Environmental Justice Legislation Update
May 17, 2021 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelEnvironmental Justice, as an urgent priority of the Federal Government, dates back to 1994, and President Clinton’s issuance of Executive Order 12898. This order directed federal agencies to identify and address, as appropriate, the disproportionately high and adverse human health and environment effects of its many programs, policies and procedures on minority populations and low-income populations. The primary legal basis for this order was Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in particular, Sections 601 and 602, which prohibit discrimination in programs and activities receiving federal financial aid and assistance. Over the years, the Supreme Court has reviewed the scope and importance of Title VI. In Alexander v. Sandoval, decided in 2001, the Court concluded that while private parties could sue to enforce Section 601 or its implementing regulations, as written, Section 601 only prohibits intentional discrimination. Noting that disproportionate impact is not the sole touchstone of invidious racial discrimination. Moreover, the Court also ruled in Sandoval that private parties cannot sue to enforce regulations implementing Section 602. Perhaps as an acknowledgement of these shortcomings, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established an administrative system to process environmental justice complaints at 40 CFR Part 7. Without strengthening the statutory base of environmental justice, the program may continue to be the subject of countless symposiums and seminars. However, this may change soon.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Expired Contract Not Revived Due to Sovereign Immunity and the Ex Contractu Clause
September 15, 2016 —
David R. Cook Jr. – AHHC Construction Law BlogA few months ago, a decision by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc. provided a strict rule for contractors who work with state agencies to determine whether a state agency has waived its sovereign immunity. The issue as framed by the Court was “whether an agency’s waiver of immunity from a breach of contract claim as a result of entering into a written contract remains intact in the event the contract is extended without a written document signed by both parties expressly amending the contract, as required by its terms.”
The case involved a contract executed on March 1, 2012, by a contractor, RTT Associates, Inc. (RTT), and the Georgia Department of Labor (DOL), whereby RTT was to develop certain computer software for the DOL by the completion date, June 30, 2012. The contract required that amendments be in writing and fully executed by both parties. Time was of the essence and RTT’s obligation under the contract survived the expiration or termination of the contract.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
David R. Cook Jr., Autry, Hanrahan, Hall & Cook, LLPMr. Cook may be contacted at
cook@ahclaw.com
Energy Efficiency Ratings Aren’t Actually Predicting Energy Efficiency
February 07, 2022 —
Ryan Hesketh - BloombergThere’s a secret dogging British buildings with some of the most coveted environmental ratings: On paper they’re green, but scratch the surface and they’re red hot. Buildings that have received the highest rating in the U.K. — an A Energy Performance Certificate — use more energy than some of their peers rated C, D, E or even F.
This disparity between how buildings are designed and what their actual emissions are is widespread in the U.K., according to recent findings from the Better Buildings Partnership, which analyzed 2020 self-reported energy data provided for more than 1,100 commercial properties.
It found that commercial buildings regularly use more energy than their sterling eco-friendly labels would suggest. In fact, the analysis finds, the ratings are so far off that the median energy intensity for all B-rated buildings is higher than for C-rated buildings.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Ryan Hesketh, Bloomberg
OIRA Best Practices for Administrative Enforcement and Adjudicative Actions
November 23, 2020 —
Anthony B. Cavender - Gravel2GavelOn March 2, 2020, the Environmental Protection Agency revised its “On-Site Civil Inspection Procedures” in accordance with Executive Order 13892 . (The rules are located at 40 CFR Part 31.) These rules set forth the components of an appropriate inspection procedure. Briefly, the rules require that, after the inspector’s credential are made available, the object of the inspection will be discussed (and most inspections will be held during regular working hours), consent to enter must be obtained, there should be an opening and a closing conference with facility representatives, safety protocols must be observed, confidential business information must be protected, and there will be an opportunity for split sampling. Once the report is completed, it will be shared with the facility.
A few months later, on August 31, 2020, the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) circulated a memo to the heads of all federal agencies to implement the principles of fairness in administrative enforcement and adjudication. This directive implements Executive Order 13924, and includes a comprehensive list of “best practices” that should be employed in their administrative enforcement and adjudicative actions. Briefly, these best practices (which are framed in broad terms) are:
1. The government has the burden of proving a violation of the rules or other authorities;
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Anthony B. Cavender, PillsburyMr. Cavender may be contacted at
anthony.cavender@pillsburylaw.com
Crane Firm Pulled Off NYC Projects Following Multiple Incidents
October 07, 2019 —
Jeff Rubenstone - Engineering News-RecordFollowing a partial crane collapse at a site on Manhattan’s Lower East Side and a fatality in April on a jobsite in lower Manhattan, the New York City Dept. of Buildings announced on Aug. 12 that it is suspending United Crane & Rigging’s work on 21 construction sites across the city.
Jeff Rubenstone, Engineering News-Record
Mr. Rubenstone may be contacted at rubenstonej@enr.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Toxic Drywall Not Covered Under Homeowner’s Policy
March 28, 2012 —
CDJ STAFFThe Duphuys of Baton Rouge Louisiana found themselves needing to argue both sides of an issue, according to the judge in Duphuy v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. The Duphuys alleged that the drywall in their home “emits odorous gases that cause damage to air-condition and refrigerator coils, copper tubing, electrical wiring, computer wiring, and other household items.” Additionally, they reported damage to “their home’s insulation, trimwork, floors, cabinets, carpets, and other items” which they maintained were “covered under the ‘ensuing loss’ portion of their policy.”
Their insurer declined coverage, stating that the damages were not a “direct, physical loss,” and even if they were “four different exclusions independently exclude coverage, even if such loss occurred.” The policy excludes defective building materials, latent defects, pollutants, and corrosion damage. The court noted that “ambiguities in policy exclusions are construed to afford coverage to the insured.”
The court did determine that the Duphuys were not in “a situation where the plaintiffs caused the risk for which they now seek coverage.” The judge cited an earlier case, In re Chinese Drywall, “a case with substantially similar facts and construing the same policy” and in that case, “property damage” was determined to “include the loss of use of tangible property.” The court’s conclusion was that the Duphuys “suffered a direct, physical loss triggering coverage under their policy.”
Unfortunately for the Duphuys, at this point the judge noted that while they had a “direct, physical loss,” the exclusions put them “in the tough predicament of claiming the drywall is neither defective nor its off-gassing corrosive or a pollutant, but nonetheless damage-causing.”
In the earlier Chinese Drywall case, the judge found that “faulty and defective materials” “constitutes a physical thing tainted by imperfection or impairment.” The case “found the drywall served its intended purpose as a room divider and insulator but nonetheless qualified under the exclusion, analogizing the drywall to building components containing asbestos that courts have previously determined fit under the same exclusion.” In the current case, the judge concluded that the drywall was “outside the realm of coverage under the policy.”
The court also found that it had to apply the corrosion exclusion, noting that the plaintiffs tried to evade this by stating, “simplistically and somewhat disingenuously, that the damage is not caused by corrosion but by the drywall itself.” The plaintiffs are, however, parties to another Chinese drywall case, Payton v. Knauf Gips KG, in which “they directly alleged that ‘sulfides and other noxious gases, such as those emitted from [Chinese] drywall, cause corrosion and damage to personal property.’” As the court pointed out, the Duphuys could not claim in one case that the corrosion was caused by gases emitted by the drywall and in another claim it was the drywall itself. “They hope their more ambiguous allegations will be resolved in their favor and unlock the doors to discovery.”
The court quickly noted that “the remaining damage allegations are too vague and conclusory to construe” and permitted “exploration of the latent defect and pollution exclusions.”
The judge concluded that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient facts to establish coverage under the ensuing loss provision, stating that the “plaintiffs must allege, at the very least, how the drywall causes damage to the trimwork, carpet, etc., not simply that it does so.” Given the court’s determinations in the case, the plaintiffs’ motion was dismissed.
Read the court’s decision…
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Design Professional Liens: A Blueprint
March 12, 2015 —
Garret Murai – California Construction Law BlogIf you work in the construction industry in California you’re likely familiar with
mechanics liens.
But there’s one other type of lien available on construction projects in California: The design professional lien.
So, here’s a blueprint of what you need to know.
What is a design professional lien?
A design professional lien, like a mechanics lien, creates a security interest in real property for services rendered by a design professional prior to commencement of construction. If the design professional is not paid, the design professional can file a lawsuit to foreclose on the design professional lien to have the property sold and the proceeds from the sale used to satisfy the amount of the design professional lien.
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
Garret Murai, Wendel Rosen Black & Dean LLPMr. Murai may be contacted at
gmurai@wendel.com
Gillotti v. Stewart (2017) 2017 WL 1488711 Rejects Liberty Mutual, Holding Once Again that the Right to Repair Act is the Exclusive Remedy for Construction Defect Claims
June 05, 2017 —
Richard H. Glucksman, Esq. & Chelsea L. Zwart, Esq. - Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger BulletinBackground
In Gillotti v. Stewart (April 26, 2017) 2017 WL 1488711, which was ordered to be published on May 18, 2017, the defendant grading subcontractor added soil over tree roots to level the driveway on the plaintiff homeowner’s sloped lot. The homeowner sued the grading subcontractor under the California Right to Repair Act (Civil Code §§ 895, et seq.) claiming that the subcontractor’s work damaged the trees.
After the jury found the subcontractor was not negligent, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the subcontractor. The homeowner appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly construed the Right to Repair Act as barring a common law negligence theory against the subcontractor and erred in failing to follow Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Brookfield Crystal Cove LLC (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 98. The Third District Court of Appeal disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of the subcontractor.
Impact
This is the second time the Third District Court of Appeal has held that Liberty Mutual (discussed below) was wrongly decided and held that the Right to Repair Act is the exclusive remedy for construction defect claims. The decision follows its holding in Elliott Homes, Inc. v. Superior Court (Hicks) (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 333, in which the Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act’s pre-litigation procedures apply when homeowners plead construction defect claims based on common law causes of action, as opposed to violations of the building standards set forth in the Right to Repair Act. Elliott is currently on hold at the California Supreme Court, pending the decision in McMillin Albany, LLC v. Superior Court (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1132, wherein Liberty Mutual was rejected for the first time by the Fifth District. CGDRB continues to follow developments regarding the much anticipated McMillin decision closely, as well as all related matters.
Discussion
The Right to Repair Act makes contractors and subcontractors not involved in home sales liable for construction defects only if the homeowner proves they negligently cause the violation in whole or part (Civil Code §§ 911(b), 936). As such, the trial court in Gillotti instructed the jury on negligence with respect to the grading subcontractor. The jury found that while the construction did violate some of the Right to Repair’s building standards alleged by the homeowner, the subcontractor was not negligent in anyway. After the jury verdict, the trial court found in favor of the grading subcontractor.
The homeowner moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial on the grounds that the trial court improperly barred a common law negligence theory against the grading subcontractor. The trial court denied the motions on the grounds that “[t]he Right to Repair Act specifically provides that no other causes of action are allowed. See Civil Code § 943.” The trial court specifically noted that its decision conflicted with Liberty Mutual, in which the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that the Right to Repair Act does not eliminate common law rights and remedies where actual damage has occurred, stating that Liberty Mutual was wrongly decided and that the Liberty Mutual court was naïve in its assumptions regarding the legislative history of the Right to Repair Act.
In Gillotti, the Third District Court of Appeal stated that the Liberty Mutual court failed to analyze the language of Civil Code § 896, which “clearly and unequivocally expresses the legislative intent that the Act apply to all action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, residential construction, except as specifically set forth in the Act. The Act does not specifically except actions arising from actual damages. To the contrary, it authorizes recovery of damages, e.g., for ‘the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards....’ ([Civil Code] § 944).”
The Court also disagreed with Liberty Mutual’s view that because Civil Code §§ 931 and 943 acknowledge exceptions to the Right to Repair Act’s statutory remedies, the Act does not preclude common law claims for damages due to defects identified in the Act. The Court stated: “Neither list of exceptions, in section 943 or in section 931, includes common law causes of action such as negligence. If the Legislature had intended to make such a wide-ranging exception to the restrictive language of the first sentence of section 943, we would have expected it to do so expressly.”
Additionally, the Court of Appeal rejected the argument that Civil Code § 897 preserves a common law negligence claims for violation of standards not listed in Civil Code § 986. It explained that the section of Civil Code § 897, which provides, “The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure,” expresses the legislative intent that the Right to Repair Act be all-encompassing. Anything inadvertently omitted is actionable under the Act if it causes damage. Any exceptions to the Act are made expressly through Civil Code §§ 931 and 934. The Court concluded in no uncertain terms that the Right to Repair Act precludes common law claims in cases for damages covered by the Act.
The homeowner further argued that she was not precluded from bringing a common law claim because a tree is not a “structure,” and therefore the alleged tree damage did not fall within the realm of the Right to Repair. The Court of Appeal also rejected this argument, holding that while the tree damage itself was not expressly covered, the act of adding soil to make the driveway level (which caused the damage) implicated the standards covered by the Right to Repair Act. The Court explained that since under the Act a “structure” includes “improvement located upon a lot or within a common area” (Civil Code § 895(a)), as the driveway was an improvement upon the lot, the claim was within the purview of the Right to Repair Act. As the soil, a component of the driveway, caused damage (to the trees), it was actionable under the Act.
Reprinted courtesy of
Richard H. Glucksman, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger and
Chelsea L. Zwart, Chapman Glucksman Dean Roeb & Barger
Mr. Glucksman may be contacted at rglucksman@cgdrblaw.com
Ms. Zwart may be contacted at czwart@cgdrblaw.com
Read the court decisionRead the full story...Reprinted courtesy of
