Do Change Orders Need to be in Writing and Other Things That Might Surprise You
June 02, 2016 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogYou’ve likely heard it before or maybe you’ve even said it yourself: “Go ahead and get started, we’ll get you a change order later.”
The only thing is, “later” never happens, and after you’ve finished performing the work you find yourself in a fight over whether you’re entitled to get paid for the work you performed.
So, do you need a written change order to get paid for extra work you performed? Read on, you may be surprised.
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Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 09, 2011 —
CDJ STAFFIn the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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What Counts as Adequate Opportunity to Cure?
June 13, 2022 —
Christopher G. Hill - Construction Law Musingsqimono @ PixabayHere at Musings, we like to discuss (likely more than readers would like) the fact that in Virginia, the contract is king and its terms will be looked at carefully by the courts. One of those provisions that will be looked at carefully is the so-called “cure period.” The “cure period” is the time that a subcontractor has to fix any non-compliant construction after receiving notice of any deviation from the contract documents that must be fixed.
In United States ex rel Allan Myers VA, Inc. v. Ocean Construction Services, Inc. the federal court for the Eastern District of Virginia examined what it means to grant a proper opportunity to cure. The Ocean Construction Services case arises from a contractual dispute between Allan Myers VA Inc. and Ocean Construction Services Inc., or OCS, involving renovation work performed in sections of Arlington National Cemetery. Presently before the court is Myers’ motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the undisputed facts demonstrate that it was not provided with a three-day cure period, a contractual prerequisite to OCS terminating the subcontract for default.
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The Law Office of Christopher G. HillMr. Hill may be contacted at
chrisghill@constructionlawva.com
Winning Attorney Fees in Litigation as a California Construction Contractor or Subcontractor
December 27, 2021 —
William L. Porter - Porter Law GroupThe General Rule in California: The Winner Does NOT Receive Attorney Fees and Costs:
There is a common misconception that court decisions require the loser in a lawsuit to reimburse the winner for the fees and costs incurred during the lawsuit. Reliance on this misconception in developing a legal strategy for dealing with disputes is a serious strategic error. Where the legal issue is, for example, “breach of contract,” the general rule in California is that there are only two methods by which the winning litigant will be awarded the attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing or defending the lawsuit. The first of these is if the contract in question contains an effective attorney fee clause specifically providing that the prevailing party will recover their attorney fees and costs. The second is if there is a statute on point which provides that the prevailing party will be awarded those fees and costs. The general rule in California is that each party pays their own attorney fees and costs, unless there is an independent legal basis that provides otherwise. This is known as the “American Rule,” used throughout most of the country.
The Issue is Important Because Spending More Money Than You Can Be Awarded is a Losing Strategy:
The importance of whether the prevailing party in a lawsuit will be awarded their fees and costs cannot be underestimated. The party contemplating whether to bring a lawsuit must seriously consider whether it is even worth the trouble. In many cases, unless the one bringing the lawsuit (the “plaintiff”) is entitled to be reimbursed for the considerable attorney fees and costs incurred in bringing the case, it is just not worth doing so. There is no point spending $50,000 on attorneys on a $40,000 claim unless the plaintiff can be awarded both the $40,000 and the $50,000 if the plaintiff wins. Unless fees and costs are awarded, the plaintiff will still be out $10,000 in the very best of cases. For a party sued (the “defendant”) a similar situation arises in that the defendant faces the reality that it may be less expensive to just pay on a frivolous or false claim than to fight it. Either scenario is unsatisfactory. On the whole, it is beneficial to have an attorney fee clause in a contract when either a plaintiff or a defendant must vindicate its rights. Both deserve to be fully compensated to achieve justice. It is also beneficial to have an attorney fee clause in a contract to encourage the one who is at fault to resolve the case rather than risk paying the fees and costs of the other party who is likely to win the case. In either case, the presence of an attorney fee clause facilitates the party in the right and encourages resolution outside of litigation. These are admirable societal goals.
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William L. Porter, Porter Law GroupMr. Porter may be contacted at
bporter@porterlaw.com
Measure of Damages for a Chattel Including Loss of Use
November 16, 2020 —
David Adelstein - Florida Construction Legal UpdatesIn a non-construction case, but an interesting case nonetheless, the Second District Court of Appeals talks about the measure of damages when dealing with chattel (property) including loss of use damages. Chattel, you say? While certainly not a word used in everyday language, a chattel is “an item of tangible movable or immovable property except real estate and things (such as buildings) connected with real property.” Equipment, machinery, personal items, furniture, etc. can be considered chattel.
With respect to the measure of damages for a chattel:
“Where a person is entitled to a judgment for harm to chattels not amounting to a total destruction in value,” the plaintiff may make an election out of two theories of recovery in addition to compensation for the loss of use. Badillo v. Hill, 570 So. 2d 1067, 1068 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 928 (Am. Law Inst. 1939)). In addition to compensation for the loss of use, the plaintiff may elect either “the difference between the value of the chattel before the harm and the value after the harm” or “the reasonable cost of repairs or restoration where feasible, with due allowance for any difference between the original value and the value after repairs.” Id. (quoting Restatement of Torts § 928).
Sack v. WSW Rental of Sarasota, LLC, 45 Fla.L.Weekly D2306a (Fla. 2d DCA 2020).
Sack is a good example of a case dealing with the measure of damages with a chattel, here, an aircraft, including loss of use damages.
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David Adelstein, Kirwin Norris, P.A.Mr. Adelstein may be contacted at
dma@kirwinnorris.com
US-Mexico Border Wall Bids Include Tourist Attraction, Solar Panels
April 05, 2017 —
Engineering News-RecordSAN DIEGO (AP) — Tuesday was the deadline for companies to propose designs for President Donald Trump's border wall with Mexico . U.S. Customs and Border Protection will ask several of the bidders to build prototypes in San Diego . The government won't identify companies until contracts are awarded around June 1 — and even then, only the winners — but some bidders released plans on their own.
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Engineering News-RecordENR may be contacted at
ENR.com@bnpmedia.com
OSHA Extends Temporary Fall Protection Rules
March 01, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFOSHA announced that its current rules on fall protection for residential construction will remain in place until September 15, 2012. The current measures became effective in June 2011. Under the new rules, falls must be prevented by fall protection measures unless the measures can be shown to be unfeasible or even hazardous.
Under the extension of the temporary enforcement measures, contractors who ask for compliance assistance with OSHA are given top priority and penalties can be reduced. OSHA has conducted more than 1,000 outreach sessions on the new rules.
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Federal Courts Keep Chipping Away at the CDC Eviction Moratorium
March 22, 2021 —
Kriston Capps - BloombergIn a March 10 decision, a federal court in Cleveland blocked the national eviction moratorium, making it the second court to challenge the emergency measure implemented under President Donald Trump and extended by the Biden administration. The order clears the way for courts and landlords to resume evictions against tenants across much of Ohio. But the landlord groups who brought the suit believe that the decision could have a broader national application, setting the stage for an earlier-than-anticipated resumption of eviction activity before the ban expires on March 31.
The judge ruled that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which introduced its ban on evictions in September, lacks the authority to enact such a policy. While the court stopped short of issuing an injunction against the CDC ban, its decision goes further than the Texas court that made a similar call late in February.
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Kriston Capps, Bloomberg
