2020. As it turned out, construction starts increased 12% in 2021. That’s why economic forecasts should be viewed less like a marksmanship competition and more like horseshoes and hand grenades. Close is about the best you can realistically hope for.
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Garret Murai, Nomos LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@nomosllp.com
Idaho Federal Court Rules Against Sacketts After SCOTUS Decided Judicial Review of an EPA Compliance Order was Permissible
May 13, 2019 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelIn a decision released on March 31, in Sackett v. EPA, the U.S. District Court for Idaho held, without benefit of oral argument, that the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) motion for summary judgment should be granted, and accordingly, the Sacketts had violated the Clean Water Act (CWA) by making improvements to 0.63 acres of land they owned without a required CWA permit when the land qualified as a “wetlands.”
The EPA had determined the Sacketts’ “property is subject to the CWA because it contains wetlands adjacent to Priest Lake, a traditionally ‘navigable water,’ and, additionally, their property is wetland adjacent to a tributary and similarly situated to other wetlands and has a significant nexus to Priest Lake.” The District Court rejected the Sacketts’ arguments that their property was not a “wetlands” subject to the CWA.
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Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Florida Adopts Daubert Standard for Expert Testimony
October 07, 2019 —
Michael L. DeBona - The Subrogation StrategistSeven months ago, the Florida Supreme Court declined to adopt Daubert as the standard for admitting expert testimony in Florida state courts. In DeLisle v. Crane Co., 258 So. 3d 1219 (2018), the court reaffirmed that “Frye, not Daubert, is the appropriate test in Florida.” On May 23, 2019, however, Florida’s high court did an about-face. In In Re: Amendment to the Florida Evidence Code, No. SC19-107, the Florida Supreme Court overruled its decision in DeLisle and declared that Florida will now apply the Daubert standard to determine whether scientific evidence is admissible.
The Daubert standard comes from the case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which held that the longstanding Frye test[1] for admitting expert testimony was superseded by Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Daubert instructed that federal judges should act as “gatekeepers” to ensure expert testimony is rooted in scientifically valid principles and that those principles are properly applied to the facts at issue. In determining whether scientific evidence should be admitted, Daubert sets forth several factors to consider: the testability of the theory or technique; the peer review and publication of the theory or technique; the error rate for the technique; the standards controlling the technique’s operation; and the general acceptance of the theory or technique.[2] The Daubert standard is generally considered a more onerous test than Frye, precluding expert testimony that might otherwise go to the jury under Frye.[3] Whereas Frye is a single factor test that applies only to new or novel science, Daubert is a multifactor test that applies to all expert testimony.
Since Daubert, a growing number of states have moved away from the Frye test in favor of the Daubert standard; it is now followed by a majority of jurisdictions in the country. In 2013, the Florida State legislature attempted to move Florida in this direction by amending the Florida Evidence Code to codify the Daubert standard. But because the Florida Supreme Court is vested with the power to make procedural rules and it was unclear whether the Daubert standard was a procedural or substantive rule, it was uncertain whether the 2013 Daubert amendments were controlling law. Then in 2017, in In Re: Amendment to the Florida Evidence Code, No. SC16-181, the Florida Supreme Court expressly declined adopting the Daubert amendments to the extent they were procedural. This decision signaled that, if faced with the Daubert standard on appeal from a litigated case, the Florida Supreme Court would reaffirm that Frye – not Daubert – controlled the admissibility of expert testimony in Florida state courts.
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Michael L. DeBona, White and Williams LLPMr. DeBona may be contacted at
debonam@whiteandwilliams.com
Continuous Injury Trigger Applied to Property Loss
January 07, 2015 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals predicted that the Wisconsin appellate courts would apply the continuous injury trigger to find coverage after the policy expired for damage caused by water infiltration. Strauss v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. App LEXIS 21794 (7th Cir. Nov. 18, 2014).
The insureds built their home in 1994. They purchased coverage for their home from Chubb. Coverage was in place from October 1994 through October 2005. The policy stated that coverage was limited "only to occurrences that take place while this policy is in effect." "Occurrence" was defined as "a loss or accident to which this insurance applies occurring within the policy period. Continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general conditions unless excluded is considered to be one occurrence."
In October 2010, the insureds discovered that water infiltration had been causing damage within the building envelope of the home. The infiltration was ongoing, beginning around the time of original construction and continuously occurring with each subsequent rainfall. Chubb denied coverage because the damage was not discovered during any of their policy periods.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Three-Year Delay Not “Prompt Notice,” But Insurer Not “Appreciably Prejudiced” Either, New Jersey Court Holds
November 04, 2019 —
Anthony L. Miscioscia and Timothy A. Carroll - White and Williams LLPIn Harleysville Preferred Insurance Company v. East Coast Painting & Maintenance, LLC, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135295 (D.N.J. Aug. 12, 2019) (East Coast Painting), the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey held that an insurer, which received notice of a bodily injury accident three years after it happened, was not “appreciably prejudiced” by such late notice, even as the court acknowledged notice three years later did not satisfy the policy’s “prompt notice” condition. The court also held that the policy’s “Operational Exclusion,” which excluded coverage for bodily injury arising out of the operation of “cherry pickers and similar devices,” did not apply because the accident arose out of the use of a “scissor lift,” which is not a device similar to a cherry picker.
East Coast Painting arose out of a Queens, New York bridge-painting project, during which an employee of the insured, East Coast Painting and Maintenance LLC was injured while “standing on a scissor lift mounted to the back of a truck,” owned and operated by East Coast. The employee sued various project-related entities which, in turn, joined East Coast as a defendant. East Coast sought coverage under its business auto policy, and the insurer agreed to defend the insured under a reservation of rights. The insurer subsequently sought a declaration that it did not owe coverage based on, among other things, the policy’s “Operational Exclusion,” and the insured’s failure to satisfy the policy’s “prompt notice” condition. The insurer moved for summary judgment on both of those bases, but the court in East Coast Painting denied the motion.
As for the insurer’s “prompt notice” defense, the court in East Coast Painting concluded that, the insured’s notice to the insurer was not prompt because it did not receive notice until three years after the accident. But, the court added, the inquiry does not end there. “[T]his Court must determine whether [the insurer] was appreciably prejudiced by that delay.” Reviewing the facts, the court held that the insurer was not “appreciably prejudiced,” even though during the three-year delay the lift truck was “not properly maintained” or “in the same condition it was at the time of the Accident.” The court observed that the insurer had “ample other evidence with which it can defend itself,” such as experts who inspected the lift truck and opined about the cause of the accident.” [Emphasis added.] Further, “there are multiple contemporaneous accident reports,” “a list of the East Coast employees on site at the time,” “photographs of the lift truck and its location when [the employee] was injured,” and “depositions of [the employee] and others regarding the events at issue.” Thus, the court held, the insurer was not prejudiced and summary judgment was inappropriate.
Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony L. Miscioscia, White and Williams LLP and
Timothy A. Carroll, White and Williams LLP
Mr. Miscioscia may be contacted at misciosciaa@whiteandwilliams.com
Mr. Carroll may be contacted at carrollt@whiteandwilliams.com
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Hilary Soaks California With Flooding Rain and Snarls Flights
August 21, 2023 —
Brian K. Sullivan & Brian Wingfield - BloombergThe remnants of Tropical Storm Hilary pummeled California with record rains on Monday, disrupting flights but sparing its largest cities from widespread destruction.
Across the region, “the ongoing and historic amount of rainfall is expected to cause life-threatening to locally catastrophic” floods, along with landslides and mudslides, the National Hurricane Center said in a notice early Monday.
The storm, now a post-tropical cyclone, has weakened since coming ashore in California late Sunday. As of early Monday, it had maximum sustained winds of about 35 miles (56 kilometers) per hour and is forecast to move across Nevada and dissipate on Monday.
Hilary, a rare storm to hit the Southwest, could bring a year’s worth of rain to parts of a region famous for its usually balmy weather. Heavy rain and flash flooding have already disrupted transportation, and officials warned residents to stay off the roads. In the last 10 years, flooding from rainfall has caused the most deaths from hurricanes and tropical storms in the US.
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Bloomberg
Supreme Court of Kentucky Holds Plaintiff Can Recover for Stigma Damages in Addition to Repair Costs Resulting From Property Damage
August 15, 2018 —
Gus Sara - The Subrogation StrategistIn Muncie v. Wiesemann, 2018 K.Y. LEXIS 257, the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered whether stigma damages[1] in a property casualty case are recoverable in addition to the costs incurred to remediate the actual damage. The court held that stigma damages are recoverable in addition to repair costs, but the total of the stigma damages and repair costs cannot exceed the diminution in the fair market value of the property. The court’s decision establishes that if the repair costs are insufficient to make the plaintiff whole, a recovery for stigma damages up to the amount of the diminution in the market value of the home is appropriate.
Appellants Cindy and Jim Muncie incurred significant property damage to their home as a result of an oil leak originating from a neighboring property owned by the Estate of Martha Magel. In 2011, Auto Owners Insurance Company (Auto Owners), the liability carrier for the Estate’s testatrix, Patricia Weisman, filed an impleader complaint in federal court to discharge its obligation to settle the third-party liability claims on behalf of Ms. Weisman. Auto Owners reached a settlement with the Muncies for $60,000 which represented the remediation costs for the actual damage to the property. The settlement release reserved the Muncies’ right to pursue a claim for stigma damages associated with the oil leak.
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Gus Sara, White and Williams LLPMr. Sara may be contacted at
sarag@whiteandwilliams.com
Turning Back the Clock: DOL Proposes Previous Davis-Bacon Prevailing Wage Definition
April 19, 2022 —
David Chidlaw & Carina Novell - Sheppard Mullin Construction & Infrastructure Law BlogOn March 11, 2022, the Department of Labor (“DOL”) proposed reverting the definition of “prevailing wage” under the Davis-Bacon Act to a definition used over 40 years ago. According to the DOL, the proposal is meant to modernize the law and “reflect better the needs of workers in the construction industry and planned federal construction investments.”
[1]
Brief History Lesson
The Davis-Bacon Act was enacted in 1931 and requires the payment of locally prevailing wages and fringe benefits on federal construction contracts. The law applies to workers on contracts in excess of $2,000 entered into by federal agencies and the District of Columbia for the construction, alteration, or repair of public buildings or public works.[2]
From the 1930s to the early 1980s, the DOL used the following three-step process to define prevailing wage:
- Any wage rate paid to a majority of workers.
- If there was no wage rate paid to a majority of workers, then the wage rate paid to the greatest number of workers, provided it was paid to at least 30 percent of workers (i.e., the “30 percent rule”).
- If the 30 percent rule was not met, the weighted average rate.
Reprinted courtesy of
David Chidlaw, Sheppard Mullin and
Carina Novell, Sheppard Mullin
Mr. Chidlaw may be contacted at dchidlaw@sheppardmullin.com
Ms. Novell may be contacted at cnovell@sheppardmullin.com
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