Maryland Legislation Prohibits Condominium Developers from Shortening Statute of Limitations to Defeat Unit Owner Construction Defect Claims
May 16, 2018 —
Nicholas D. Cowie - Maryland Condo Construction Defect Law BlogNew Maryland legislation prevents developers from shortening the time period within which condominium associations and their unit owner members can assert claims for hidden construction defects in newly constructed condominium communities. The legislation known as HB 77 and SB 258 passed both houses of the Maryland General Assembly and was signed into law by Governor Lawrence J. Hogan on April 24, 2018 (see photo above). Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq. is the author of the legislation, which will be codified as Section 11-134.1 of the Maryland Condominium Act, effective October 1, 2018.
This article discusses how this new legislation ends the practice by which some condominium developers attempted to use condominium documents to shorten the normal statute of limitations in order to prevent condominium associations and their unit owner members from having a fair opportunity to assert their warranty and other legal claims for latent construction defects.
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Nicholas D. Cowie, Esq., Cowie & MottMr. Cowie may be contacted at
ndc@cowiemott.com
Las Vegas Student Housing Developer Will Name Replacement Contractor
February 15, 2018 —
John Guzzon – ENRMore than four months after construction abruptly stopped on a $76-million student housing project for the University of Nevada at Las Vegas, the developer is seeking a new contractor.
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John Guzzon, Engineering News- RecordMr. Guzzon may be contacted at
ENRSouthWestEditor@enr.com
Efficient Proximate Cause Applies to Policy's Collapse Provisions
February 23, 2016 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiThe court applied the efficient proximate cause doctrine to find coverage under a property policy for a building's collapse. Vardanyan v. Amco Ins. Co., 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 1181 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2015).
The insured submitted a claim to Amco for damage to the flooring of the house and for mold. Amco's adjustor reported that the house seemed to be settling, possibly due to a water leak. A structural engineer then inspected and found multiple potential leaks in the roof, gutters in disrepair, downspouts that deposited water at the base of the walls of the house, and evidence that a faucet had been spraying the wall in one area. Water damage was noticed in these areas. Further, the kitchen was water damaged and had past termite infestation.
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
Michigan: Identifying and Exploiting the "Queen Exception" to No-Fault Subrogation
May 13, 2014 —
Robert M. Caplan – White and Williams LLPIn Michigan, an employee’s entitlement to compensation for injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident is governed by both the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act of 1969, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 418.801 et seq., and Chapter 31 of The Insurance Code of 1956, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.3101 et seq., commonly referred to as the “no-fault act.” Polkosnik v. United Canada Ins. Co., 421 N.W.2d 241, 242 (Mich. App. 1988).
PIP1 benefits payable arising from a motor vehicle accident in Michigan include, principally, (1) medical benefits unlimited in amount and duration, and (2) 85% of lost wages for up to three years. See DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE AND FINANCIAL SERVICES, Brief Explanation of Michigan No-Fault Insurance. As of October 2013, lost wages are capped at $5,282 per month. Id. Such benefits constitute an injured worker’s “economic loss.” See generally Wood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 668 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Mich. 2003).
Michigan’s no-fault legislation is no different than other no-fault legislation in regard to its purpose: The automobile insurer pays without any right of reimbursement out of any third party tort recovery. Sibley v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exch., 427 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Mich. 1988). Moreover, just like in New York, for example, “where benefits are provided from other sources pursuant to state or federal law, the amount paid by the other source reduces the automobile insurer’s responsibility.” Id. at 530.
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Robert M. Caplan, White and Williams LLPMr. Caplan may be contacted at
caplanr@whiteandwilliams.com
California Court of Appeal Finds Alleged Inadequate Defense by Insurer-Appointed Defense Counsel Does Not Trigger a Right to Independent Counsel
January 11, 2022 —
Robert Dennison - Traub LiebermanThe California Second District Court of Appeal had occasion to examine an insurer’s duty to provide independent counsel (“Cumis counsel”) to its insured in a declaratory relief action entitled Nede Management, Inc. v. Aspen American Insurance Company. The action arose from a fire on a property covered by an insurance policy issued by Aspen American Ins. Co (“Aspen”). Aspen’s insureds were sued for wrongful death and negligence by tenants and squatters allegedly injured by the fire.
Aspen defended three individual members of the family who owned the property and the family business, Nede Management, Inc. (“Nede”), which managed the property. The defense was subject to reservations of rights on the lack of an obligation to pay any judgment in excess of the $1 million policy limits and no coverage for punitive damages. Aspen appointed defense counsel to defend its insureds. The insureds sought independent counsel based on the assertion that defense counsel appointed by the insurer defended the action inadequately, failed to communicate an initial settlement demand within policy limits and failed to fully investigate the case. Aspen did provide Cumis counsel to Nede for a period but terminated the arrangement after revoking its reservation of rights to that entity. The underlying case eventually settled at no cost to the insureds.
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Robert Dennison, Traub LiebermanMr. Dennison may be contacted at
rdennison@tlsslaw.com
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Rules that Insurance Salesman had No Fiduciary Duty to Policyholders
July 19, 2017 —
Austin D. Moody - Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.On June 20, 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that a life insurance salesman had no fiduciary duty to his customers where the customers retained decision-making authority regarding which policies to purchase. In Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., the Court returned a 4-2 verdict, overturning the lower court’s finding that it was possible that a fiduciary relationship existed between the parties.
The suit arose from a series of transactions between Eugene and Ruth Yenchi and Bryan Holland, a financial advisor for IDS Life Insurance Corporation.
The relationship began when Holland cold-called the Yenchis and asked to meet with them regarding their “financial stuff.” For a fee of $350, Holland met with the Yenchis on several occasions and counseled them regarding their insurance needs. On Holland’s advice, the Yenchis cashed out several existing polices and purchased a whole-life policy for Mr. Yenchi and a deferred variable annuity in Mrs. Yenchi’s name.
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Austin D. Moody, Saxe Doernberger & Vita, P.C.Mr. Moody may be contacted at
adm@sdvlaw.com
Power Point Presentation on Nautilus v. Lexington Case
July 23, 2014 —
Tred R. Eyerly – Insurance Law HawaiiHere is our power point from today's presentation to the Hawaii State Bar Association's Litigation and Insurance Coverage Litigation sections. We discussed "other insurance" clauses as addressed by the Hawaii Supreme Court in Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 132 Haw. 283, 321 P.3d 634 (2014).
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Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law HawaiiMr. Eyerly may be contacted at
te@hawaiilawyer.com
They Say Nothing Lasts Forever, but What If Decommissioning Does?
June 10, 2019 —
Stella Pulman - Gravel2Gavel Construction & Real Estate Law BlogThe looming decommissioning liabilities of offshore energy producers have been a focus of the federal government in recent years. One recent case out of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, Taylor Energy v. United States, highlights the tension between the federal government’s desire to maintain financial security for decommissioning activities, and that of an operator whose security is tied up indefinitely while the government awaits technological advances to allow for safe decommissioning.
The case relates to a trust agreement between Taylor Energy and the United States, established to secure Taylor’s decommissioning liabilities for 28 wells in the Gulf of Mexico. Taylor completed certain decommissioning work for which it was reimbursed by the trust. However, with over $400 million remaining in the trust, Taylor and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) concluded that the ecological benefits of further decommissioning would be outweighed by the ecological risks. But despite recognizing that the limitations of current technology made the environmental impacts of further decommissioning work unjustifiable, the BSEE declined to release Taylor from its decommissioning obligations and instead decided to await “changes in technology and a better understanding of the undersea environment.” Because Taylor’s decommissioning obligations remained in place, the U.S. refused to release the remaining funds in the trust.
Taylor claimed that the United States should release the remaining funds in the trust because “decommissioning the remaining wells is not ‘currently technologically feasible.’” Taylor asserted that Louisiana law applied to the trust agreement, and that under Louisiana law every contract must be completed within an ascertainable term. By holding the trust funds until decommissioning was complete, Taylor argued that the government was essentially holding the funds in perpetuity given the technological infeasibility of completing decommissioning. Taylor also asserted that the agreement was premised on an impossibility (the full decommissioning of the wells), and/or a mutual mistake of the parties (that the wells could be decommissioned).
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Stella Pulman, PillsburyMs. Pulman may be contacted at
stella.pulman@pillsburylaw.com