Forcible Entry and Detainer Actions: Courts May Not Consider Tenant’s Hardship
December 08, 2016 —
Erica Stutman – Snell & Wilmer Real Estate Litigation BlogIf you own property and a tenant wrongfully refuses to vacate the premises (for example when the lease expires or after proper written notice of termination), you may have a quick and easy remedy to have the tenant removed. Arizona’s forcible entry and detainer (FED) statute allows a person to bring a speedy, summary action to obtain an order that the person must leave the property immediately. See A.R.S. § 12-1171 – 1183. To allow for quick resolution, the only question a court may consider in a FED action is who has the right of possession of the property. A.R.S. § 12-1177(A) (“On the trial of an action of forcible entry or forcible detainer, the only issue shall be the right of actual possession and the merits of title shall not be inquired into.”). Counterclaims and cross-claims are not permitted in a FED action, and must be addressed in a separate civil action between the parties. If factual questions bear on the right of possession, they will also need to be resolved in a regular civil action.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Erica Stutman, Snell & Wilmer Ms. Stutman may be contacted at
estutman@swlaw.com
Washington Court of Appeals Divisions Clash Over Interpretations of the Statute of Repose
August 07, 2023 —
Masaki Yamada & Ryanne Mathisen - Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLCThe construction statute of repose under RCW 4.16.310 bars any claims arising from construction, design, or engineering of any improvement upon real property that has not accrued within six years after substantial completion or termination of services, whichever is later, even if the injury has not yet occurred.
On June 20, 2023, Division One of the Washington Court of Appeals (Div. I) published its decision in
Welch v. Air & Liquid Systems severely criticizing and rejecting the statute of repose reasoning contained in
Maxwell v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 15 Wn. App. 2d 569, 476 P.3d 645 (2020), a Division Two (Div. II) opinion.
More than a mere difference of opinion, the courts in Welch and Maxwell reached different results as to whether claims asserted against Brand Insulations, Inc. were barred by the statute of repose despite involving (i) the same procedural posture, both appeals from summary judgment decisions; (ii) the same facility, Atlantic Richfield Corporation’s (ARCO) petroleum refinery at Cherry Point in Ferndale; (iii) the same activity of installation of asbestos laden insulation on pipes; (iv) the same type of injury, mesothelioma; and (v) application of the same test set forth in Condit v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 101 Wn.2d 106, 676 P.2d 466 (1984).
Reprinted courtesy of
Masaki Yamada, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC and
Ryanne Mathisen, Ahlers Cressman & Sleight PLLC
Mr. Yamada may be contacted at masaki.yamada@acslawyers.com
Ms. Mathisen may be contacted at ryanne.mathisen@acslawyers.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
GRSM Attorneys Selected to 2024 Super Lawyers and Rising Stars Lists
January 14, 2025 —
Gordon Rees Scully MansukhaniSuper Lawyers® has released its 2024 attorney lists across various regions of the United States. This year, 169 Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani attorneys have been selected, with 51 named to Super Lawyers and 118 named to Rising Stars.
*For attorneys licensed to practice in New Jersey: No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Please visit the Super Lawyers Selection Process for a detailed description of the Super Lawyers and Rising Stars selection methodology.
The selections are a result of independent research by the team at Super Lawyers® to determine no more than the top five percent of legal professionals in each geographic region. The research team selects no more than two and a half percent of the lawyers in each geographic region to the Rising Stars list.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani
Despite Misapplying California Law, Federal Court Acknowledges Virus May Cause Physical Alteration to Property
October 26, 2020 —
Scott P. DeVries, Michael S. Levine & Michael L. Huggins - Hunton Insurance Recovery BlogOn August 28, Judge Stephen V. Wilson of the Central District of California, entered the latest ruling in the ongoing saga of the COVID-19 business interruption coverage dispute between celebrity plaintiff’s attorney Mark Geragos and Insurer Travelers.
The case, 10E, LLC v. The Travelers Indemnity Co. of Connecticut, was filed in state court. Travelers removed to federal court, where Geragos sought remand and Travelers moved to dismiss. Judge Wilson denied remand and granted the Motion to Dismiss, finding plaintiff did not satisfactorily allege the actual presence of COVID-19 on insured property or physical damage to its property. This holding is inconsistent with long standing principles of California insurance law and appears to improperly enhance the minimal pleading threshold under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need only allege a claim “that is plausible on its face.”).
After rejecting Geragos’ attempt to have the case remanded based on a finding that Geragos had fraudulently joined a defendant to avoid removal, the Judge proceeded to the Motion to Dismiss which raised three issues: (1) the effect of the Virus Exclusion in the Travelers’ Policy, (2) whether plaintiff failed to allege that the governmental orders prohibited access to its property, and (3) whether plaintiff could “‘plausibly allege that it suffered ‘direct physical loss or damage to property’ as required for civil authority coverage.’” Rather than address the effect of the exclusion, which would be the narrowest issue (this exclusion is not present in all policies), the Court proceeded directly to the third issue, which has the broadest potential application.
Reprinted courtesy of
Scott P. DeVries, Hunton Andrews Kurth,
Michael S. Levine, Hunton Andrews Kurth and
Michael L. Huggins, Hunton Andrews Kurth
Mr. DeVries may be contacted at sdevries@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Levine may be contacted at mlevine@HuntonAK.com
Mr. Huggins may be contacted at mhuggins@HuntonAK.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
California Assembly Passes Expedited Dam Safety for Silicon Valley Act
June 22, 2020 —
Tim Newcomb - Engineering News-RecordIn an effort to move forward a $576 million Anderson Dam Seismic Retrofit Project, the California State Assembly passed AB 3005 on June 8, the Expedited Dam Safety for Silicon Valley Act, facilitating the construction of the project.
Tim Newcomb, Engineering News-Record
ENR may be contacted at ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
Read the full story... Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Plans Go High Tech
April 25, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFOne construction executive described it as “the wave of the future.” What is it? Accessing building plans on an iPad. According to an article in MacWorld, several companies are now offering solutions to distribute and update construction plans on iPads. Changes to plans and notes can be distributed quickly through cloud computing.
Alan Dillon, a senior superintendent at DPR Construction told MacWorld, “I can take my iPad into the field and have my whole set of drawings.” He described a set of drawings for a large construction project as “five or six inches thick.” Danielle Douthet, of Level 10 Construction said it “can help everyone be on the same page more quickly, and make sure that everybody is working off the most current set of documents.”
And it’s not just building plans. Other firms offer building management applications designed to be taken into the field on mobile devices.
Read the full story…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
General Liability Alert: A Mixed Cause of Action with Protected and Non-Protected Activity Not Subject to Anti-SLAPP Motion
February 18, 2015 —
Valerie A. Moore, Lawrence S. Zucker II and Blythe Golay – Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLPIn Baral v. Schnitt (filed 2/5/2015, No. B253620), the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that California’s anti-SLAPP statute does not authorize the striking of allegations of protected activity in a cause of action that also contains meritorious allegations of non-protected activity not within the purview of the statute. In so holding, the court attempted to resolve, or at least add its voice to, the growing conflict among appellate districts on the issue.
A SLAPP lawsuit (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) seeks to chill or punish the exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the government for redress of grievances. California’s Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to permit a defendant to file a special motion to strike as to any cause of action that arises out of an act in furtherance of such rights. In Baral, the plaintiff alleged that his business partner had violated fiduciary duties in usurping the plaintiff’s ownership and management interests in their jointly owned company, so that the defendant could benefit from a secret sale of the company. The complaint alleged that the defendant hired a public accounting firm and prevented the plaintiff from participating in its investigation in order to force the plaintiff's cooperation of the sale of the company. The defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion, seeking to strike all references to the accounting firm's audit. The trial court denied the motion, on the ground that the anti-SLAPP statute applies to causes of action, not allegations.
Reprinted courtesy of Haight Brown & Bonesteel LLP attorneys
Valerie A. Moore,
Lawrence S. Zucker II and
Blythe Golay
Ms. Moore may be contacted at vmoore@hbblaw.com.
Mr. Zucker may be contacted at lzucker@hbblaw.com.
Ms. Golay may be contacted at bgolay@hbblaw.com.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
South Carolina Legislature Redefining Occurrences to Include Construction Defects in CGL Policies
April 01, 2011 —
Beverley BevenFlorez CDJ STAFFThe question of what circumstances must be in place for construction defects to be covered in a general commercial liability (CGL) policies is being raised by the courts and the legislature in South Carolina. The Insurance Journal reports that the American Insurance Association as well as the Property and Casualty Insurers Association of America are speaking out on the issue.
The problem seems to be centered on what defines an “occurrence.” CGL policies were not meant to cover faulty workmanship, according to the filing by the South Carolina Supreme Court. In January of this year, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the ruling in Crossmann Communities v Harleysville Mutual declaring that “Respondents cannot show the damage here was the result of an occurrence. Rather, the damage was a direct result and the natural and expected consequence of faulty workmanship; faulty workmanship did not cause an occurrence resulting in damage.” They focused their attention on the word “accident,” stating that there is a fortuity element that is not diminished.
The South Carolina legislature reacted by producing a bill that would add new language directly negating the ruling by the Supreme Court. The South Carolina bill S-431 would change the definition of an occurrence in regards to construction defects as follows: “For a liability insurance policy issued to a construction professional, an ‘occurrence’ means, at a minimum: (1) an accident; or (2) continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful condition or substance. No additional requirement of a fortuitous event is needed to constitute an ‘occurrence.’”
S-431 is currently residing in the House Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry.
Read the full story...
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
